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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 88

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

'VODK' COMMUNIQUE CLAIMS VICTORIES OVER SRV INVADERS

OW191958 Beijing XINHUA in English 1636 GMT 19 May 80

[Text] Beijing, 19 May (XINHUA)--The Democratic Kampuchean Government in a press communique broadcast by Radio Democratic Kampuchea today summed up and analysed the present political situation in Kampuchea.

The communique said: During the dry season in 1979-1980, the Kampuchean troops, guerrillas and people defeated the offensives launched by the Le Duan clique of Vietnam in an attempt to eliminate the Kampuchean nation. The victory was due to the valiant struggle put up against the Vietnamese aggressors by the Kampuchean Army and people imbued with strong patriotism and revolutionary heroism, due to the increasing support by various peoples and governments of the world, and due to the political program and new strategic political line of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of the great national union of Kampuchea.

The communique stressed: The Democratic Kampuchean Government has unhesitatingly drawn useful lessons from both the positive and negative aspects of its work and improved it.

The communique called on the Kampuchean army and people to carry out the political program of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of the great national union of Kampuchean and to win greater victory.

CSO: 4020

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

'XINHUA' REPORTS DECLINE IN U.S. PRODUCTION

OW171816 Beijing XINHUA in English 1559 GMT 17 May 80

[Text] Beijing, 17 May (XINHUA)--United States industrial production slowed down dramatically in April, recording its largest drop in more than five years. This shows that the economic recession in the U.S. is deepening.

The Federal Reserve Board said yesterday industrial production plunged 1.9 per cent last month, marking the largest falloff since February of 1975.

The sharpest production decline was registered in the automobile industry. Automobiles were assembled at an annual rate of 6 million--15 per cent below March's level and 30 per cent below the rate for the first six months of last year.

Reductions in April were widespread, encompassing virtually every facet of American factory output.

Output of durable goods dropped 5.2 per cent. Output of construction materials plummeted 2.6 per cent. Production of steel and other raw materials fell 2.3 per cent. Further reductions occurred in the output of non-durable goods, business equipment, textiles and chemicals.

The overall index stood at 148.5 in April (take 1967 as 100), down 2.9 per cent from its peak in March 1979.

The situation of the construction industry--another important industrial sector in U.S.--is not encouraging either. According to the Commerce Department, housing units slipped 2.1 per cent in April to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 1,019,000 units and 41.8 per cent below the rate of the same month last year.

Permits for new housing units were issued in April at a rate of 14.2 per cent below the rate for March and 47.3 per cent below the rate of a year earlier.

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT says in an article entitled "As Recession's Toll Spreads Across U.S. in its latest issue, "From Whittier, Calif., to Philadelphia and from the Dakotas to Florida, the sting of the economic downturn is increasingly being felt." "The question is no longer if the country is in a recession--but how bad it will be," the article says.

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

MARCOS, TINSULANON CALL FOR ASEAN SUMMIT ON KAMPUCHEA

OW161640 Beijing XINHUA in English 1609 GMT 16 May 80

[Text] Manila, 16 May (XINHUA)--Both Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon and Filipino President Marcos emphasized on the unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea at a joint press conference by the two leaders here this morning.

The two leaders also hoped that a summit meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should be held to tackle the Kampuchea problem.

Speaking at the conference held at the end of his official visit to the Philippines, Prem Tinsulanon said, "There has been no substantive change in our insistence of a total withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea, the right of self-determination for the Kampuchean people, and the establishment of a neutral and independent Kampuchea."

He also said that the settlement of the Kampuchea problem as well as the dialogue between Thailand and Vietnam should be dealt with on the basis of the United Nations General Assembly resolution and the joint ASEAN-EEC statement on political issues, which, he said "provide the most reasonable framework for correcting the present Kampuchean anomaly."

The prime minister pointed out that the current political and security situation in the region has arisen "through no doings of our own."

"In order to prevent the Kampuchean armed conflict from becoming a widened conflagration with disastrous consequences for all," he said, "ASEAN shares a great responsibility in realising a political settlement which is both viable and just."

Answering a question about whether Thailand is determined to defend itself from foreign invasion, he said, "We are ready to preserve and safeguard our sovereignty and territorial integrity."

Asked about the statement by Vietnamese foreign minister that the Kampuchean situation is "irreversible," the Thai prime minister said that the view expressed by Vietnamese foreign minister "is his own and is not consistent with ours."

President Marcos told newsmen that the complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea "is the principle which has been adopted by ASEAN unanimously."

The president also rejected the position of so-called "compromise" and "partial withdrawal" of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. "That is not the position of ASEAN," he said, "because the position of ASEAN is on a principle. The principle is that of no interventionism."

He stressed that there will be no compromise, "so long as one country is intervening in the internal affairs of another country." He said that he will never accept a partial withdrawal of foreign troops if his country were invaded, "because the principle is there and it cannot be fragmented or divided."

The two leaders shared the opinion that perhaps "the time has arrived for a summit of heads of government of the ASEAN countries so that they may exchange views and consult with each other on the matters."

Thai prime minister said, "The president and I have agreed to consult with the other ASEAN heads of government on this matter."

The two leaders also discussed the issues of strengthening bilateral relations between the two countries and further consolidating the ASEAN. It was announced that the President and Mrs Marcos have accepted the invitation from the Thai prime minister to visit Thailand "at their convenience."

The Thai prime minister arrived here yesterday afternoon and left for home this afternoon after a busily-arranged visit.

CSO: 4020

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THAI PREMIER RETURNS FROM PHILIPPINE VISIT

OW161934 Beijing XINHUA in English 1903 GMT 16 May 80

[Text] Bangkok, 16 May (XINHUA)--"The Thai Government will not change its foreign policy," stressed Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon at a press conference here this evening upon arrival from a two-day visit to the Philippines.

Prem briefed newsmen on the problems he had discussed with Philippine President Marcos including Kampuchea, refugees and ASEAN's internal affairs. On the Kampuchea problem, he said, Thailand and the Philippines still keep to their former stand. The two leaders were of the identical view that the holding of an ASEAN summit meeting is necessary.

He said: "I have affirmed to President Marcos that the Thai Government will not change its foreign policy, with which he was very satisfied."

He went on to say that "President Marcos had stressed at each of the talks that Thailand is a frontline country whose stability will surely influence that of the other ASEAN countries."

In reference to the visit to his country by Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach tomorrow, Prime Minister Prem said that the negotiations with Vietnam should be conducted "on the basis of the ASEAN's stand."

He fully subscribed to the decision taken by the Thai Olympic Committee today that it will not send its athletes to Moscow where the International Olympic Games will be held.

CSO: 4020

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

LENIN'S POLICY OF FOREIGN CONCESSIONS JUSTIFIED

Beijing SHIJIE LISHI [WORLD HISTORY] in Chinese No 1, 2 Feb 80 pp 14-25

[Article by Wen Yi (5113 0001): "Lenin and Soviet Russia's Policy of Concessions"]

[Text] To shift the focus of the work of the whole party to socialist economic construction after the victory of the October Revolution, Lenin time and again thought of the need to adopt a policy of concessions during the transition period of economy recovery. He first raised this question in 1918¹. In May of the same year, he wrote a letter to an American firm enclosing a copy of "Plans for the Development of Economic Relations between Soviet Russia and the United States of America," which was prepared by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade under the supreme Council of the National Economy. The plans mentioned that through concessions, the United States and some other countries could participate in mining, in developing the hydropower resources of eastern Siberia, and in constructing railroads and waterways.² On 3 July, the Council of People's Commissars drafted the "Outline" of conditions for attracting foreign capital. On 23 November 1920, the Council of People's Commissars formally promulgated the "Concessions Laws,"³ and this policy was affirmed by the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) held in March 1921. The Congress also adopted a resolution entitled "The Soviet Republics Besieged by Capitalism."⁴ By the second half of 1921, when the enforcement of the New Economic Policy began, the system of concessions was practiced as "a typical form of state capitalism."⁵

Thus this policy, personally worked out by Lenin, was implemented for more than 10 years--from 1912, when the first concession treaty was signed, to 1937, when these treaties were totally abrogated. This policy, when first proposed by Lenin, provoked heated debate with the Bolshevik Party and brought strong repercussions among the worker-peasant masses. Lenin took great pains to convince the broad masses of party members and people of the necessity and feasibility of implementing this policy.

It should be pointed out that the concessions policy did promote the recovery of the Soviet national economy, particularly in the fuel and mining

industries and in communications-transportation during the enforcement of the New Economic Policy and the early stage of Soviet industrialization. In smashing the economic blockade imposed on Soviet Russia by the capitalist world and in winning a fairly long spell of peace for economic construction, the concessions policy was undoubtedly an important strategic measure. Yet there has hitherto rarely been any serious research on this subject in historical works, and evaluations of this policy, either complimentary or derogatory, have been strikingly different. Some have held that since this policy was not implemented for a long enough period, "large-scale development was impossible."⁶ Others have deliberately ignored the economic effects of this policy and have confined their observations to the negligible part it played in the entire national economy. Still others have held that "there has been a vast difference between forecasts and facts concerning the success of the concessions policy in the development of our advanced industrial technology."⁷ It is my opinion that we should conduct a concrete analysis on the implementation of the concessions policy in various departments of the national economy according to the historical conditions then existing, before we can have a comprehensive and accurate understanding of this important policy worked out by Lenin himself.

"Concessions--Brest-Litovsk Treaty"

From the time Lenin first proposed the concessions policy until 1922, all bourgeois periodicals were full of articles on capitalist restoration in Soviet Russia. The French bourgeoisie called it "the beginning of the end of the stupid socialist experiment."⁸ LE NOUVEAU of France openly declared: "All people (including Bolsheviks and Lloyd George) now agree that the Soviet system will soon be finished. Their only disagreement is on the date and some minor issues."⁹ Inside the Bolshevik camp, Trotsky said that "the cockoo has cooed," and that the destruction of the Soviet political power could not be far away.¹⁰ In VPERYOD of the Mensheviks, someone slandered the policy of concessions as a capitulation to capitalism and an admission of defeat. Others even claimed that the signing of a concessions treaty was tantamount to the signing of a "second Brest-Litovsk Treaty."¹¹

To all these charges, Lenin gave a forthright answer: "Communist Party members understand that concessions are like a Brest-Litovsk Treaty which we must sign because of the damage being suffered by a country with a majority of peasants."¹² Like Brest-Litovsk Treaty, concessions were indeed a type of compromise with the capitalist world on the part of the Soviet Russia. However, it was a practical way to accelerate the recovery of the national economy under the conditions then existing. As pointed out at the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), "concessions are essentially a form of economic agreement between the socialist republics and more industrially developed capitalist countries. At the same time, they should also be a powerful means of developing

"productive forces in the Soviet republics and consolidating the socialist economic base in the republics."¹³

Like the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, Soviet Russia's negotiations on concessions and the signing of the treaties were based on very sound principles, under which neither abandonment of the fruits of the October Revolution nor capitalist restoration would be permitted. The Conditions (Outline) for Absorbing Foreign Capital adopted by the Council of People's Commissars on 20 July 1918 particularly stressed these points: first, the Soviet Government's dominance in the national economy must be guaranteed; second, supervision must be exercised over the concessionaires; third, the location of the enterprises under concession must not become foreign spheres of influence; fourth, foreign capitalists inside Soviet Russia must abide by all Soviet laws (including special industrial and trade laws); fifth, the Soviet Government enjoys priority in the purchase of goods produced by the enterprises under concessions; and sixth, the Soviet republics reserve the right to repossess the enterprises under concession ahead of schedule.¹⁴ Subsequently, this principle was reiterated in the laws on concessions. The most significant point was that the Soviet political power remained the owner, with the authority to grant concessions on certain enterprises according to the requirements of the proletariat, and at the same time to repossess those enterprises as required under the above-mentioned conditions. Therefore, in the concession treaties, it was usually stipulated clearly that, aside from circulating funds and profits, all the property in the enterprises under concession belonged to the Soviet Government; that the concessionaires must complete specific production plans; that they must import machinery equipment and recruit experts and skilled workers from abroad; that they must improve the living conditions of the workers of the concession enterprises; and that after the expiration of the concession treaties, all structures of the enterprises (including those newly built by the concessionaires) and all equipment would belong to the Soviet Government. Of course, in an attempt to absorb foreign capital, the Soviet political power had to give way to some extent. For example, the 1923 treaty with the Germans on the "Mologa Timber Company" stipulated that the German concessionaires had the right to use more than 1 million hectares of forests and to obtain timber from 5,000 Russian *mu* (109 hectares) annually. However, that enterprise had to make the following commitments: first, to build one or several saw mills within two years; second, to commission several chemical plants to process tree roots; and third, to complete the construction of a railroad for transportation in the timberland.¹⁵ Again, according to the treaty with America and England concerning the "Lens Goldfield Company," the concessionaires could extract gold, copper, and other ferrous metals from the rich mines in the Lens area; import equipment and building materials tax free; and recruit experts and workers from abroad. On the other hand, the concessionaires had to guarantee: (1) that a plant would be built in the Altai region to extract and smelt copper, aluminum, and zinc; (2) that a new copper-smelting plant would be built in the Urals; (3) that

the present complex of metallurgical plants for nonferrous metals would be renovated; and (4) that mechanization would be carried out for the extraction of gold in the gold-producing area along the Lena River.¹⁶

The important principle worked out by Lenin concerning concession treaties remained in force even after his death. For example, an agreement was signed in 1927 as a supplement to a treaty signed by Lenin in his lifetime with the "Swedish Ball Bearing Corporation." According to this agreement, the Swedish concessionaire had to increase the production of ball bearings in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government permitted the concessionaires to sell ball bearings and import machinery equipment up to the value of 1.5 million gold rubles each year, while the concessionaires had to use modern equipment for production of ball bearings.¹⁷ Again, the "Chiaturi Manganese Mine Concession Treaty" with the U.S. Harriman Company included these conditions for both sides: while enjoying the right to exploit 12,492 acres of manganese mines with a deposit of about 80 million tons, the concessionaire had to invest 4 million dollars on prospecting and on new equipment for the mines.¹⁸

From the contents of the several concession treaties mentioned above, we can see that in order to absorb foreign capital to speed up national economic recovery, certain advantages had to be given to the capitalist concessionaires. However, these advantages were limited. In August 1921, Lenin was in constant touch with the negotiations with the Swedish Ball Bearing Corporation. On one occasion, he gave the Supreme Council of the National Economy, which was in charge of the negotiations, this directive: "For this benefit, we must never make any concessions against the following principles: We are the owners of the repossessed and nationalized enterprises and warehouses. They (meaning the Swedish concessionaires--author) can possess these enterprises and warehouses only through formal purchase procedures. We may sometimes make some concessions by selling these enterprises and warehouses to them at low prices, but we must not at any time compromise on the question of ownership."¹⁹ It was on the question of ownership that fierce debates took place between the Soviet political power under the leadership of Lenin and those capitalists who had acquired the concession rights. On the eve of the Genoa Conference in April 1922, a foreign newspaper revealed that some French capitalists might accept concessions from the Soviet political power, on condition that the Caucasus, Baku, the Donets Basin, and the Urals should become their privileged regions.²⁰ During the Genoa Conference, Chicherin, people's commissar of foreign affairs, expounded the general principles behind the Soviet Government's concessions policy. The French foreign minister openly derided him and took an antagonistic and negative attitude toward the Soviet political power.²¹ In September 1922, the representatives of some of the largest petroleum companies in the West and some Tsarist capitalists who had been deprived of their property held a meeting in Paris and openly united to oppose the Soviet Government's concessions policy. They adopted a resolution stating that the Soviet Government must not be permitted to plunder the property of other entrepreneurs. Their condition for accepting

the concession treaty was that the Soviet Government should return all their property to them, and they even threatened that without their concurrence, nobody could unilaterally accept any oil concessions from the Soviet Government.²² Apart from this, we understand that quite a lot of negotiations with the Soviet Government and Urquhardt encountered the same problem. Before the October Revolution, some British corporations headed by Urquhardt, a big capitalist, controlled most of the mining and ferrous metal industries in the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. In the course of the negotiations, Urquhardt not only wanted the concession rights over all the enterprises which formerly belonged to these corporations, but also insisted that the Soviet Government make compensations of up to 27 million rubles for the "losses" from the nationalization of the enterprises.²³ In this connection, Lenin sharply pointed out that such concessions would only set a precedent for those capitalists who tried to recover their lost paradise. The above attitude shown by the big foreign capitalists toward the Soviet Government's concessions policy clearly indicated, in a negative way, that this policy was a proletarian one. It was true that concessions constituted a second Brest-Litovsk Treaty, but this was so in a revolutionary sense.

When Lenin and Soviet Russia formulated and implemented the concessions policy, they first had in mind the concessions of the northern forest area, the oil concessions in Baku and Grozny, including the transportation facilities of the northern railroads, and the mining concessions in the Altai and the Urals. They intended to use these concessions as a means of breaking the economic blockade imposed by the capitalist countries and of speeding up the recovery of the entire national economy.

The concession of the northern railroads was made mainly for the purpose of forming a direct transportation line to Murmansk in order to exploit the northern forest areas for processing and export. This was how things stood in February 1919, when the concessions law had not yet been officially announced. The Council of People's Commissars had already agreed to this concession in principle; however, because of the bankruptcy of a Norwegian capitalist who was a concessionaire, the closing of the enterprises, and some other problems, the concession did not materialize. As to transportation facilities, including the railroads and water transport, the Soviet Government during the negotiations also raised the question of the concessionaire's responsibility for transportation in the areas around the enterprises. This was clearly stipulated in the concession treaty when it was signed. The oil concessions in Baku and Grozny were necessitated by the urgent need to end the fuel crisis. In 1920 the General Oil Control Bureau reported that, of the 3,500 oil wells in Baku, only 960 could be worked on in 1920, and that operation of many wells could not be started because of water accumulation in the wells. The water could not

be drained out, mainly because of inadequate technical personnel. Therefore, the report concluded, the solution to this problem was to import foreign technology and the rational use of their own technical staff.²⁴ At that time, Krassin, people's commissioner of foreign trade, proposed: "Is it possible to quickly change the present situation with the method of concessions? It is possible, although it calls for great courage and a firm concessions...."²⁵ Lenin read this report carefully, and seriously considered the problem. The Council of People's Commissars adopted its resolution on the concession of oilfields in Baku and Groznyy on 1 February 1921, and directed that a committee enjoying the highest prestige be organized to go to study the situation in Baku and Groznyy. At the same time, Stalin was entrusted with the task of going to explain to the people in these regions the great significance of these oil concessions, so that they would understand that this was an important means for speedy recovery of the national economy and for the consolidation of Soviet political power. Furthermore, the Supreme Council of the National Economy was charged with the task of drawing up specific drafts for the concessions.²⁶ Based on these drafts, Lenin, after making some revisions, worked out 10 main principles in March. Then on 11 April 1921, he personally explained and elucidated these 10 principles, one by one, at a meeting of the Communist Group of Trade Unions.²⁷

The question of the northern forest area concessions was highly regarded by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, and was the most significant of all the concessions granted by the Soviet Government. In the mid-1920's, 25 percent of the timber exported from the northern forest areas was produced by the concession enterprises, and the timber industry belonged to a department well known for the quick turnover of its funds. The timber concessions also absorbed a great deal of foreign capital. For example, among the large concession enterprises for timber at that time were the "Mologa Timber Company," the "Russo-British Timber Company," the Russo-Dutch Timber Company, and the "Russo-Norwegian Timber Company." By the middle of 1925, the total foreign investment in these concessions amounted to 30 million rubles, of which 14 million rubles were in forest concessions.²⁸ The development of timber concessions enabled the Soviet Government to overcome the fuel crisis with the increase in timber and to export timber in exchange for industrial machinery, which was then very scarce in the country.

Lenin had thought to the mining concessions as the foundation for developing modern large-scale industry, which could not be achieved by relying on handicrafts as they had done in the past. Therefore, the concession enterprises decided on the Soviet Government included the Sakhalin coal concessions (to the Sinclair Exploration Company of the United States), the Chiatauri Manganese Concession (to Harriman & Company of the United States), the Lena Goldfield Concession (to England and the United States) and the lead, zinc, and other ferrous metal concessions in the Urals.

From the early 1920's to the early 1930's, the ratio of concessions in the mining industry had to be a little higher than in other industries. For example, 30 percent of the total output value by all concession enterprises and the total labor power required by them belonged to the mining industry. From 1927 to 1928, the number of concession enterprises engaged in lead mining amounted to 62.2 percent; those engaged in manganese mining, about 40 percent; and those engaged in copper mining, 11.8 percent.²⁹

From this, we can see that when Lenin decided on a "highly courageous and firm concession policy," he invariably proceeded from the interests of the proletariat and had in mind the urgent need for the development of the Soviet industry. In all the concession treaties and in practice, Lenin particularly stressed two points: first, the need to use the concessions to learn advanced technology and advanced industrial and economic management. Once these goals were achieved, the Soviet Government would grant no more concessions. In a letter to the People's Economic Commissariat under the Council of People's Commissars on 23 November 1921, he directed the negotiators to especially consider: "Will it specifically guarantee that our people can learn business organization methods? Will it specifically guarantee that as soon as our stupid people have learned from the clever people, the concessions can be abolished ahead of schedule?"³⁰ Secondly, Lenin invariably stressed the need for the negotiators to "bargain" with the foreign merchants. The purpose was to really improve the workers' living conditions through these concessions. Speaking of the concessions question at a plenary session of the Moscow Soviet on 10 November 1922, Lenin particularly pointed out: "The enemy (referring to the foreign capitalists who took part in the negotiations on concessions--author) will certainly bargain and will never forget to bargain, and the purpose of their bargaining is to gain the upper hand. We should not forget to do the same thing ourselves, because we must have no illusions that the traders from other places have become good people and will then offer us benefits for nothing in return. This will never happen. What we should expect of our people is that, accustomed to resistance and having stood up, they should have the skill to do business, to make money, and to get rid of the difficult economic conditions."³¹ Of course, in granting concessions to foreign capitalists, these capitalists should be permitted to make money, even above-quota profits. As Lenin said in his report to the Third Congress of the Communist International, this was the "tribute" paid to the capitalists by the proletariat for its own complete victory. For example, in the several years after 1921 the average profits

of the Soviet state industry was 15 percent but those of the concession enterprises were much higher. Again, the profits earned by the above-mentioned "Swedish Ball Bearing Corporation" from 1925 to 1930 totaled 11 million gold rubles.³² However, according to the concession treaties, the Soviet Government had to deduct a certain percentage, generally 2 percent. Lenin gave a careful analysis of this 2 percent. He said: "This 2 percent means something, when we have nothing at all. If we take 20,000 square miles out of 1 million square miles and use it to trade with the peasants, then we can provide part of the products needed by the workers."³³

"Concessions--Open a Small Window"

According to statistics compiled by Maurice Dobb, a well-known British economist, the total amount of foreign investments in the national economy of Soviet Russia during the several years of implementation of the concessions policy was 10 million gold rubles.³⁴ In meeting the need for industrial recovery at that time, this figure was very insignificant. By 1 October 1927, the total amount of foreign investment had reached 12.2 million rubles--80 percent of which came from the following countries: England, 14.6 million rubles; the United States, 12.3 million rubles; Germany, 7.16 million rubles; Sweden, 6.3 million rubles; Japan 1.7 million rubles; and France, 600,000 rubles. From that time to the early 1928, investment by the Soviet state on industry totaled 7.878 billion rubles, of which investments on concession enterprises were 45.3 million rubles, or only 0.57 percent. Total foreign investments were not more than 2 percent of the total investment in capital construction.³⁵

The situation with regard to production by enterprises under concession after 1922 is shown in the following table:

Year	Number of Concession Enterprises	Total Output Value (in Millions of Rubles in the same year)	Means of Production	Consumer Goods
1924/25	24	13.5	12.3	1.2
1925/26	52	39.8	37.6	2.2
1926/27	65	57.2	52.6	4.6
1927/28	52	81.7	5.7	24.7
1928/29	43	99.7	No Data	
1933	6	26.9	No Data	

Source: "Russian Historical Encyclopedia," Vol 7, p 879, Moscow 1963.

The above amounts are given in absolute figures. If they are given in relative figures, then the yearly ratios of products from concession enterprises in industrial production are as follows:

1924/25	0.2 percent
1925/26	0.4 percent
1926/27	0.3 percent

If we look at the production of the means of production, we can see that the proportion of products from concession enterprises was very small. In 1924/25, it was 0.4 percent; in 1925/26, it was 1 percent; and in the two years from 1926 to 1928, it was only 1.2 percent each year. By the end of the 1920's, the highest proportion of all the concession enterprises in the entire national economy was 1.2 percent (for Plan A enterprises) and 3 percent (for Plan B enterprises).³⁶

The above figures show that the production from concession enterprises amounted to a very small proportion of the entire national economy. But this should not lead us to the conclusion that these enterprises did not play an important role. According to Lenin's original idea, these enterprises, although small in number, should serve as examples. Through the concessions to these few enterprises, Soviet Russia could obtain the most up-to-date machinery and technological equipment, obtain the experience of the most modern management, and, by learning from the foreign technicians, train a contingent of technical personnel for the country. Therefore, in all concession treaties, it was specifically stipulated that the

concessionaires must import modern machinery and equipment and must recruit a certain number of technicians from abroad. The proportion of these technicians was then stipulated at 15 percent. Lenin's idea successfully stood the test of practice, and in only one year, from 1927 to 1928, imports of advanced machinery and equipment through concessions amounted to 17 million rubles.

According to the treaty, Tetiukhe Company, a British mining company in the Vladivostok region, imported a whole set of high-quality mechanical equipment for new construction. At that time, this company played a positive role in the recovery and development of the mining industry in the Far Eastern region of Soviet Russia. Again, the Swedish Ball Bearing Corporation, in producing ball bearings and other products, had to import a certain amount of modern equipment, and for this reason it was able to hold a virtual monopoly in the production and marketing of ball bearings. (Of course, the prices of its products were higher than those sold in the international market by 50-60 percent.) When the time for the signing of a supplemental agreement arrived (in 1931), the equipment for this plant was virtually complete. This concession enterprise played quite a significant, exemplary role. Even though the concessionaires generally failed to observe the stipulation of recruiting 15 percent of their personnel from abroad, they did bring in a certain number of skilled workers or experts along with the importation of their machinery and equipment. For example, in the 23 enterprises of the processing industry of Soviet Russia during the 1920's, 3-4 percent of the personnel were foreigners. Again, in a German concession enterprise in Leningrad, there were altogether 140 workers and engineers. Among them were 84 former workers and two foreign engineers.³⁷

The above data show that the foreign capital gained through concessions were generally used to purchase modern, or fairly modern, machinery and equipment and to recruit skilled workers and technicians into Soviet Russia. This naturally had a profound influence on the scattered and backward handicraft form of production and on the workers. The concession enterprises, though small in number, all used heavy machinery for production. Under conditions then existing, this mechanized production was competing with the scattered and small production, and this was a practical state capitalist form which marked the transition from large-scale capitalist production to large-scale socialist production. The following figures are interesting: from 1926 to 1928, the development of concession enterprises reached its highest level, and steady production was maintained. At the same time, however, private industry and small production registered a sharp drop. From 1925 to 1927, they dropped to 80.1 percent, and the drop continued until it reduced to only 43.9 percent in 1928.³⁸ This shows that the concession system and the other important Soviet economic measures played an important role in the struggle between large-scale production and small production.

From 1921, when the treaty for the first concession enterprise--for asbestos mining--was signed, to 1929, when the last concession treaty was signed, the proportion of production by concession enterprises among the entire industrial system was maintained at about 1 percent, and not more than 3 percent at most. This shows that the practice of Soviet concessions had all along followed the important principle of "opening a small window" as put forward by Lenin. We can further study the situation from the following figures.

From 1921 to 1928, as many as 2,400 applications were received for concessions. Details are shown in the following table.³⁹

Year	Number of Applications	Number of Treaties Actually Signed	Number of Treaties in Force
1921/22	224	14	9
1922/23	579	33	41
1923/24	396	34	68
1924/26	256	31	89
1926/27	263	20	74
1927/28	200	13	68
1929	/	/	59
1932	/	/	24
1936	/	/	11

From the above table, we can see that the number of applications far exceeded the number of treaties signed. This illustrates two points: first, that the foreign capitalists who had been deprived of their property attempted in vain to recover their plants through the concession treaties; and secondly, that the Soviet Government firmly adhered to proletarian principles and would never hand over to the exploiters the fruits of the revolution. If every application had been accepted, the total number of concession enterprises would have turned out to be far more than 2,400. In that event, the temporary sacrifice of partial interests would not have been for the long-range benefits of the proletariat. Instead, it would have turned out as pointed out by Lenin: "It would be absurd if we are going to gain concessions on the majority of our plants. In that case it will be a retreat before capitalism, instead of concessions."⁴⁰

By 1 May 1924, Soviet Russia had 70 concession enterprises. They were distributed in the national economy as follows: industry, 31; foreign trade, 23; communications-transportation, 8; agriculture, 7; and the building industry, 1. In industry, the concession enterprises were concentrated in the production department of the means of production, and about 60 percent of them were again concentrated in mining and timber processing.⁴¹ This shows that the basic purpose of the concession policy of "opening a small window" was to develop the production of the means of production and large-scale production and to radically overhaul the old enterprises. Control of concessions granted by enterprises engaged in the production of consumer goods was very strict, and the number of those enterprises was very small and confined to only a very few departments. Examples for this type were the concession to Hammer Company of the United States for the production of pencils, pen nibs, and other stationery, and some concessions for garment production enterprises.⁴²

Concession enterprises in Soviet Russia "could not be extensively developed," because this policy was dictated by the nature of the proletariat, and these enterprises could only develop within the scope prescribed by the long-range benefits of the proletariat.

Because of the implementation of a series of economic policies, including the concessions policy, and the continual readjustments and revisions in the course of implementation under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, Soviet Russia was able to rapidly recover its national economy, then on the brink of collapse. In 1922, industrial production was only one-quarter what it was before World War I. Then one year later it increased to one-third.⁴³ Along with gradual industrial recovery, Soviet Russia quickly embarked on large-scale economic construction. This called for huge funds, and continued absorption of foreign capital could solve the problem to a certain extent. In March 1926, the Council of People's Commissars passed a resolution on the "granting of favored conditions for investment of foreign capital in construction within Soviet territories," stipulating that foreign traders' construction enterprises, like the other enterprises inside the country, could build houses, factories, and other industrial structures and pay tax in the same way. The concession treaties signed at that time included production of gas and electric equipment and [treaties with] other industrial departments. In July 1928, the Council of People's Commissars again worked out a plan for granting concessions to 100 enterprises in order to absorb foreign capital. This concessions policy of "opening a small window" ended in early 1930 for various reasons. By that time, a special committee was formed to consider repossessing all concession enterprises through redemption. The duration of the concessions, according to the original treaties, was quite long, generally more than 20 years, and some of them as long as 99 years. However, all the concession treaties were abrogated by 1937, so that the actual duration was generally about 10 years, and in some cases even shorter.

"Concessions Are the Continuation of Class War"

Since, as mentioned above, the purpose of concessions was to utilize foreign capital to develop Soviet Russia's national economy, this kind of concession was naturally a new battle instead of a peaceful measure. Lenin said: "I clearly understand the difficulties we will encounter on the way. Therefore, concessions do not mean the arrival of class peace. They are the continuation of class war."⁴⁴ From the idea of concessions advanced by Lenin to the formulation of principles and laws for them and all the way down to the actual operation of each concession enterprise, the Bolshevik Party and Soviet Russia indeed waged a fierce life and death struggle, which was a matter of "who will triumph over whom." There were three fronts in this war: first, the war against the international monopoly capitalists and the foreign concessionaires; second, the war against the opposition group and the enemy inside the Bolshevik Party and the government; and third, the war against traditional small production.

On the first front, there was a struggle against the international monopoly capitalists and the foreign concessionaires. When the concessions policy was enforced, the monopoly capitalists of England, the United States, and France did everything they could to hinder and sabotage, such as refusing to extend any loans to the capitalists who had accepted concessions rights from Soviet Russia. For example, although the "Lena Goldfield Company" and the "Georgia Manganese Company" had signed concession treaties, the British capitalists refused to grant them a loan. These capitalists even applied pressure on the concessionaires through various international conferences. The concessionaires, too, from the time of negotiations to the signing of the treaties, continually haggled at the bargaining table and tried every way to gain the upper hand over the new born proletarian political power. Almost all the concessionaires demanded compensation for "loss." This was what the "Lena Goldfield Company" concessionaire stubbornly demanded. Since this concession involved the biggest mine, the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) took a direct part in the negotiations, organized a special committee to study the contents of the treaty, and finally made a drastic revision in the treaty concerning the concessionaire's demand for compensation, making it clear that the concessionaire "cannot demand any compensation." Again, the "Mologa Timber Processing Company" first demanded compensation, then asked for loans from the Soviet Government, and further requested a revision of the treaty. In fact, it was requesting extraterritorial rights and exemption from any payment to the Soviet Government (including taxes). By the beginning of March 1927, this company owed Soviet Russia 6 million rubles, and consequently the Soviet Government was compelled to revoke this treaty.

There were many aspects to the struggle between the concessionaires and the Soviet Government. They tried every possible way to evade their obligations under the concession treaties concerning the importation of machinery and equipment from abroad. While on the one hand buying outdated equipment

inside Soviet Russia, they on the other hand chose low-price and outdated equipment even though they bought it from abroad. The depreciation rate of such equipment reached 40 percent, and the invisible wear and tear of the outdated machinery was even more serious. Therefore, the Council of People's Commissars in 1926 charged the Chief Concession Committee with the task of revising the signed concession treaties to specifically show that the concessionaires must import machinery and equipment, so as to provide the maximum guarantee that foreign technology could be drawn on to expand the Soviet industrial foundation. Furthermore, the concession treaties also stipulated that the workers' living conditions be improved. However, the concessionaires invariably tried to evade this clause. Some of them deliberately paid high wages and "vodka" allowances to the backward workers, or paid much higher wages to the staff members in addition to providing them with better houses with private baths, in an attempt to create a split between the workers and the staff members. Furthermore, the high-level administrative and technical personnel of the concession enterprises, who were hostile to the Soviet political power, took advantage of their control over the concession enterprises to carry out anti-Soviet counterrevolutionary espionage. For example, the responsible person and chief metallurgical engineer of the "Lena Goldfield Company" was punished by the Soviet Supreme Court in 1930 for this crime.⁴⁵

The Soviet Government made great efforts in the struggle to keep the concession enterprises under the supervision of the party and government organs. Lenin pointed out: "Concession is a continuation of war in the economic sphere."⁴⁶ However, as far as the Soviet political power was concerned, the purpose of this war was to develop the productive forces instead of destroying them.

On the second front, the Soviet Government had to fight the opposition group and the enemy inside the Bolshevik Party, the trade unions, and the government organs. In this connection, it should first be pointed out that the opposition to the concessions policy came from the same people who had formerly opposed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and Trotsky was one of them. With outwardly ultraleftist but meaningless polemics, they tried to obstruct the signing of any concession treaty. Lenin promptly exposed them and called on the whole party to "concentrate their attention to the actual conditions of the concession treaties. If we are not fools, we will get some benefits out of these treaties."⁴⁷

Furthermore, Shelyapnikov, the organizer and leader of the "workers' opposition"; and Ryazanov, who had "temporarily" left the party because of his opposition to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, both jumped into the open. When the question of concessions was discussed in the All-Russia Trade Union Central Executive Committee, they strongly opposed Lenin's concessions policy and spread seditious propaganda in the meeting, claiming that concessions were a kind of "fearful capitalism." Lenin strongly refuted this in the debate, pointing out that there was nothing to be feared from state capitalism in the form of concessions, and adding: "As for ourselves,

"the vast majority of factories and railroads are in our hands. There is party leadership with party basic-level organizations below and Communist Party members above. If we are still unable to protect our own belongings under such conditions, there can only be suicide. This is simply a case of being frightened out of our wits."⁴⁸

Of course, in opposing the concessions policy, the Trotskyites had not been merely frightened out of their wits. They even opposed it with actual deeds to the extent of counterrevolutionary activities. On 11 August 1923, the Council of People's Commissars charged the Chief Concession Committee with overall responsibility for the concessions. However, the Trotskyites, who had usurped the leading positions in that committee, did not follow the instructions of the Council of People's Commissars on the need to sign treaties with reliable trade firms. Instead, they signed them with brokers or swindlers who had neither material nor financial power. As a result, the treaties became mere scraps of paper, causing losses to the Soviet Republic both politically and economically. A Trotskyite, Malozemo, sneaked into the position of chairman of the Chief Concession Committee and colluded with the spies of the "Lena Goldfield Company" in systematically collecting military and economic intelligence on Soviet Russia to be periodically dispatched to London. He was a hired hand of the foreign capitalists and was finally arrested and punished by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) had to exercise constant supervision over this committee and several times reorganized it. By the end of 1923, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a special resolution, pointing out that since that committee did not carry out Lenin's concessions policy, it had to be thoroughly reorganized, and the majority of its duties were taken over by the People's Commissariat of Economics.

On the third front, the struggle was with the traditional forces of small production. The nature of this struggle was different from those on the last two fronts. This was mainly because the broad worker-peasant masses at that time did not have a clear understanding of the significance of the concessions policy and therefore had misgivings. At that time, some people said: "We have just driven the capitalists away, and now we are going to invite them back. What good can there be in this?" In this connection, Lenin said: "We invited the capitalists in so that we can attract foreign capital. There is nothing to be afraid of. We need them because we want to raise our productivity. They have a very well-organized rear area and well-equipped factories. We can buy what we need from these factories instead of from the free market--because there is only a heap of trash in the free market."⁴⁹

This front involved quite a wide area and called for a great deal of work. At the same time, the method for winning victory on this front was also different from what was required on the other two fronts. Lenin stressed the need for constant and patient propaganda work among the masses so as to enlighten them on the situation. After the promulgation of the "concessions laws," Lenin many times talked about the question of concessions

in the party, government, trade union, and mass meetings. At that time, the People's Commissariat of Labor and the Council of Labor and National Defense had to discuss this question every two or three days. Lenin invariably urged the negotiators to be well informed of the reaction of the people in the concession areas and to do meticulous ideological work among them. As for the Groznyy and Baku oilfield concessions, he particularly instructed Ordzhonikidze, who was then in Georgia, to attend to this work well and to protect the people's interests in Georgia. To learn the reaction of the masses, Lenin also invited a delegate of workers in Baku to make a 15-minute report and give his opinion on the oilfield concessions to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee during the sessions of the 10th Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik). In addition, Lenin stressed the need to deliver determined counterblows against the Mensheviks, who were conducting their propaganda abroad against the concessions.

Lenin and the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) also emphasized ideological work among the workers of the concession enterprises so as to constantly enhance their class consciousness and encourage them to protect the economic interests of the working class and to exercise their supervision of the activities of the concession enterprises. Since there were only a few Communist Party members in the concession enterprises (by the end of 1925, the number was only 2-11 percent of the total number of these enterprise workers), the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) decided on 9 July 1926 to "strengthen the private and concession enterprises by transporting or drawing workers into the party." On 23 August of the same year, a resolution was adopted on strengthening party work in the concession and private enterprises.⁵⁰

Although concession was a war, the foreign capitalist still showed great interest in the concession enterprises. "What was the secret? Simply because our country was the biggest market for machinery equipment and the capitalist countries had to sell these products."⁵¹

Finally, on the concessions policy, Lenin raised the question as to whether for its recovery and development, the Soviet economy should depend on its own strength, with some help from foreign "capital." His own answer was in the affirmative.

This article has devoted much space to an analysis of the necessity and importance of the concessions policy from the economic point of view. Of course, it was also very significant politically. Soviet Russia was then completely encircled by capitalism; in order for its economy to recover and develop, there had to be a peaceful environment. Whether or not this peaceful environment could be attained was decided mostly by the Soviet political power's ability to postpone its war with capitalism in the world and its ability to take advantage of the contradictions among the capitalist powers. In this respect, the concessions policy did play an important role. For example, although the Soviet Government finally failed to sign

the treaty after its negotiations with the big U.S. capitalist Vanderlip on the Kamchatka concessions, the negotiations deepened the contradictions between the United States and Japan and prevented them from forming a united front in the Far East against the Soviet political power.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Chicherin, "Lenin Remembered," Moscow, 1957, p 168.
2. See B. A. Wa-li-ko-fu, "The Soviet Union and the United States--Their Political and Economic Relations," Moscow, 1965, pp 93-94.
3. See B. N. Ka-xi-ya-nien-ko, Mo-lo-zuo-fu, and Shi-ka-lun-ko-fu, "History of Soviet State Policy of Concessions," carried in HISTORY OF USSR, No 4, 1959.
4. "Resolutions of CPSU," Vol 2, People's Publishing House, 1964, p 109.
5. "General History of USSR," Vol 8, Moscow Scientific Publishing House, 1967, pp 72-73.
6. Ibid.
7. Liang-shi-chin-ko, "History of Soviet National Economy," Vol 3, People's Publishing House, 1960, p 1969.
8. Ba-bi-sai, "See a New World Through One Person," Continental Publishing House, p 137.
9. Quoted from "Soviet Russia and the Capitalist World," Jointly Published 1960, p 578.
10. Quoted from "Collected Works of Stalin," Vol 10, p 225.
11. Quoted from "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 43, Fifth Russian Edition, p 189.
12. Ibid.
13. "Resolutions of CPSU," Vol 2, p 109.
14. From files of the Central Committee and the Museum on the October Revolution and Socialist Construction. Quoted from "History of Soviet Policy on Concessions."
15. See "History of Soviet Policy of Concessions."

16. B. A. Wa-li-ko-fu, "The Soviet Union and the United States--Their Political and Economic Relations," p 136.
17. See "History of Soviet Policy of Concessions."
18. B. S. Wa-li-ko-fu, "The Soviet Union and the United States--Their Political and Economic Relations," p 137.
19. "Collected Articles of Lenin," Vol 33, Moscow 1945, pp 217-218.
20. PRAVDA, 23 March 1922.
21. Basbi-sai, "See a New World Through One Person," p 137; "Speech of People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin before the First Plenary Session of Genoa Conference on 10 April 1922" SHIJIE LISHI [WORLD HISTORY] No 1, 1978.
22. "Collected Articles on Soviet Russian National Economy," Berlin 1923, p 5.
23. PRAVDA, 30 October and 1 November 1922.
24. "Collected Articles of Lenin," Vol 20, Moscow 1932, pp 129-131.
25. Ibid, p 127.
26. Ibid, p 146.
27. See "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 32, pp 289-304.
28. PRAVDA, 19 June 1925.
29. See "History of Soviet Policy of Concessions."
30. "Collected Articles of Lenin," Vol 35, p 220.
31. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 33, p 398.
32. See "History of Soviet Policy of Concessions."
33. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 43, Fifth Russian Edition, pp 188-189.
34. Maurice Dobb, "History of Soviet Economic Developments," Shanghai 1950, p 190.
35. See "History of Soviet Policy of Concessions"; "Soviet Encyclopedia," Vol 7, Moscow, 1963, p 879.
36. Ibid.

37. See "History of Soviet Policy of Concessions."
38. Ibid.
39. See "History of Soviet Policy of Concessions," "Soviet Encyclopedia," Vol 7, p 879.
40. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 32, p 286.
41. See "History of Soviet Policy of Concessions."
42. See B. A. Wa-li-ko-fu, "The Soviet Union and the United States--Their Political and Economic Relations," p 137.
43. Maurice Dobb, "History of Soviet Economic Development"; H. Chi-er-nien-ko: "the Party During the Recovery of the National Economy (1921-1925)," Moscow, 1961.
44. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 43, Fifth Russian Edition, p 193.
45. PRAVDA, 20 April and 7 May 1930.
46. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 31, p 393.
47. "Collected Works of Lenin," Vol 43, Fifth Russian Edition, pp 193, 191.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid, p 193.
50. See "History of Soviet Policy of Concessions."
51. "Collected Works of Stalin," Vol 10, p 247.

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U.S. WORLD WAR II POLICY, STRATEGY REVIEWED

Beijing LISHI YANJIU [HISTORICAL RESEARCH] in Chinese No 12, 15 Dec 79
pp 81-91

[Article by Yu Xintun [0205 6580 3545] and Wang Dunshu [3769 2415 2579]:
"U.S. Policy Toward Japan and the Outbreak of the Pacific War"]

[Text] The Pacific war was a struggle between the two Pacific powers--Japan in the west and the United States in the east--for hegemony over the Pacific Ocean. When the two powers were locked in the struggle, Japan was on the offensive and the United States on the defensive. As Japan was moving step by step southward, the United States countered with a double-barreled policy of coupling economic sanctions with a pacification plan. The consequence was that the Pacific war could not be avoided, thus bringing sufferings to the United States. This article deals with Japan's southward drive on the eve of the outbreak of the Pacific war, and the U.S. policy toward Japan, especially its pacification aspect and the plot for a Far Eastern Munich hatched by the United States at the expense of China, and the origins of this plot.

I

Southeast Asia and the western and southern Pacific islands are a region with large population and abundant resources of petroleum, rubber, tin, aluminum and rice; they comprise a strategically important region linking the Pacific and Indian oceans and Oceania. For this reason, it has long been coveted by colonialists and imperialists, especially Japan. On 7 August 1936, the Hirota cabinet issued a "basic policy statement" stressing that "in addition to maintaining its position in the Eastern Asian continent, our empire should expand to include the ocean in the south; its navy should be well equipped and reinforced so that it can cope with the U.S. Navy and retain the command of the sea in the southwest Pacific." ("Chronicle of Japanese Diplomacy and Its Major Documents" compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1940-1945, Vol 2, 1969 edition, p 344) This fully indicates that in addition to annexing China, Japan's ambition was to dominate Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific. In 1938, Comrade Mao Zedong predicted: "Now that

Japan has launched a war against China, as long as it does not suffer a fatal blow from Chinese resistance and still retains sufficient strength, it is bound to attack Southeast Asia or Siberia, or even both. It will do so once war breaks out in Europe." ("On Protracted War," combined edition of "Selected Works of Mao Zedong," People's Publishing House, 1967, p 477) Just as it was predicted, Germany frantically launched World War II in September 1939. As the following spring turned into summer, Germany launched blitzkrieg attacks on Great Britain, France and the Netherlands and badly routed their troops on the European continent, thus leaving them little strength to take care of their interests in the Far East. Japan seized this moment as a "God-blessed" opportunity for its drive to fill "a power vacuum" in Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific. Soon a furor to advance southward raged throughout Japan; a newly organized Japanese 4th Fleet steamed toward the Ryukyu Islands, heralding a drive southward.

On 16 April 1940, the French Government suggested that the United States, Great Britain and France take a joint action to present a note to Japan. But this suggestion was ignored by the United States. Fearing that any move by Great Britain to occupy the Dutch East Indies when the Netherlands Government was in exile in London would prompt Japan to take military actions against the Dutch East Indies, on 10 May 1940, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull put pressure on Great Britain, demanding that "His Majesty's government and the United States jointly present to Japan a guarantee of no change in the position of the Dutch East Indies, in the form of the British proposal." ("The Road to the Pacific War" compiled by the Japanese International Political Society, Vol 6, 1963 edition, ASASHI NEWS AGENCY, p 323) Three days later, Roosevelt proposed the following to Great Britain: "1) An official note be drafted and sent to Japan with the assurance that the British have no intention of interfering in the affairs of the Dutch East Indies; 2) Notify and inform Japan that the Netherlands has neither the necessity nor intention of requesting aid from Great Britain; 3) Announce a schedule as early as possible for withdrawing the British and French troops which have occupied the Dutch East Indies." (On 10 May 1940, the Netherlands Government asked the Anglo-French allied troops to occupy two islands of the Dutch East Indies.) Under this pressure, the British and Netherlands ambassadors to Japan had no alternative but to hand to Japan that guarantee, as instructed by Roosevelt, during their respective meetings with the Japanese foreign minister. On the other hand, the United States also took some measures to counter Japan's southward thrust. For example, in May 1940, it declared that its Pacific Fleet, then holding routine exercises near Hawaii, would remain there indefinitely in order to strengthen its naval forces in the Pacific and act as a deterrence to Japan's expansionist drive into Southeast Asia. But its true intention was not to prepare for a war against Japan. U.S. Secretary of the War Henry Lewis Stimson acknowledged that he and U.S. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox agreed to the view that "the U.S. fleet in Hawaii poses no substantial threat to Japan and can provide no valuable defense for its inability to

protect the Philippines." ("Active Service in Peace and War" by Henry Lewis Stimson, 1947 edition, New York, p 386) This sign of U.S. weakness only served to whet Japan's appetite to expand into Southeast Asia. In October 1940, Japan proclaimed a so-called "policy decision on the development of the Dutch East Indies and its economy"; it openly and blatantly proposed that "the Japanese empire occupy a predominant position over the Dutch East Indies." ("Chronicle of Japanese Diplomacy and Its Major Documents" compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol 2, p 462) This fully exposed Japan's audacious desire to annex the Dutch East Indies.

Under these circumstances the United States adopted a pacification policy to revitalize the economy of militaristic Japan. Japan was a country short of natural resources, and its economy largely depended on the imports from the United States. It imported most of its petroleum, scrap iron, and aircraft parts from the United States for the purpose of expanding its arms. With 10 percent of its oil need supplied by the local petroleum industry, Japan had to import the rest. In 1939, it obtained 90.8 percent of its oil supply from the United States. From 1933 to 1940, the United States supplied Japan with over 10 million tons of scrap iron to feed its steel industry. This figure represented 53 percent of U.S. scrap iron exports for that year. On 3 July 1940, the U.S. Congress passed a bill authorizing the president to restrict the shipment of supplies to other countries. President Roosevelt followed this congressional action with a decree requiring prior governmental approval of such exports as weapons, military equipment, aluminum, and magnesium, a decree which did not apply to the shipments of petroleum and scrap iron from the United States to Japan. Petroleum and scrap iron were vital to Japan's expansionist drive into Southeast Asia. On 26 July, the United States began reluctantly to restrict the exports of aviation gasoline, aircraft lubricants, and high-grade scrap iron to Japan. But not on the list of restrictions were ordinary petroleum products and scrap metal. By 19 August 1940, 99 percent of the scrap metal purchase orders from Japan were approved by the U.S. Government. In 1940, the shipments of gasoline from the United States to Japan reached 3,918,000 barrels, and from January to early August 1941, they totaled 2,225,000 barrels, exceeding the 1939 shipments of 2,146,000 barrels. ("American Vacuum Oil Company and U.S. Policy Toward East Asia" by Anderson, 1933-41, 1975 edition, published by Princeton University Press, pp 136, 138, 143, 224)

This form of the American appeasement of Japan further whetted its appetite for military adventures into Southeast Asia. On 22 July 1940, Fumimaro Konoye was recalled to form another cabinet with the Japanese militarists' support. On the day he took power, he proclaimed the so-called "basic policy outline," "guidelines dealing with the current situation in connection with the development of the world situation" and "a new order in East Asia with the empire as its nucleus and the solidarity of Japan, Manchukuo and China as its foundation." He stressed the need to "seize every opportune moment to use force when the internal and

external conditions permit." ("Chronicle of Japanese Diplomacy and Its Major Documents," Vol 2, pp 436-438) Later, he instructed his foreign minister to issue a notorious declaration of "the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere" comprising New Zealand in the east, India in the west, Australia in the south and China in the north. In other words, Japan wanted to establish a greater East Asian colonial empire and to dominate the entire Asia-Pacific region.

To this end, Japan should first win control over French Indochina, an inevitable passage on its way to conquering Southeast Asia and a bridge-head for its next move into Thailand, Burma, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. On 19 June 1940, the second day after France's capitulation to Germany, Japan immediately seized the opportunity to intimidate the French Government into closing the international route along the Vietnam-China border. On 19 and 20 June 1940, the French Indochinese authority sent a note to the U.S. Government through the French ambassador in Washington, requesting urgent help. But the United States persuaded France to surrender and turned down a request to sell aircraft and other weapons to French Indochina. ("Challenge to Isolation" by Glinn, 1952, New York edition, p 598; "The Rise and Fall of Japan's New Order in East Asia" by Jones, Oxford University Press, p 225) Under the military pressure from Japan, France's Vichy government signed an agreement with Japan on 30 August 1940, pledging to "provide the latter with special military facilities" and granting to it "a more favored economic status than any other third country." On 9 September 1940, Roosevelt called a meeting to discuss the Japanese invasion of the northern part of French Indochina. Henry Morgenthau recommended that an overall embargo, including an embargo of petroleum, be imposed on Japan. But this recommendation was disapproved by Roosevelt. The United States also rejected a British suggestion that it join Great Britain in giving French Indochina military aid. On 19 September 1940, Japan handed the Vichy government an ultimatum, demanding that the latter approve the former's request for movement into the northern part of French Indochina no later than zero hour 23 September 1940. This development forced Secretary Hull to hold a meeting on 19 September with a suggestion to the United States that an embargo of scrap iron be imposed on Japan, but no date was set for its execution. Hull also failed to bring up for discussion the matter of an oil embargo against Japan. Under pressure from Japan and Germany, the Vichy government agreed to the terms of Japan's ultimatum on 23 September 1940, permitting the Japanese troops to occupy the northern part of French Indochina. After swallowing up the northern part of French Indochina, the Japanese troops were ready for the next move into Southeast Asia. On 26 September 1940, following the fall of the northern part of French Indochina into Japan's hands, Roosevelt announced an embargo on all shipments of scrap iron to Japan.

On 27 September 1940, Japan signed a three-nation military pact with Germany and Italy in Berlin. The pact committed "its three signatories to give all necessary political, economic and military support and

assistance whenever any one of them is under attack launched by any country not yet involved in the European war or the Sino-Japanese conflict." ("Chronicle of Japanese Diplomacy and Its Major Documents," Vol 2, p 459) Undoubtedly, this was a spearhead directed at the United States. But, the United States continued to respond by taking no decisive actions. In early October 1940, Roosevelt and Hull still hoped to "avoid any open conflicts in the Pacific Ocean area and promise to rip open the door to discussions which may lead to the conclusion of an agreement." ("Memoirs of Cordell Hull" by Cordell Hull, 1948 edition, New York, pp 911-912) This was another attempt to trade space for time through negotiations in the hopes that Japan would stop its southward drive.

In December 1940, nonofficial negotiations between Japan and the United States began with each side represented by two private citizens closely associated with the leaders of their respective governments. On 16 April 1941, the negotiations ended with a "statement of mutual understanding between Japan and the United States," which could be used as a basis for further negotiations between the two governments. The statement stressed: "In appreciation of Japan's pledge to carry on its activities in the southwest Pacific Ocean without resorting to the use of force but by peaceful means, the United States should extend cooperation and support in enabling Japan to gain access to petroleum, rubber, tin, nickel and other desirable natural resources there." ("History of Japanese Diplomacy and Japanese-U.S. Negotiations," Vol 23, published by the Kagoshima Peace Research Institute 1970, p 70) Encouraged by one concession after another from the United States, the Japanese fascist forces became more blatant than ever. On 12 May 1941, they deleted such terms as "pledge" and "without resorting to the use of force" from the aforementioned statement and replaced it with a strong demand for unconditional assistance from the United States to enable Japan to gain access to the natural resources in Southeast Asia.

On 22 June 1941, war broke out between Germany and the Soviet Union. The then Japanese foreign minister suggested that Japan immediately mount attacks on the Soviet Union and seize control over Siberia in coordination with Germany on the European front. But the real power-holders of the Japanese ruling class retorted by saying that the war between Germany and the Soviet Union relieved Japan of a threat from the north, thus providing a golden opportunity for Japan to speed up its movement into Southeast Asia. At a joint meeting on 25 June 1941, the Japanese leaders decided to annex all of French Indochina; at another meeting held in his majesty's presence on 2 July 1941, they came up with another decision to "prepare and declare war on Great Britain and the United States." ("Chronicle of Japanese Diplomacy and Its Major Documents," Vol 2, p 531) At this time, U.S. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes suggested to Roosevelt that "the United States immediately impose an overall embargo on oil shipments to Japan at a time when Japan is taking advantage of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union to mount attacks on the Dutch East Indies." Roosevelt rejected this suggestion on the grounds that at

a time when Japan remained undecided on whether it should march northward toward the Soviet Union or southward into Southeast Asia, an oil embargo would prompt Japan to choose the latter. ("The Road to the Pacific War" compiled by the Japanese International Political Society, Vol 7, p 400) This fully exposed the true nature of the U.S. pacification policy aimed at inducing the Japanese fascist forces to direct their spearhead at the Soviet Union.

Encouraged by this pacification policy, Japan took a decisive step forward on its march toward Southeast Asia. On 12 July 1941, the Japanese foreign minister handed the French Vichy government a note demanding that Japan be allowed to use eight air bases and Saigon and Cam Ranh naval bases in the southern part of French Indochina, and that a reply to this note should be delivered no later than 20 July. On 18 and 20 July, the U.S. leaders met to study countermeasures. Earlier, Morgenthau and other U.S. cabinet members suggested that the United States place an overall embargo on shipments of oil and other vital supplies to Japan plus strict economic sanctions as a warning against its military adventures in Southeast Asia. But Roosevelt maintained that "a complete embargo on oil shipments to Japan at this time might hasten the outbreak of the Pacific war and endanger the communication network linking Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand." ("Stimson Manuscript") Harold Raynsford Stark, chief of Naval Operations, was also opposed to an oil embargo, contending that "such an action would force Japan to attack Malaya and the Dutch East Indies and involve the United States in the Pacific war," adding that "even if the United States wants to play a role in the Pacific war, it should wait until Japan declares war on the Soviet Union." ("Records of the Hearings on Attacks on Pearl Harbor," Vol 5, p 2382, compiled by the Joint Pearl Harbor Incident Investigation Committee of Both Houses) When the U.S. leaders were pursuing a pacification policy based on a wishful thinking, the Japanese Government had already ordered its main force--the 25th Army--to invade the southern part of Indochina. On 23 July, the Vichy government gave in to the Japanese demand. Seeing Japan swallow up all of Indochina, Roosevelt reluctantly signed an order freezing all Japanese assets in the United States. On 28 July, the Japanese troops swaggeringly moved into the southern part of Indochina and secured another bridgehead for expansion into Southeast Asia. On 1 August, the United States imposed an embargo on shipments of all vital supplies except for rice, cotton and oil to Japan. Later, Great Britain, India, Burma and the Netherlands promptly froze all Japanese assets in their countries, abrogated their treaties of commerce and restricted trade with Japan, thus dealing a blow to Japan's adventure in Southeast Asia. But it was too late, because Japan had already stored 42.7 million barrels of petroleum, mostly from the United States, an amount of fuel sufficient to supply the needs of its war machine in the Pacific Ocean for the next 2 years.

Japan's step-by-step adventure in Southeast Asia increasingly threatened the British colonial interests in the Orient. Since 1940, Great Britain

had repeatedly asked the United States to send warships to Singapore. But this request was turned down by the United States for the reason that "any deployment of warships would irritate and provoke Japan to take prompt and retaliatory actions." ("The Headquarters of the Army and the War in East Asia" compiled by the Defense Research Institute of the Japan Defense Agency, Vol 2, p 290) At his Atlantic shipboard meeting with Roosevelt in August 1941, Churchill presented "a draft of a joint declaration of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands concerning the Japanese policy toward the Pacific" requesting that the United States issue the following statement: "Any further aggression by Japan in the southwest Pacific Ocean will create a situation in which the U.S. Government will have no alternative but to take countermeasures, even if such countermeasures may lead to war between the United States and Japan." ("Disappearance of U.S. Neutrality," 1955 edition, Michigan University Press, p 281) But the United States failed to take this position. Accompanying Roosevelt on this shipboard conference was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who brought back to Washington a statement of warning to Japan. Before its release, it was revised by Hull and the office of the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs for fear of creating misunderstanding with Japan. When Roosevelt met Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura for the fourth time on 14 August, the president first read the following warning: "If the Japanese Government continues to use force or the threat of force as a policy or an instrument for gaining military control over its neighbors, and if it takes any further step in that direction, the United States of America will have no alternative but to take any immediate countermeasures it deems necessary." After he finished reading this document, the president read another statement in quite a different and soft tone: "The Government of the United States of America is ready to resume the unofficial exploratory talks suspended in mid-July if Japan is willing and able to stop its expansionist activities, change its position, and participate in a Pacific program for peace along the line of the formulas and principles outlined by the United States." ("Documents on U.S. Foreign Relations--Japan From 1931 to 1941" compiled by the U.S. Department of State, Vol 2, pp 556, 557, 559) He also showed an interest in a proposal submitted by Nomura on 8 August for holding a conference of the leaders of the two countries. In this way, the second statement read by the president greatly diluted the sense of warning in his first statement, turning the whole thing into a piece of scrap paper. But this development was appreciated by Nomura who, on the following day, reported that meeting with Roosevelt to his foreign minister in this way: "Roosevelt was friendly and seemingly had no intention of expelling Japan. Warning is only a form of reference material. The United States is mainly interested in restoring and holding a summit conference." Fumimaro Konoye was delighted at this report. On 26 July, he wrote a letter to Roosevelt officially proposing a conference of the leaders of the two countries. Upon receiving his message on 28 July, Roosevelt responded with the following statement: "I hope to hold a 3-day talk with Konoye." (Microfilm UD 41 on "Documents of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign

Affairs" reproduced by the U.S. Library of Congress) This exchange of messages eventually led to the resumption of Japanese-U.S. negotiations, which were suspended when Japan invaded southern Indochina.

Japan used the resumed negotiations and the summit conference as a smoke-screen behind which it could actively prepare for war against the United States and Great Britain. On 6 September 1941, the Japanese leaders held a meeting in his majesty's presence and concluded with a resolution to "accomplish war preparations in late October and declare war on the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands in early October, if diplomatic talks still produce no results acceptable to us." On 16 October, General Hideki Tojo succeeded civilian prince Fumimaro Konoye as prime minister, and he formed a war cabinet. On 5 November, another conference was held in his majesty's presence and ended with a decision to mount armed attacks on the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands in December. At that time, the Japanese Pacific Fleet issued its first strike order instructing its task force, under the command of Chuichi Nagumo, to set sail from its Kurile Islands base and to launch a surprise attack on the main force of the U.S. Pacific Fleet based in Pearl Harbor. In order to cover up such military operations, the then Japanese deputy chief of the Naval General Staff advised the Japanese foreign minister to continue diplomatic talks with the United States until the attacks were effectively launched.

At that time, the United States also had a hunch that war was approaching. On 4 November, it intercepted a coded message from the Japanese foreign minister to his ambassador in the United States, Nomura, which contained two alternatives, or proposal-A and proposal-B, adopted by a meeting held in his majesty's presence the previous day, with regard to the relations between Japan and the United States. The coded message said: "This round of diplomatic negotiations is our last try. Our proposal is final, no matter whether in form or in substance. If the United States still adopts a contemptuous attitude on our empire's stand, it can be said that there would be no more room for negotiation and the relations between the two countries would be finished." This coded message was a signal to the imminent outbreak of the war. But the U.S. Government still tried to do everything possible to avoid it. On 5 November, General Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, and Admiral Stark, chief of naval operations, suggested to Roosevelt that "the war between the United States and Japan should be avoided at a time when the U.S. defense forces in the Far East remain in a stage of development; no ultimatum should be sent to Japan." Roosevelt still hoped to reach a temporary agreement with Japan in order to avoid or defer the war.

As the United States still dreamed of pacifying Japan, Kichisaburo Nomura handed Hull his government's last proposal, or proposal-B, as a basis for negotiation on 20 November, a proposal calling on the United States not to extend its influence into Southeast Asia and the Pacific region, to lift its economic embargo on Japan, and not to prevent Japan from coaxing

Chiang Kai-shek into capitulating to Japan. In other words, Japan wanted the United States to offer it China, Southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific on a silver platter. Certainly, the United States could not accept this demand, mainly because the American public and its allies, including Great Britain, resented any excessive U.S. appeasement of Japan. At the same time, the United States also learned that Japan had reinforced its armed forces in Indochina and the southwest Pacific region. All information told the United States that the negotiations were approaching a breaking point. On 26 November, Hull handed Nomura his "outline of bases for agreement between the United States and Japan" or the "Hull Memorandum" he drafted one day earlier at a meeting attended by Roosevelt, himself and leaders of the U.S. Army and Navy. It demanded that Japan pull all its troops out of China and Indochina, scrap the three-nation military pact and extend no recognition to "Manchukuo" and the Wang Qingwei puppet regime. Upon receiving this memorandum on 27 November, Tojo said: "This is clearly an ultimatum to Japan, absolute. unacceptable to us." ("The Road to the Pacific War," Vol 7, p 362) Japan's proposal-B and the "Hull Memorandum" were in every sense a tit for tat, indicating that the war between the two countries in the Asia-Pacific theater was imminent.

On 26 November, the Japanese naval task force gathering around the Kurile Islands set sail for Hawaii to launch surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor. On 1 December, the Japanese Government decided to declare war on the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands on 8 December. Although the flames of the war were about to spread to the front door of the United States, on 2 December, Roosevelt proposed that a message be drafted and sent to the Japanese emperor asking him to join the United States in sweeping away the dark cloud. This message was sent on the afternoon of 6 December. When the then U.S. ambassador to Japan handed it to Japanese Foreign Minister Togo, it was at 00:30, 8 December, Tokyo time. The Japanese planes that struck Pearl Harbor came from six aircraft carriers operating in the sea north of Oahu Island. Particularly dramatic was the fact that when the flames of the war were roaring toward the United States, Roosevelt was at the White House reading out aloud to Chiang Kai-shek's ambassador Hu Shi his message to the Japanese emperor, which said: "This is my last effort for peace." ("History of Diplomacy During World War II" by Lu Tienjun [5684 3944 0971], 1960 edition, published by Current News Agency, p 385) No sooner had he finished reading than the first wave of 183 planes from the Japanese naval task force struck Pearl Harbor with the force of a thunderbolt. Thousands of bombs and torpedoes rained over the airfields and harbor; dark smoke and flames engulfed Pearl Harbor; aircraft and warships were burning and exploding, turning the Oahu Island into a sea of fire. In a matter of 1 hour and 50 minutes, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was almost entirely destroyed, four capital battleships were sunk, one capital battleship was heavily damaged, over 10 cruisers and other craft were either sunk or damaged, three airfields used by U.S. Army were destroyed, and over 4,500 American officers and men were either killed or wounded.

At the same time, the Japanese aggressor army launched multipronged attacks on Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines, Guam and other areas, seized many strategically important points, and expanded the territory under its control.

The U.S. pacification policy toward Japan was abandoned amid the explosions of bombs and torpedoes.

II

At that time, the U.S. policies toward Japan and China were closely related. On the eve of the Pacific war, on the one hand, the United States continued its "aid to China" (by the end of 1941, the United States granted \$171.5 million in loans to China), providing funds in the form of loans and military equipment for China to carry on its war of attrition against Japan and to draw resources away from Japan's military adventure into Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the United States also plotted to create a Far East Munich at the expense of China. In this plot, the United States tried to dangle China as a bait to satisfy the Japanese aggressors' desire and to induce them to abandon their southward drive and redirect the spearhead of their aggression northward. For this reason, the plot for a Far East Munich at China's expense was an important part of the U.S. pacification policy toward Japan.

By the end of 1940, following their arrival in Japan, two American priests, or unofficial representatives of the United States, advised Prime Minister Konoye that "Japan may be able to proceed from fait accompli to deal with the Sino-Japanese war and may be able to achieve harmony with the U.S. proclamation of the 'open-door' policy without yielding too much ground." This implies the betrayal of China. Before launching its military adventure into Southeast Asia, Japan had 78 percent of its 50 army divisions bogged down in the vast sea of the Chinese people's war of resistance. In order to extricate itself from China, Japan fervently hoped that the United States would do something to pressure Chiang Kai-shek into capitulating. In the spring of 1941, the Japanese foreign minister conveyed a message to Roosevelt through the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union: "With the mediation of Roosevelt, I hope to hold a talk with Chiang Kai-shek openly and frankly at any time and any place he wishes. As for our meeting place, Zhongqing is acceptable, but Washington is even better." ("History of Deception," 1955 edition published by ASASHI SHIMBUN, pp 172-173) In February and March, two unofficial Japanese representatives and an American priest met to plot a Far East Munich. On 17 March, through secret negotiations, both sides agreed to this view on the China issue: "The geographic definition of China's territory shall be decided through bilateral consultations between Japan and China." ("U.S. Documents on Foreign Relations" compiled by U.S. Department of State, Vol 4, pp 100-102) On 9 April, they came up with another proposal calling for "recognition of

Manchukuo" stating: "Roosevelt shall invite the Chiang Kai-shek government to conclude a peace treaty with Japan. If the latter turns down President Roosevelt's invitation, the U.S. Government should terminate its aid to China." ("U.S. Documents on Foreign Relations," Vol 2, p 400) Following a price haggling, on 16 April, both sides ended their talks with "A Proposal of Mutual Understanding Between Japan and the United States." The proposal contained eight provisions on China openly calling for formation of "an independent China" for "recognizing Manchukuo," for "incorporating the Chiang Kai-shek government with the Wang Qingwei regime," and for "the implementation of an open-door policy." Japan's demand for terminating U.S. aid to China was not included in the proposal because of U.S. unwillingness to do so.

On 18 April, the Japanese army headquarters and government held a joint conference to discuss the proposal. The Japanese leaders held that "Today's Zhongqing is entirely dependent on the United States, and therefore any negotiation with Zhongqing must involve the United States." ("Fumimaro Konoye Manuscript on 20-Year Government Service" by Fumimaro Konoye, 1948 edition, published by International Cultural Service, p 103) For this reason, the Japanese leaders agreed to the suggestion that Roosevelt act as a mediator in the negotiations between Japan and China to iron out their differences. However, on 12 May, the Japanese foreign minister came up with a new proposal deleting the eight provisions, emphasizing that "the U.S. Government should endorse the three principles contained in Konoye's statement, the treaty concluded by Japan and the Nanjing government on the basis of these principles, and the principles spelled out in the Japan-Manchukuo-China joint declaration, believe in the Japanese Government's friendly policy toward its neighbors, and immediately persuade the Chiang government to come to terms with Japan for peace." In other words, the United States had only the obligation to push Chiang Kai-shek to capitulate to Japan through negotiations but no right to mediate between the two on terms agreeable to the U.S. Government. This demonstrated Japan's ambition to annex all of China.

Although the United States disliked the aforementioned proposal, Hull told Nomura that "it is not difficult for the United States to help Japan to extricate itself from its unfortunate war against China, if it promises not to launch attacks on the British and U.S. protectorates in Southeast Asia." On 21 June, the United States asked Japan to transmit its terms for negotiations between Japan and China to the American side as soon as possible, in addition to informing Japan of America's conditions for such negotiations, conditions essentially similar to those listed in the "proposal of mutual understanding between Japan and the United States." Hull told Nomura that if the aforementioned U.S. conditions were acceptable, "my government will proceed to suggest to the Zhongqing government that it hold negotiations with the Japanese Government to end their hostilities and to restore peace between them." ("U.S. Documents on Foreign Relations," Vol 2, p 475) But the Japanese foreign minister considered the U.S. conditions laid down by Hull unacceptable,

feeling that it did not make any sense to continue talks with Americans in this way. The talks between Japan and the United States were suspended in late July because of Japan's invasion of southern Indochina.

During a meeting held in his majesty's presence on 6 September, the Japanese leaders decided to put off "a declaration of war on the United States" until early October depending on whether progress could be made in negotiations so that Japan could get what it wanted. On 11 September, Japan conveyed to the United States the following "basic conditions for peace between Japan and China": "Recognize Manchukuo, organize the Chiang and Wang regimes into a coalition government, start economic cooperation between Japan and China in developing and utilizing the latter's resources vital to national defense, permit the Japanese armed forces and warships to be stationed in some designated localities in times of need as indicated in the past agreement and regulations." At a time when the fever for war between Japan and the United States had heated up to an explosive point, the latter seemingly felt more anxious than ever to prevent the former from embarking on a military adventure into Southeast Asia at the expense of China. It was also precisely at this time that the plot for a Far East Munich, hatched by the United States and Japan, reached a peak. On 6 November, Roosevelt conveyed the idea to Secretary of War Stimson that "a proposal for China and Japan to cease their military actions for 6 months and to negotiate for peace during this period may work." ("Stimson Diary" compiled by the Japanese International Political Society, Vol 7, p 439)

On 10 November, Roosevelt conveyed a proposal to Nomura to conclude a temporary agreement between the United States and Japan. In his report to his home government summing up his meeting with Roosevelt, Nomura said: "This marks the first time that the U.S. Government is willing to play a role in bridging the gap between Chiang Kai-shek and our government during the negotiations for peace." Later, Roosevelt and Hull directed the Far Eastern Affairs Division of the Department of State to prepare a draft proposal for temporary agreement, which states: "The United States will suggest to the Chinese and Japanese governments that they settle their disputes through peaceful means and that direct friendly negotiations be immediately opened between them; the Japanese Government propose a ceasefire to the Chinese Government during the period of their friendly negotiations; the United States would suspend its shipments of military supplies to China when the ceasefire between Japan and China is in effect and their friendly negotiations are under way." On 17 November, upon receiving special envoy Saburo Kurusu, sent by Japan, Roosevelt told him: "My administration may be able to introduce Japan and China to each other and to persuade them to proceed with the unfinished business of settling their disputes." He also personally drafted a temporary agreement for a 6-month ceasefire, as stated above. In view of this, on the eve of the outbreak of the Pacific war, the United States did try hard to achieve a compromise with Japan at the expense of China. Acknowledging this, Roosevelt's confidant Harry Hopkins said: "This deal of ours is very

unpopular with the people in the Far East." ("Roosevelt and Hopkins" by Sherwood, 1950 edition, New York, p 429)

Then why was the United States unable to sacrifice China? Credit should mainly go to the Chinese people, under the leadership of the Communist Party and Chairman Mao, for their perseverance in carrying on the war against Japan, in opposing capitulation and in the timely exposure and prompt rejection of the plot for a Far East Munich. On 25 May 1941, Chairman Mao issued an instruction entitled "Expose the Plot for a Far East Munich" to the entire party and people throughout our country. In it he said: "A compromise between Japan and the United States at the expense of China and the creation of a Far East Munich against communism and the Soviet Union--this is the new plot being hatched by Japan, the United States and Chiang Kai-shek. We must oppose this plot and fight it." ("Selected Works of Mao Zedong," 1967 combined edition, People's Publishing House, p 762) On 16 May, JIEFANG RIBAO, organ of the Chinese Communist Party, began to carry one editorial after another exposing this plot and solemnly warning that "The war of resistance against Japan carried on by the broad masses of the Chinese people absolutely brooks no sellout. Anyone who wants to offend or provoke the most powerful people should be prepared to suffer burns on his head and forehead." (JIEFANG RIBAO 30 May 1941 editorial: "Question Guomindang About the Far East Munich") When the Americans engaged in deals behind closed doors, they were wary of the Chinese people's opposition. Hull told Nomura on several occasions that "I hope that the actions taken by the U.S. Government will not touch off an explosion." The so-called "explosion" here refers to the Chinese people's struggle against a Far East Munich.

Furthermore, the contention between Japan and the United States over control of the Chinese mainland was a form of irreconcilable contradiction. Japan wanted to swallow up all of China free from the American influence. But this Japanese scheme could never be tolerated by the United States.

Secondly, the United States also faced a dilemma in the process of plotting its Far East Munich. For example, while thinking of betraying China, the United States feared that Japan might pull all its troops out of China and move them southward and speed up its drive into Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the United States also hoped that China's war of resistance against Japan would play a restraining role in Japan's drive to conquer Southeast Asia.

The Far East Munich plot became bankrupt for the aforementioned reasons.

III

"Scramble for 'world hegemony' is an integral part of the imperialist policy." ("On Sarcasm of Marxism and 'Imperialist Economism,'" Chinese edition of "Collection of Lenin's Works," Vol 23, p 26) The pacification

policy is a tactic used by imperialists to contend for world hegemony in a given period. On the eve of the Pacific war, in order to seek hegemony over the Asia-Pacific region, the United States had to impose economic sanctions on Japan. The pacification policy adopted by the United States during World War II was an integral part of its global strategy aimed at winning control over Europe as its first priority and gaining domination over the Asia-Pacific region as the second priority.

The United States is located on the far side of the Atlantic Ocean. When the world war broke out in September 1939, it was not under a direct threat from Germany; the geographic advantage enabled it to adopt a policy of "sitting atop the mountain to watch the tigers fight." In this connection, Chairman Mao said in 1939 that besides the Anglo-French bloc and the German-Italian-Japanese bloc, "there is a third bloc in the capitalist world, headed by the United States and including a number of Central and South American countries. In its own interests, this bloc will not enter the war for the time being. In the name of neutrality, U.S. imperialism is temporarily refraining from joining either of the belligerents, so as to be able to come on the scene later and contend for the leadership of the capitalist world." ("Interview With a NEW CHINA DAILY Correspondent on the New International Situation" by Mao Zedong, combined edition of "Selected Works of Mao Zedong," p 946) The drastic development of the war in Europe in 1940 also had a strong influence on the United States. After France was defeated, and Great Britain was in grave danger, the United States had to abandon the policy of sitting atop the mountain to watch tigers fight and entered the European war. Confronted by two powerful enemies--fascist Germany and militaristic Japan on the opposite sides of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the United States had to concentrate its resources on dealing with Germany and winning the European war first before it could do anything in the Asia-Pacific region. For this reason, it had to adopt a pacification policy toward Japan and the Pacific region with the aim of avoiding the war with Japan. In this connection, Hull once said: "Both the president and I agreed that it is our interests not to pass up any opportunity to avoid war in the Pacific. The threat of Hitlerism from the opposite side of the Atlantic Ocean provides ample reason for us to take every conceivable step to preserve peace in another wing." This was the core of the U.S. pacification policy toward Japan. Europe had long been the pie in which all imperialists wanted to put their fingers. U.S. Secretary of the War Stimson once said: "U.S. foreign policy is guided by the principle of regarding Europe as the decisive stage of the world struggle."

An analysis of the U.S. investment in Europe and Asia and its trade relations with these two continents clearly shows that its major economic interests rested with Europe. In 1940, U.S. investments abroad totaled \$7 billion, \$1.42 billion of which went to Europe. If the British commonwealth nation--Canada--were included, its investment in Europe rose to 4.5 billion, or 64 percent of the total. ("U.S. Historical Statistics From the Colonial Period to 1957" compiled by the U.S. Census

Bureau, 1960 edition, p 556) In 1940, U.S. investments in major Asian countries was only \$260 million, or 3.7 percent of the total. In 1940, the United States exported \$1,645,000,000 worth of goods to Europe, accounting for 41 percent of its total export volume, and \$618 million worth of goods to Asia, accounting for 14 percent of its total export volume.

Although the United States had a great strategic interest in seeking world hegemony, its strength clearly could not measure up to its will. The United States was well aware that if it decided to fight wars across the two oceans, its resources would be overextended. When the war broke out in the Pacific in December 1941, the U.S. Navy had 389 warships, totaling over 1,426,000 tons as compared with Japan's 233 warships totaling 976,000 tons, which accounted for 68 percent of the U.S. naval strength in terms of tonnage. Their divisions of aircraft carriers and heavy cruisers were almost comparable in firepower, although Japan had two more aircraft carriers than the United States. The United States had 3,500 aircraft carrier-launched airplanes compared with Japan's 3,200. This comparison shows that if the United States fought wars on the two oceans, its naval power would be outgunned by the Japanese fleets in the Pacific Ocean.

The aforementioned factors induced the United States to concentrate its armed forces on the Atlantic Ocean and neglect its defense in the Far East. Consequently, on the eve of the Pacific war, the U.S. Asian fleet based at Manila had only 45 warships, including three cruisers. The U.S. Far Eastern Command, established in July 1941, had only 42,000 men in the army, three air force squadrons, and 900 Marines, plus some local defense units. The U.S. Pacific fleet based at Pearl Harbor had only three aircraft carriers, compared with Japan's nine; nine battleships, compared with Japan's 10; and 21 heavy cruisers as against Japan's 35. Furthermore, there were shortcomings in the Hawaiian reconnaissance system. According to the original plan, the U.S. Army based in Hawaii should be armed with 180 B-17 airplanes. But ultimately it could get only 12, six of which were out of commission or in need of repair; Hawaii's 14th Naval Base should have been reinforced with an additional 100 reconnaissance planes, but eventually it could get none of them. In a letter to Ickes, Roosevelt said: "To the United States, it is very important to control the Atlantic Ocean and to maintain peace in the Pacific Ocean. Even a minor stir in the Pacific Ocean can draw our battleships away from the Atlantic Ocean." ("The Road to the Pacific War," Vol 7, p 400) This idea originated from the strategic concept of giving first priority to Europe and second priority to Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

Because the balance of military power in the Pacific Ocean tipped in favor of Japan, the most worrisome development in the eyes of the United States was that Japan, pursuant to the third provision of the three-nation military pact with Germany and Italy, might mount attacks on the United States behind its back, thus forcing it to fight wars on the two

oceans. This worry was especially realistic as the United States became increasingly involved in the war on the European front. With the three-nation pact as its backing, Japan became bolder and more provocative than ever in Southeast Asia. This was why the three-nation pact became the focal point in negotiations between Japan and the United States until war broke out in the Pacific.

Before Japan declared war on the United States, the former continued to coax the latter to promote the pacification policy and the Far East Munich plot. For example, on 25 September 1941, Japan explained the three-nation pact to the United States this way: "As the United States goes to war in Europe, Japan enjoys complete freedom in interpreting its obligations and commitment to the three-nation pact." ("Chronicle of Japanese Diplomacy and Its Major Documents" compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, p 550) This means that Japan was not under German and Italian influence and pressure, although it did not say whether it would honor its obligations to the pact. This gave the United States a hopeful sign for further agreement. On 17 November, Roosevelt and Hull repeatedly brought the subject of the three-nation pact up for discussion during a meeting with Nomura and Kurusu. In this connection, Kurusu wrote: "Among the three thorny problems during the negotiations, the three-nation pact commanded America's greatest attention. Just as the president pointed out on 17 November 1941, the pact should be nullified before any general agreement could be reached and signed so that the United States could completely relieve itself of any worry that Japan might attack it from behind its back, as the situation developed in Europe for better or for worse." ("Secret Diplomacy Between Japan and the United States" by Saburo Kurusu, 1952 edition, p 129) This indicates that in order to achieve its goal of controlling Europe, the United States never wanted to give up its pacification policy in Asia until a few days before the outbreak of the Pacific war and until Japan declared war on the United States and Great Britain.

However, the Japanese bombs that fell on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 8 December 1941 exploded America's dream of disintegrating the three-nation pact and avoiding the Pacific war and smashed its global strategy of giving first priority to Europe and the Atlantic Ocean and second priority to Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Once under attack, the United States had no alternative but to counterattack and assume an active role in the Pacific war. On 11 December, Germany and Italy followed Japan with a declaration of war on the United States, in accordance with the third provision of the three-nation military pact, thus turning the conflicts in the European and Asian continents into a worldwide war both in name and in fact.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EARLIER OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II TRACED

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[Article by Liang Zhosheng [2733 0587 3932]: "Why Did the German Fascists Start World War II Ahead of Time?"]

[Text] The German Fascists originally planned to start World War II in 1943-45, but eventually started the war 4 to 6 years ahead, in 1939. Why and how did the German Fascists start World War II ahead of time? A study of these questions should be helpful toward expounding the origin of World War II.

I. Proof As to the Question That the German Fascists Really Planned to Start World War II in 1943-45

In order to analyze the question that the German Fascists started World War II ahead of time, we must first of all perceive clearly the truth as to how Hitler planned to start World War II in 1943-45.

Fascism is war. The ambition with which the German Fascists started World War II was very great; they wanted not only to defeat Britain and France and disintegrate the Soviet Union under Stalin's leadership, but even to attack the United States, vainly thinking of establishing "The Third Reich" as the hegemonic power of the world. For this purpose, the German Fascists fabricated a whole war theory in terms of "total war" as the basis for starting the war.

"Total war" as propagated by the German Fascists meant total militarization, with emphasis placed on well planned preparatory work for the aggressive war in the economic, political, diplomatic, military as well as ideological aspect. Then, a "blitzkrieg" would be launched to destroy the enemy side by superior armed forces and achieve victory by a quick decision in a quick war. In order to realize this criminal goal of the war, it was necessary for the German Fascists to set a time limit for the starting of the war so that preparatory work for the war would be completed before this time limit.

in 1937, Germany entered the stage of preparing for the start of the world war. Hence, a question was raised as to when the war should get started. On November 5 in that year, Hitler formally declared the date for starting the war at a conference of Germany's principal military and administrative chieftains. He set forth three scenarios for starting the war but placed emphasis on the question of starting the war in "1943-45" and pointed out that "1943-45" was the date for starting the war according to his "plan."¹ He said, this was the result of his "thorough consideration and more than 4 and a half years of executive experience"; should he suddenly meet death, it should be carried out as his "will." Then, he gave a careful explanation to the decision, emphatically pointing out that during the given period Germany's "equipment for the army, the navy, and the air force and staffing of officers would be generally completed, and material equipment and weapons would be new," but "after this date, conditions would only become disadvantageous to us."² Here, Hitler paid great attention to achieving superiority in military equipment as the necessary condition for starting the war, for, without such superiority in military equipment, it would be impossible to carry out a blitzkrieg against countries like Britain and France, nor to defeat them within a short period of time. At the same time, Hitler also repeatedly pointed out the necessity of establishing superiority in military strategy and selecting an advantageous international situation in order to launch the world war. He maintained that it was imperative to realize the annexation of Austria and the occupation of Czechoslovakia before 1943-45 in order to eliminate the threat from the flank of East Europe, and also to utilize the strength of Japan and Italy to divert the united strength of Britain and France and to increase the threat against the Soviet Union -- thereby reducing possible pressure for fighting a two-front war through these measures--and then start the war.³ But Hitler made an emphatical point to remind his principal military chieftains that World War II could not be started later than that date. Why? Because after that date, weapons would become old, and "the secrecy of 'secret weapons' could not be kept forever."⁴ Meanwhile, the supply of military manpower would be hard to keep up, food crisis would become serious, military expenditure would become exorbitant; and even more importantly, Britain and France would continue to reinforce their armed forces and adopt various measures against Germany, and Germany would lose its military superiority. Therefore, he could not wait any longer. Consequently, he conveyed to his principal military and administrative chieftains an order as follows: "His unchangeable determination was: to solve Germany's Lebensraum question (i. e., to start an aggressive war--quoter) by 1943-45 the latest."⁵

In view of the fact that whether the proposition that the German Fascists started World War II ahead of time can be firmly established depends on whether the view that Hitler wanted to have the war started in 1943-45 is fully acknowledged, we therefore propose to examine this question further from 4 different aspects.

First, Hitler's decision to prepare for the launching of the world war in 1943-45 was not only announced at the conference of his principal military and administrative chieftains but also conveyed to all the commanding officers. Before the occupation of Sudetenland, differences developed between Hitler and his commanding officers over the question of the execution of the "Green Plan."⁶ After the Munich Conference, Hitler, in order to soothe the dissatisfaction of the German army to explain to his subordinates, indicating that before 1942-43 (1944-45 according to another source) there was going to be no war against Britain, and asking that they calmly carry on their preparatory work for the war.⁷ Meanwhile, Hitler also indicated often to commanding officers of the navy that at least in the ensuing 6 years there was no need for them to fight against Britain. These aforesaid events prove that Hitler had actually repeatedly considered, in the process of preparing for the war, the question of starting the war in 1943-45; and even when he got into arguments with his generals he did not mind doing this just in order to mitigate the internal contradictions of the German armed forces.

Second, Principal commanding officers of German Fascism, like Hitler himself, maintained that preparatory work for the war would not be completed until after 1942. Former chief-of-staff of the German army Beck "was convinced that before 1942 or 1943 the new army could not be viewed as a reliable instrument for military action. And even Keitel (a chieftain in the Supreme Military Command Hqrs. of Germany -- quoter) thought that before then no military action could be of any consequence."⁸ As for the time limit set for the accomplishment of the tasks for building up the German navy, it was still delayed further. Commander-in-Chief of the German navy Raeder, in a letter to his subordinates dated June 11, 1940, provided a detailed explanation in this regard. The letter said: the building of the German fleet was entirely "carried out according to the political requirements set forth" by Hitler.⁹ In the last hour prior to the outbreak of the war, Hitler still "hoped to avoid any dangerous conflict with Britain before 1944-45."¹⁰ Because only by 1944-45 was Germany "able to achieve conspicuous superiority on submarines, and to secure an even more dominant position on other vessels, especially vessels built for fighting on the high seas."¹¹ This letter fully illustrates that it was according to Hitler's decision to start the war in 1943-45 that Raeder prescribed the time limit for accomplishing the tasks of building up the navy. Hence, from the time limits for completing the armament programs set by the principal commanding officers of German Fascism, it can be seen that the view that they did not intend to start the war before 1943-45 was a fact.

Third, Before the outbreak of the war, the German Fascists consistently assured Mussolini that they were not going to start the world war before 1942, and even when Hitler's launching of the war ahead of time was questioned by Mussolini, they still dared not to refute him but merely shunned him. What should be pointed out is that, after the Munich Conference,

Germany already started to consider the question of launching the world war. Under such circumstances, Germany should have informed its ally Italy of its own consideration of launching the war ahead of time. But Germany was afraid of letting out its war secret and hence chose to keep it from Mussolini and Ciano, daring not to tell the truth. Therefore, till March 1939. Hitler still told Italy's Ambassador to Germany Attolico that Germany was not thinking of starting the war, and the reasons were: "Military preparations were not yet ready, and would not be ready even after another two years or more; the navy still fell short; Japan's burden was too heavy and thus could not provide any effective help."¹² On May 6, 1939, when Ciano met in his talks with Ribbentrop he emphatically pointed out to the Germans that "At least within 3 years Italy wishes to avoid war. Unexpectedly to the Italian, Ribbentrop agreed that Germany also hopes to maintain peace for such a long time."¹³ This was the basis for the signing of the German-Italian "Steel Convention"; that is, "the two sides agree not to plunge into war before 1942."¹⁴ Although Germany and Italy negotiated in secrecy, the secrets of their negotiation were already detected by French Ambassador to Germany Andre Francois-Poncet. In his memoirs he recorded thus: Germany and Italy mutually agreed that "war would break out only after 1942."¹⁵ Although Germany and Italy had this agreement, Italy gradually discovered that Germany was preparing to launch the war while keeping the matter from their knowledge; unable to bear this any longer, they finally despatched Ciano to Berlin on August 11, 1939, to find out what was going on. This time Hitler could not but tell the truth, as he said to Ciano that now was the best time to get the war started and a delay could no longer be tolerated. After hearing this, Ciano was astonished, and after he returned to Rome he denounced both Ribbentrop and Hitler as having reneged on their own promise. Some 10-odd days later, Mussolini received the letter from Hitler on the launching of World War II ahead of time. In his reply Mussolini said: "In our several talks, we have expected the war to take place after 1942."¹⁶ Now, because of the launching of the war ahead of time, Italy was not yet well prepared; if Italy was expected to participate in the fighting, Germany must "immediately provide us with munitions and raw materials to enable us to cope with the attacks France and Britain would probably launch against us; then we can of course participate at once."¹⁷ He also purposely requested 17 million tons of munitions and war materiel from Hitler in order to create a dilemma for Hitler, and at the same time establish a pretext for himself to get out of the deal.¹⁸ When Hitler received the letter, he could not do anything. He dared not to refute Mussolini, but only rebuked the latter in his back, alleging that, like in the case of 1914, he was trying to escape just before battle. Ultimately, Hitler found no better solution except to beg Italy to help him out militarily by posing some threat to Britain and France so as to wind up the matter.

Fourth, In recent years, people in the international historical circles have begun to pay attention to the question of Hitler's launching of World War II ahead of time. After some research, British historian Hart Liddel maintained that Hitler originally did not plan to fight against Britain before 1944 but later decided to launch the war ahead of time; one of the reasons for this was that Chamberlain's appeasement policy enabled him to complete his war preparations smoothly and he therefore made the decision to fight Britain ahead of time. Volume 2 of the Soviet Union's "History of World War II" (12-volume edition) points out: Hitler originally planned to launch the world war not later than 1943-45, but he eventually started the war when he secured military superiority in 1939. Noticeably, even British historian A. J. P. Taylor, who did not agree that Hitler had launched World War II with a definite purpose and according to a definite plan, was forced to acknowledge in his book "The Origins of World War II" the fact that Hitler had said that war would break out after 1942. He said: "According to ordinary experience, it (Germany -- quoter) must spend a period of 10 years (beginning from 1933 -- quoter) before it could become a formidable military power. Estimates like this could not possibly be all wrong. Hitler and Mussolini themselves held such a view, as they often presumed in their talks that 1943 would be the decisive year."¹⁹ That international historical works have gradually recognized the fact concerning Hitler's preparation to launch World War II in 1943-45 should attract our attention.

The facts above, from Hitler's own decision, the German generals' estimation, to Mussolini's circumstantial testimony and views of international historians, all prove that Hitler originally planned to launch World War II only in 1943-45.

II. German Fascists Took Advantage of the Appeasement Policy and Quickened the Pace for Launching the War

German Fascist war culprit Hitler was the greatest war adventurer in modern history; taking the risk to launch the war was a prominent demonstration of his class character. Thus, after he made the decision to launch the war in 1943-45, he never lost time to make use of all advantageous conditions to quicken the pace of war, and ultimately launched the war suddenly ahead of time. This was why he clamored at the meeting on November 5, 1937, when decision on the war date was made, that it was impossible not to take any risk in launching a war, that playing safe everywhere would accomplish nothing, and that "The Third Reich" was compelled to follow the warlike, risky path.²⁰

Historical facts prove that Hitler's taking the risk to launch the war was predicated upon the permissiveness of the appeasers. Like a pair of deformed twins, Hitler's war adventurism and the appeasement policy brought the scourge of war upon the people of the world. In December 1937, commander-in-chief of the German armed forces Blomberg offered a good explanation in

this regard. He said: Germany would start a war only after sufficient preparation. "But if, because Britain's fear of an all-European war, because of its indifference toward the affairs of Central Europe, and because of the development of conflict between Italy and France in the Mediterranean, there should emerge the situation in which no one except Russia would stand on the side of Czechoslovakia to oppose Germany, then, even before Germany is sufficiently prepared for the war, the 'Green Plan' can still be carried out."²¹ This is to say that if a situation advantageous to Germany should emerge, even when war preparations were insufficient, the country could still start the war ahead of time. What should be especially pointed out is that the German Fascists entrusted their hope of taking the risk and launching the war on Britain's "indifference toward the affairs of Central Europe," i. e., on Britain's practice of a policy of appeasement toward Germany; this is an even more thought-provoking question.

There was a long background for the fact that Hitler was quite pleased with this appeasement policy. Shortly after Hitler's access to power in 1933, he took advantage right away of the permissiveness of Britain's and France's appeasement policy to expand his armed forces and prepare for the war step by step. At the meeting of November 5, 1937, he clearly said to war criminals Goering, Raeder, Neurath, etc., that he was "convinced that Britain would not join the war, and also dissuaded of any possibility that France would take military action against Germany."²² This was namely the principle on which he proceeded to annex Austria and occupy Czechoslovakia. After he annexed Austria and occupied Czechoslovakia by taking advantage of the appeasement policy, he again proceeded to prepare the attack on Poland. At the meeting of May 23, 1939, he again said to the big bunch of war criminals like Goering, Raeder, Halder and Brauchitsch: "Britain will not launch any powerful attack to defeat us." "Our task is to isolate Poland. Successful isolation of Poland will be of decisive significance."²³ Thus he once more revealed his policy to isolate Poland by taking advantage of the appeasement policy, vainly thinking of occupying the country at one stroke. Even when he decided to launch the war against Poland, he still held that "Britain and France will not carry out their obligation (to aid Poland)."²⁴ The result was that Germany once again relied on the appeasement policy of Britain and France to defeat Poland in a short period of time. All of these were facts visible to everyone.

In this manner, Hitler, under the encouragement of the appeasement policy, continued to push the world toward the abyss of war one step after another close step. The approaches he adopted were invidious and poignant; a slight advantage of the appeasement policy to quicken the pace of war.

In the first place, he followed the original intention of the British appeasers to divert the course of disaster eastward, making noise in the East but aiming his strike at the West, so as to hypnotize Britain and France in gesture. In October 1936, Hitler imparted his counter-revolutionary experience in this regard to Ciano. It was his idea that so long as he continuously clamored against Bolshevism, it would be possible to win over Britain; then Britain would not only refrain from fighting Germany, but even "reach agreement and common understanding" with Germany.²⁵ But, Hitler would not fall into the trap of Chamberlain by directing the spearhead of war first toward the Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin. On this question, Ribbentrop's statement could not have been more thinly veiled, as he said: "According to the official view, Russia is treated as an enemy, but in reality everything is directed at Britain. Simultaneous opposition to Britain, France and the USSR is wrong, and this approach should certainly not be repeated."²⁶

Hence, Hitler intensified his effort to connive with Chamberlain; they coordinated with each other, and when one took the initiative, the other would automatically respond. As soon as Hitler decided to take advantage of the appeasement policy so as to complete the strategic deployments for the annexation of Austria and occupation of Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain also despatched his confidant Halifax to Germany to see Hitler. Once the two entered their secret plotting, a deal was soon closed. Halifax was deeply satisfied with Hitler's clamor against communism, unceasingly praising Germany as "the anti-Bolshevist bulwark of the West" and obsequiously bragging that, to the anti-Communist "cause," Hitler had already "made many contributions."²⁷ At the same time, he indicated that so long as Germany proceeded to realize its annexation of Austria and occupation of Czechoslovakia in the manner of "peaceful evolution," and Britain would not raise any objections.²⁸ After this meeting, Hitler repeatedly indicated that he was deeply "moved by the extraordinary sincerity, high principle, and utter frankness" of people like Halifax.²⁹ By Halifax's "extraordinary sincerity," "high principle" and "utter frankness" were meant by Hitler no other than the fact that Halifax let him carry out aggression in East Europe without restraint. From then on, Hitler made use of Britain's promise and unscrupulously pushed his preparatory work for a world war onto a new stage. Small wonder that even a major figure like the British Ambassador to Germany, Henderson, who served as the liaison between Britain and Germany. At the time, had to acknowledge that Germany's "good relations with Britain" implied that he (meaning Hitler) wanted Britain to give consent to his plan to re-draw the map of Central Europe."³⁰

Secondly, Hitler was adept at chanting the scripture of peace in order to sweep away obstacles in his war preparations. After his occupation of Sudetenland, Hitler confessed on November 10, 1938 the sinister goal of his constant use of the "strategy of peace." In his secret talk to the German journalist circles he divulged without external pressure by saying: "For 10 whole years, circumstances have compelled me to speak of nothing except peace. Only because of my consistent emphasis on the peaceful desires and peaceful attempts of Germany was it possible for me to gradually enable the

German people to gain their freedom and to master the weapons needed for the realization of the next step. Needless to say, the value of these years of propagation for peace is rather doubtful, because it very easily made people think that our system were connected with a determination and willingness to firmly maintain peace. But this is an erroneous perception of the goal embraced by our system of state." In reality, Germany's attitude was this: "If the solution cannot be found in a peaceful way, then the country would resort to the use of force."³¹ How thoroughly has this exposed Hitler's secret of chanting the scripture of peace! The truth was that Hitler's talk of peace for those 10 years was false; he was compelled by "circumstances" to do so. What the German Fascists needed was war and not peace; that was really Hitler's genuine original idea.

In the process of preparing for World War II, Hitler made full use of this "strategy of peace." Every time he started an aggressive war, he would chant the scripture of peace once, and then order his troops or his fifth columns to do everything possible in adopting ways acceptable to Britain and France for occupying the country subject to aggression or for putting pressure on such a country. On the day before he invaded Austria, Hitler issued this order: "When we march to the front, we must create the impression that we are not intentionally getting into a fight with our Austrian brothers. From the point of view of our interest, no activity of annexation should require the use of force; instead, the peaceful way of local residents welcoming our soldiers to march in should be adopted. Therefore, we should avoid all conflicts." (Here it should of course be also pointed out that Hitler was never going to abandon any opportunity to suppress the Austrian people. He said: "If Austria should put up resistance, then, by all means, let us destroy them by force without mercy.")³² Similarly, in the occupation of the Czechoslovak Sudetenland, the method of Austria's annexation was also adopted, but this time the way in which it was executed was even more invidious and poignant. Just as a report of the foreign ministry of Germany has pointed out, under this policy one must not be too impatient over the Czechoslovakia question; one must gradually create conditions and, before such conditions were ripe, not rush into any action. "Neither Britain nor France cares to get into trouble on behalf of Czechoslovakia." We can believe that if Czechoslovakia was not subject to "any direct external interference" but was to gradually disintegrate by itself, Britain and France would "both allow Czechoslovakia to be disposed of by fate." But this process should be gradually carried out through the forms of "plebescite" and "territorial concession." "If this action is not carried out in any hurry, it would not incur any swift reaction from the Allies anyway." "We must avoid the greater danger, and manage to have things develop in the direction advantageous to us."³³ Thus, Hitler did his best to get his military preparations ready according to the "Green Plan" for the invasion of Czechoslovakia on the one hand and, on the other hand, used the "peaceful evolution" approach to instigate the Nazi elements in Czechoslovakia -- the German partisans in Sudetenland to create disturbances as a way to prepare conditions for the invasion. It was in this manner that Czechoslovakia gradually became Hitler's captive.

Third, Hitler demonstrated a whole "divide and rule" approach in isolating the countries subject to his aggression and eventually achieving the goal of crushing them one by one. In the process of Hitler's preparation for the launching of the war, he adopted the method of crushing the enemies one by one by planning on "finishing the fight against one before taking on another." Hitler himself admitted: in the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the invasion of Poland, "the goal should not be achieved through one action"; efforts must be made to eat them up one by one.³⁴ Thus, Hitler's occupation of Sudetenland was merely to pave way for the elimination of the entire Czechoslovakia. By the time Czechoslovakia was eliminated, the seizure of Poland would be like taking a thing out of a bag, i. e., easy as turning one side of one's palm to another.

Sowing discord between Britain and France on the one hand and Austria and Czechoslovakia on the other was an important component of Hitler's "divide and rule" approach. Hitler knew that countries like Austria and Czechoslovakia were supported by Britain and France; if these countries abruptly lost the support of Britain and France, then Germany would be able to invade and occupy them one by one without encountering obstruction. Before annexing Austria, Hitler clearly knew that Britain and France were not going to interfere. He therefore said to Austrian Premier Schuschnigg: "Britain? Britain is not going to move a finger for Austria"; "France?...to France it is already too late today." Since Austria refused to surrender, Germany simply sent troops to have it occupied.³⁵ Austria became immediately isolated, and ultimately had to place hope in Italy. But, at the last minute, Italy abandoned Schuschnigg, and let Hitler dispose of Austria. Seeing that his "divide and rule" approach was achieving results, Hitler extended profuse thanks to Mussolini. He said: "I am no longer afraid of the terrible military situation in which we might find ourselves should we ever get involved in a conflict." "I really thank him from the bottom of my heart. I shall never, never forget this."³⁶ These words of Hitler on the one hand reflect how he was afraid of interference by Italy, which might stop his move to annex Austria, and, on the other hand, also illustrate how he needed to rely on divisive approaches to isolate Austria in order to achieve the goal of annexation.

Czechoslovakia was even more of a victim of Hitler's "divide and rule" approach based on such divisive strategy. Czechoslovakia concluded a treaty of alliance with France, and the Soviet Union also concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia; ordinarily, it would not be easy for Hitler to achieve the goal of dismembering Czechoslovakia. But Hitler first applied pressure on Britain, and then let Britain force France to abandon the Franco-Czechoslovak military treaty. Subsequently, they also came up with a Munich plot to have the ally of France sold by the hands of Britain and France to Germany. This method of driving a wedge between countries reached its peak of sophistication during this period.³⁷ Even General T. Taylor, American prosecutor in the 1947-49 trial of the German diplomatic criminals,

had to admit: countries like Austria and Czechoslovakia were occupied by Nazi diplomats "in accordance with the divide-and-rule principle of Hitler's foreign policy." "Prior to aggression each time, the defendants (meaning German diplomatic offenders -- quoter) engaged themselves in frenzy activities in order to have the country politically isolated by diplomatic means."³⁸ In the process of occupying Czechoslovakia, diplomatic chieftains like Von Weizsaecker "exerted diplomatic pressure to sabotage the relations between Czechoslovakia and its allies Britain and France, and thereby keep Czechoslovakia isolated under the pressure of German power just like Austria."³⁹

Fourth, When Austria and Czechoslovakia became isolated, Germany then its troops to occupy them according to the "Austrian Trusteeship Plan" or the "Green Plan" already formulated long ago. However stated, it was very difficult for Germany to carry out direct military occupation, because Germany would be hard put to cope with French counter-attack from its western border. On the eve of the occupation of Sudetenland, a commander on the western front of the German army said: the western front could not resist three weeks of attack by France. Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia's defense works in the hills were solid and reliable and hard to conquer. But when the German Fascists formulated their "Green Plan," they relied on the appeasement policy of Britain and France as their basis. They thus placed their main force on the eastern front, leaving only scanty troops on the western front as cover. In doing so, they had long expected Britain and France not to send any troops to intervene. Thus, ultimately Germany achieved the goal of occupation without firing a single shot. Why? Hitler himself answered this question. He said: "Only when I was firmly convinced that France would send no army, just as at the time we re-occupied the Rhineland demilitarized zone and took over Austria, and hence Britain would also not interfere, did I decide to attack Czechoslovakia."⁴⁰ This was the confession, bare and clear, as to how they took advantage of the appeasement policy to accomplish their strategic deployment.

Thus, within 22 short months, from Austria to Poland, Germany accomplished its deployment for launching the world war without obstruction, placing the several invaded countries under its enslavement one by one. The more Hitler's aggressive activities were spared from punishment, the more daring he became, and the quicker the pace of the war. All of these can only be attributed to the permissiveness of the British and French appeasement policy and also to the dexterity with which Hitler took advantage of such permissiveness in order to strengthen his own strategic position. Is this not very clear?

III. The Various Factors Causing the German Fascist to Start the World War Ahead of Time

After occupying Czechoslovakia, Hitler seized the then emerging political and military situation advantageous to Germany and put all his eggs in one basket by recklessly launching the war. On May 23, 1939, Hitler declared at a meeting at the German Supreme Command Headquarters: "Britain is a driving force against Germany" and "is our enemy"; war with Britain and France was inevitable. And it was also "a question of life and death."⁴¹ Prior to this, at the meeting on November 5, 1937, he decided to launch the war in 1943-45. But now he could wait no further, because "after another 2 or 3 years all this advantageous situation would disappear." "Today is more advantageous than 2 or 3 years from now." Thereafter, he immediately proceeded with his unscrupulous action, banking on the defeat of Britain and France by his adventurous launching of the war. He clamored: "Today is still not too late, the West will not interfere. We must take the necessary risk to attack with unshakable determination. Political leaders must take risks just as military leaders. The solemn choice before us is: either attack or wait to be eliminated sooner or later."⁴² The adventurist nature of this war maniac Hitler was thus completely exposed here.

Of course, we cannot just emphasize Hitler's warlike adventurist nature in isolation, but must relate it to various factors prompting him to launch the war in a hurry at the time in our analysis; only thus can the causes for Hitler to launch World War II ahead of time be comprehensively explained.

The various factors prompting Hitler to launch World War II ahead of time were:

First, Germany's armament already attained a definite superiority; if the war was not launched then, this superiority would be lost.

After the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Germany's military power became considerably augmented. Germany absorbed the Czechoslovak army of 35 finely equipped divisions. In the meantime, Germany secured advantageous conditions also in military deployment. Before occupying Czechoslovakia, Germany needed a force greater than 35 divisions to cope with that country. After its occupation, Germany needed not only no longer to use the numerous troops deployed along the Czechoslovak border, but also turn them directly against Poland. Also, the considerable military productive capability of Czechoslovakia now combined with the great military productive capability of Germany further strengthened Germany's munition production. At this time Goering issued an order to expand the country's air force production by 5 times; tasks in building naval vessels were to be completed as soon as possible; and the army's preparedness was to further improve. By the middle of 1939, Hitler, Ribbentrop, etc., considered that German armament had already attained temporary superiority and the good opportunity must not be lost; hence they were determined to launch the war.

Second, Germany already secured superiority in military strategy, which favored the launching of the world war.

After the occupation of Czechoslovakia was secured, Poland became subject to German attack from both flanks, and Poland's industrial center was only 25 minutes of flying distance away from the base of the German air force. Therefore, a chieftain at the high command of the German armed forces, Jodl, had this to say: Upon the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the German army "can consider the Poland question under a more or less advantageous strategic premise."⁴³

Meanwhile, along with the conclusion of the civil war in Spain, Hitler established a Fascist regime under the control of Franco in the Iberian Peninsula, thereby encircling France from both sides and threatening the strategic fortress in the western Mediterranean -- Gibraltar, and the links between France and her North African colonies became also cut.

Hitler hastened to build Germany's own military alliance. On May 22, 1939, Germany and Italy signed the "Steel Convention" to conclude a military alliance. The two sides agreed that once Germany launched the world war Italy must join in. Germany thus attempted to strengthen its strategic superiority by the conclusion of this German-Italian military alliance.

Besides, Germany also improved its strategic position in the Balkan Peninsula. In April 1939, Italy occupied Albania. Hitler expressed profound satisfaction about this, pointing out that "The recent incident in Albania is another factor of advantage to us, because this has put forces in the Balkan in balance. A situation of drastic disturbance has emerged in Yugoslavia. There has been no increase in Romania's strength; she is easily invaded and cannot sustain much of an attack. Hungary and Bulgaria are threatening her...."⁴⁴ Thus Hitler was building up a front against Britain and France in the Balkan Peninsula.

Thus Hitler built an advancing front in the fight against Britain and France, which ran from the Atlantic, via Spain, crossing the Italian-French and German-French borders, connecting Austria and Czechoslovakia, and through Albania. With this strategic superiority in place, Germany decided to start the war against Britain and France.

Third, contradictions between Germany and Britain and France became already very sharp; the question of Germany's attempt to take colonies back from, and divide them with, Britain and France was already placed on the country's agenda. In order to snatch colonies from Britain and France, Germany must launch the war in time.

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, Germany had already become an economic superpower in the capitalist world; but the pre-war colonies of Germany had mostly been divided up by Britain and France. With this, Hitler was very dissatisfied, and he must struggle for these colonies with Britain and France. But when Germany negotiated with Britain and France over the question of these colonies, Britain and France always had some pretext and showed an unwillingness to solve it. Hitler pointed out: Britain would say, "Ask France first"; and then France would turn the question back to Britain. And when the question was proposed to both Britain and France, the two would shift the question still to other countries.⁴⁵ Therefore, it was not possible for Germany to tolerate forever this approach on the part of Britain and France. But Hitler said, in order to propose this question about the colonies to Britain and France he must select an advantageous time; that is to say, "Only when Britain finds itself in a difficult situation and the German Reich becomes strong and armed will it be possible for us to get down to serious discussion over the question of returning our colonies to us."⁴⁶

By the time the occupation of Czechoslovakia was accomplished, Germany began to command a military superiority; she was then determined to solve the question about the colonies with Britain and France. Since the German demand on the colonies was very exacting, it was naturally unlikely to be accepted by Britain and France. The talks on this question about the colonies between Britain and Germany proceeded in secrecy until a few days prior to the outbreak of the war. Hitler let it be known at the time that "If the British government considers these demands to be beneficial to both Germany and Britain, peace will be preserved; if the German suggestions are declined by Britain, war will begin."⁴⁷ Britain ultimately declined the German demands. A few days later, Germany formally issued the order to battle.

Fourth, in 6 and a half years of mad military expansion and war preparations, the German Fascists exhausted all their capital. When the German economy was bordering on collapse by 1939, Hitler launched the world war in order to get the country out of its economic difficulties.

Since the economic crisis of 1929-33, Germany had directed the country's economy toward the course of war. By the time war broke out, Hitler admitted that Germany had spent the huge sum of more than 90 million marks in preparation for it.⁴⁸ This gigantic expenditure in military operations brought unbearable burdens to the German economy and German people. At this time, the state debt of Germany exceeded 60 billion marks, and the people's tax burden leaped time and again, increasing from 10.5 billion marks in 1933 to 27.2 billion marks in 1939. Gold reserve was extremely low. The German economy could no longer sustain itself. The German general B. (Mueller-Grierbrand) pointed out: "'Going to war' is the only way out."⁴⁹ Hitler himself also warned: the German economic situation was bad, and the only way out was to start the war.⁵⁰ For the sake of escaping from its economic crisis, the German Fascists were very anxious to launch World War II.

Fifth, because the German Fascists' international united front could not be built, and Germany, in addition, also wanted to avoid fighting a two-front war, Hitler therefore seized the opportunity for belligerence and started World War II.

To the German Fascists, it was necessary to avoid fighting a two-front war after launching the world conflict. During World War I, it had been debilitated and exhausted by the very question of fighting a two-front war. After World War I, headquarters of the German general staff did all the thinking they could, but still found no sure solution. Thus, by the eve of World War II, they were most eager to avoid fighting a two-front war and did all they could to sabotage the British-French-Soviet negotiations of 1939, so that Britain, France and the Soviet Union would be unable to form an anti-German international united front. The German Ambassador to Britain Dirksen revealed this anxiety on the part of Germany in one glaring statement, as he said: "The danger of Britain's encircling policy (meaning the anti-German Fascist international united front the British-French-Soviet negotiations aimed at forming her--quoter) to Germany is known to all Germans; the German people are firmly united in their readiness to eliminate this danger."⁵¹

Chamberlain and the Daladier regime, in their negotiations with the Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin, lacked sincerity and also created many obstacles. These approaches on the part of Chamberlain and Daladier were naturally utilized by Germany to its own advantage. Dirksen confessed that Germany "considered that the most effective method would be to try to influence the British leaders in the following two aspects: first, to warn them that they must oppose that kind of encircling policy; and second, to make a proposal to carry out cooperation and coordination."⁵² The British appeasers thought precisely of putting pressure on Germany through the British-French-Soviet negotiations so as to realize the goal of conniving with Germany in the first place; now, Germany took the initiative to "make a proposal to carry out cooperation and coordination" with Britain, this was of course welcomed by the Chamberlain government in Britain. On this point, Dirksen had this to say: "Because of this...the British government thereby turned... that inclination toward coordination into positive action by actually abandoning that exclusive policy of building an encircling front and embracing, instead, the approach of negotiating with Germany in order to reach an agreement with that country."⁵³ Thus, from May to the end of August, 1939, negotiations between Britain and Germany never stopped. But, because of various reasons, British-German negotiations did not reach any agreement, and British-French-Soviet negotiations also halted on account of British and French feet-dragging. Under such circumstances, a Hitler already eager to launch the war thereby signed the Soviet-German Treaty of Mutual Non-aggression to avoid fighting a two-front war.

On September 1, 1939, the German Fascists despatched 1.5 million troops to attack Poland. Thus, World War II broke out 4 to 6 years ahead of the date originally set by Hitler.

Footnotes:

1. "Conference Minutes of the Secretariat of the Reich" (November 5, 1937). Published in P. A. (Lyudenko), ed., "The Nuremberg Trial of Principal German War Criminals" (compilation of documents, 3-volume edition), vol 1, Moscow, 1965, p 129.
2. Ibid., pp 123, 128.
3. 4. 5. Ibid., pp 129-131, 128, 129.
6. It should be pointed out here that the German Fascist leaders such as Hitler all owe cumulated blood debts to the people of the world; although they had at times certain quarrels with Hitler over certain concrete military questions, those questions were trivial and secondary and they can thus in no way be relieved of their criminal responsibility for the war.
7. B. (Mueller-Grierbrand): "The German Army (1933-1945)" (Russian translation), vol 1, Moscow, 1956, p 160.
8. Walter Goerlitz: "Headquarters of the German General Staff" (English translation), London, 1953 edition, p 299.
9. 10. 11. "The Nuremberg Trial of Principal German Criminals" (7-volume collection), vol 2, 1958 edition, p 835.
12. "The Diary of Ciano (1939-1943)," New York, 1946 edition, p 50.
13. 14. Wm. Shirer: "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich," New York, 1960 edition, pp 482, 553.
15. Andre Francois-Poncet: "Memoirs on Mission to Germany," Paris, 1946 edition, p 309.
16. 17. Winston Churchill: "Memoirs on World War II," vol 1, London, 1972 edition, p 356.
18. "Diary of Ciano," p 129.
19. A. J. P. Taylor: "Origins of World War II," London, 1961 edition, pp 74-75.
20. "The Nuremberg Trial of Principal German War Criminals" (3-volume edition), vol 1, pp 126-128.

21. "Appendix to Blomberg's Directive on Joint Preparations of the Armed Forces for War," published in B. U. (Dashichev): "Bankruptcy of the German Fascist Strategy -- Brief History, Documents and Data" (hereafter cited as "Bankruptcy"), vol 1, Moscow, 1973 edition, p 210.
22. "The Nuremberg Trial of Principal German War Criminals" (3-volume collection), vol 1, pp 132-133.
23. "Records of Meetings between Hitler and Leaders of the Armed Forces" (May 23, 1939), published in "Bankruptcy," vol 1, p 134.
24. "Records of Meetings Between Hitler and Leaders of the Armed Forces" (August 22, 1938), "Bankruptcy," vol 1, p 139.
25. E. M. (Robeson): "Hitler's Pre-war Policy and Military Plan," London, 1963 edition, p 97.
26. Quoted from "Bankruptcy," vol 1, p 106.
27. "Documents and Data on the Eve of World War II," vol 1, Moscow, 1948 edition, p 18.
28. Ibid., p 31.
29. 30. Sir Neville Henderson: "A Mission of Failure," New York, 1940 edition, p 96.
31. "Hitler's Secret Talk with Leaders of Press" (November 10, 1938) (summary), published in "Bankruptcy," vol 1, p 303.
32. "The Nuremberg Trial of Principal German War Criminals" (7-volume collection), vol 2, p 182.
33. Ibid., p 328.
34. "A Meeting of Leaders of the Armed Forces" (November 23, 1939), published in "Bankruptcy," vol 1, p 482.
35. Wm Shirer: "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich," p 327.
36. Ibid., p 343.
37. John Wheeler-Bennett: "Munich -- Overture of a Tragedy," New York, 1962 edition, pp 119-136.
38. "Indictment by General T. Taylor" (summary), published in "The Nuremberg Trial of Principal German War Criminals" (3-volume edition), vol 1, p 246.

39. Ibid., p 250.
40. "Draft of a New Directive," published in "The Nuremberg Trial of Principal German War Criminals" (3-volume edition), vol 1, p 517.
41. "Bankruptcy," vol 1, pp 134-135.
42. Ibid., p 138.
43. "The Nuremberg Trial of Principal German War Criminals" (7-volume edition), vol 2, p 45.
44. Ibid., vol 1, pp 629-630.
45. "Compilation of the Diplomatic Documents of Germany (1918-1945)," Collection C, vol 5, p 977.
46. "The Nuremberg Trial of Principal German War Criminals" (3-volume edition), vol 1, p 127.
47. 48. "The Nuremberg Trial of Principal German War Criminals" (7-volume edition), vol 2, pp 360, 49.
49. B. (Mueller-Grierbrand): "The German Army" (Russian translation), vol 1, p 162.
50. "The Nuremberg Trial of Principal German War Criminals" (7-volume edition), vol 1, p 629.
51. "Documents and Data on the Eve of World War II," vol 2, p 179.
52. 53. Ibid., pp 178, 185.

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CSO: 4005

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

THAI STAND ON KAMPUCHEA--Bangkok, 18 May (XINHUA)--Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda has declared that his country will adhere to its original stand on the Kampuchean issue during coming talks with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, according to press reports here today. The prime minister told reporters yesterday, the day of Nguyen Co Thach's arrival here, that the ASEAN nations had a unanimous and clear-cut approach to the Kampuchean issue, that is, they would continue to recognize the Government of Democratic Kampuchea until an eventual settlement is achieved. Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila told reporters yesterday that Prem's recent visit to other ASEAN nations had enhanced the solidarity of the association and disproved the allegation about a split among the ASEAN nations. The ASEAN nations held, he said, that the turbulent situation in Kampuchea affected peace and neutrality in this region and caused instability. The United Nations and the ASEAN could not shirk the responsibility to work jointly to settle the issue, he noted. [Text] [OW181225 Beijing XINHUA in English 1215 GMT 18 May 80]

U.S. CITIES UNEMPLOYED PROTESTS--Washington, 17 May (XINHUA)--Thousands of demonstrators, mostly blacks and colored people, marched past the White House today to protest the high rate of unemployment among young people in the country and demand special job programs specially for unemployed black teenagers. "We want jobs, we want jobs, we want jobs," the protesters chanted as they marched past the White House and on to a rally near the capitol this afternoon. Many carried placards reading: "We work and starve at the same time," "Give us a change, a job" and "We support full employment." The participants in the march called "National Youth Pilgrimage for Jobs, Peace and Justice" represented a variety of organisations and included people from many cities including New York, Chicago, Philadelphia and Baltimore. Unemployment now sweeping across the country deteriorates along with a new recession, the 7th since World War Two. The latest official figures showed that the number of Americans without jobs grew by 825,000 in April to 7.3 million. Hardest hit were colored people, first of all, colored young people. While the jobless rate among white workers was 6.2 per cent, it was 12.6 per cent among the non-whites, and 29.8 per cent among non-white teenagers. [Text] [OW180249 Beijing XINHUA in English 0145 GMT 18 May 80]

THAIS ON KAMPUCHEA ISSUE--Bangkok, 16 May (XINHUA)--There was no change in the stand of the Thai Government on the Kampuchea problem, Prasong Soonsiri, deputy secretary-general of the Thai National Security Council, told reporters yesterday, according to press reports here. Prasong was clarifying an allegation abroad of such a change. Thailand would not recognize a government which relies on outside support, he added. The Thai Government holds, he said, that the solution of the Kampuchean problem and the refugee problem lies basically on putting an end to the war in Kampuchea, withdrawing all foreign troops from that country and letting the Kampuchean people elect their own government themselves in accordance with the principles laid down in the ASEAN-EEC joint statement and the UN resolution. In case a political solution to the Kampuchea problem could not be reached, Prasong said, Thailand proposes to establish a security zone on the Thai-Kampuchean border under the supervision of UN observers. [Text] [OW161230 Beijing XINHUA in English 1215 GMT 16 May 80]

JAPAN TO SHELVE SIBERIAN PROJECT--Tokyo, 16 May (XINHUA)--Japan will shelve the third-phase Siberian forestry development project in view of the Soviet armed invasion of Afghanistan, said a top Japanese trade official yesterday. Speaking to reporters, Shigeo Nagano, representative of the Japan-Soviet economic committee, said that the development project will be suspended for the time being so long as there is no major improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Under the project, Japan is to supply the Soviet Union with bank loans totalling 600 million dollars from 1980 to 1985 for developing forestry resources in Siberia and import timber in return. The Japanese Government has decided to call off new economic cooperation with the Soviet Union in exploiting Siberia following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Japanese paper ASAHI SHIMBUN described the temporary suspension of the project announced by Nagano as "a link in the economic sanctions against the Soviet Union." [Text] [OW161316 Beijing XINHUA in English 1239 GMT 16 May 80]

FIJI REJECTS SOVIET EMBASSY REQUEST--Beijing, 17 May (XINHUA)--Fiji Prime Minister Ratu Kamisese Mara said Friday that his government opposed an application by the Soviet Union to establish its embassy in his country, according to a Reuter report from Tokyo. Mr Mara is in Japan on an official visit. In reply to a question at a press conference in Tokyo, he said, "I think my belief, whether rightly or wrongly, is that the Russian philosophy is to try to dominate the world by getting people that will toe their line." He added, "The embassy is used as a means of propagating their philosophy." The South Pacific island nation has been approached several times by Moscow for its approval of the request. [Text] [OW171220 Beijing XINHUA in English 1212 GMT 17 May 80]

FRENCH TROOPS LEAVE CHAD--Beijing, 18 May (XINHUA)--All French troops in Chad have been withdrawn, according to reports from Paris quoting a French Government announcement yesterday. A contingent of some 1,100 French troops had remained in the outskirts of Ndjamena during eight weeks of civil war to protect French interests in Chad. It was reported that during the early days of the fighting the French force evacuated hundreds of Europeans from Ndjamena and provided medical facilities for the wounded. [Text] [OW180729 Beijing XINHUA in English 0709 GMT 18 May 80]

MALAYSIA 200-MILE ECONOMIC ZONE--Beijing, 21 May (XINHUA)--Malaysia today gazetted its declaration of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around its coast, according to reports from Kuala Lumpur. With the declaration, Malaysia claims its sovereign rights to the natural resources within the zone, as well as the right to explore, exploit, conserve and manage these resources and to conduct other economic activities within the zone. It said that Malaysia was prepared to settle any matter arising from the declaration through negotiations and other peaceful means in accordance with international law. [Text] [Beijing XINHUA in English 1235 GMT 21 May 80]

FRANCE, MEXICO NUCLEAR ACCORD--Paris, 19 May (XINHUA)--The talks between the French Atomic Energy Commission and the Mexican National Nuclear Research Institute ended in the signing of two agreements on nuclear cooperation here today. According to a communique, the first agreement defines the range and ways of the cooperation in both basic and applied nuclear researches, and the second, on the cooperation in the exploration and exploitation of uranium deposits. [Text] [OW200934 Beijing XINHUA in English 0712 GMT 20 May 80]

INDIA DEMANDS SOVIET WITHDRAWAL--Beijing, 17 May (XINHUA)--Former Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai said Friday that the Soviet Union must withdraw from Afghanistan, according to an AFP report from New Delhi. "No foreign power should interfere in the internal affairs of another country," Mr Desai said at a press conference in Bombay. He further noted that "what had happened in Vietnam would happen in Afghanistan and the Russians would suffer the same fate as the Americans in Vietnam." Mr Desai said Pakistan was naturally worried of the happening in Afghanistan. It would certainly arm itself and "we have no right to be critical of Pakistan when our country was also purchasing arms from all over the world." [Text] [OW171232 Beijing XINHUA in English 1218 GMT 17 May 80]

AFGHAN GUERRILLAS ATTEND ISLAMIC CONFERENCE--Islamabad, 18 May (XINHUA)--Leaders of the Afghan guerrillas attended the plenary session of the 11th Foreign Ministers' Conference of Islamic Countries today as Iranian delegates. A spokesman of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan said they were happy that the Iranian Government provided an opportunity for them to attend the conference but they would still demand observers status as genuine representatives of the Afghan people. They were also heard by the political committee of the conference. [Text] [OW190936 Beijing XINHUA in English 0832 GMT 19 May 80]

CSO: 4020

PARTY AND STATE

SAFEGUARD UNIFIED LEADERSHIP OF PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Guangzhou NANFANG RIBAO in Chinese 3 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Nei Fei [0656 0355 7378]: "The Old Red Army and Old Eighth Route Army of the Rear Services of the Guangzhou Unit Studied the Communiqué of the Fifth Plenary Session; Leading Cadres Must Take the Lead in Safeguarding the Unified Leadership of the Party Central Committee"]

[Text] During the study of the Communiqué of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, the old Eighth Route Army and the old Red Army of the Rear Services of the Guangzhou Unit proceeded to discuss the issues surrounding the main theme of the Fifth Plenary Session. Everybody firmly supported each resolution and decision of the Plenum and expressed a willingness to take the lead in safeguarding the unified leadership of the Party Central Committee and increasing the combat effectiveness of the party.

In looking back at the history of revolutionary work of several decades under the leadership of the Party Central Committee, every comrade pointed out: In order to hold fast to the leadership of the party, the most basic step is to resolutely safeguard the leadership of the Party Central Committee. Wang Guiyun, vice minister of Rear Services of the old Red Army, and Ouyang Yi, adviser, said: In that year when we conducted the Long March, fought Japanese imperialism, and beat old Jiang, despite manifold difficulties, we were able to eliminate the intervention of the "left" and right opportunist line and obtain successive victories, owing to the presence of the Party Central Committee and the correct leadership of Chairman Mao. Practice has proven: Firm adherence to the unified leadership of the Party Central Committee is the magic weapon which guarantees revolutionary victory. Today, in strengthening the leadership of the Party Central Committee, the Fifth Plenary Session worked out several important resolutions, including the election of an expanded Standing Committee of the Central Committee Politburo, the establishment of the Central Committee Secretariat, and the dismissal of four comrades from their positions for committing grave offenses--thus allowing the Party Central Committee to become purer, sharper and stronger. We firmly believe in the Party Central Committee and resolutely follow the unified leadership of the Party Central

Committee. Putting together the experiences of that year of participating in the Yanan rectification studies, adviser Comrade Cui Lin [1508 3829] said: An important theme of Yanan rectification was stressing the unity and centralization of the whole party as well as stressing the importance of obeying the leadership of the Party Central Committee, and opposing departmentalism, independent-ism and individualism. Through rectification, the broad mass of party members walked in unison and steadfastly implemented the combat deployment of the Party Central Committee, moved quickly toward whatever direction the party indicated, and eventually saw the victory of the new democratic revolution. At present, even though the pernicious influence of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" in promoting "act in parallel" to the Central Committee has not yet been eradicated, and the concept of organizational discipline on the part of some party members and cadres is weak, we only have to strengthen ideological education and overcome factionism; the broad mass of party members will then closely unite around the Party Central Committee, and our cause will be full of hope.

These comrades also said that, in order to safeguard the unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, we must resolutely and consistently adhere to the party's political line. Political Commissioner of Rear Services Comrade Zhao Likuan [6392 0500 1401] said: The Third and Fourth Plenary Sessions of the 11th Party Central Committee formulated the political line of uniting the peoples of every race throughout the entire country to bring all positive factors into play--to work with one heart and one mind, to put forth utmost effort, to press hard for progress, and to achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in building a strong, modern socialist state. This political line reflects the historical quest for a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat; it embodies the aspirations left to posterity by revolutionary martyrs and encompasses the expectations of all party members and the entire people. If we resolutely carry through this political line, the superiority of socialism will be brought fully into play. Our leading cadres must guide the broad mass of cadre fighters to implement the party's political line firmly and consistently and advance steadfastly toward the grand goal of the four modernizations. Vice Political Commissioner of the Rear Services Yang Shibin [2799 0099 2430], adviser Ju Hongyun [3818 3163 6663], and others have said: The practice of more than a year's consistent adherence to the spirit of the Third Plenary Session has revealed that, to implement the party's political line, while it is necessary to get rid of the harassment from the right. In order to avoid deviating from the party's political line, we must earnestly carry through the spirit of the Fifth Plenary Session and wholeheartedly and diligently struggle for modern socialist construction projects. We are advanced in years, which makes it all the more necessary to work more and to contribute more to the four modernization projects in our remaining years.

PARTY AND STATE

EFFORTS MADE TO ELIMINATE SPECIAL PRIVILEGES WITHIN CCP

Guangzhou NANFANG RIBAO in Chinese 19 Mar 80 p 1

[Article by Cao Shaoye [2580 4801 2814] and Chen Zuogeng [7115 0155 5087]: "Party Committee Leadership of Guangdong Military District Takes the Lead in Implementing 'Guiding Principles'; Inspect the Party's Internal Problems and Formulate Policies to Rectify Party Spirit"]

[Text] Ever since the Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee distributed "Certain Guiding Principles on Inner Party Political Life" (draft) in April 1979, the Party Committee leadership of Guangdong Military District has earnestly carried through the spirit of the "guiding principles," and has taken the lead in restoring and developing our party's excellent tradition and workstyle by opposing special privileges and rectifying the party spirit.

In July 1979, the Party Committee of Guangdong Military District assembled a full-scale conference to verify the "guiding principles" (draft), examine the problems of inner-party life in the past, and formulate policies to correct the party spirit. Since the beginning of this year, a Standing Committee has also put together documents relevant to studies to further establish and make sound every type of code and convention opposing special privileges in lifestyles, housing, use of vehicles, and employment of facilities by staff on official duties, and thereby rectify party spirit. At present, the Party Committee leadership of Guangdong Military District is fundamentally determined to accomplish the following: As for welfare benefits, they will not set up special supplies; as for the operation of appliances, they will strictly implement standardized guidelines. No dependent will be provided transportation when going out; if a vehicle is utilized due to special circumstances, there will be charges for mileage; in going down to units to inspect work, leading comrades of the Guangdong Military District will not travel long distances with specially appointed vehicles if trains or airplanes are available. They will not even let members of organizational units give them farewell or welcome parties, give parties themselves, organize special evening movie shows, or accept any gift of special local products purchased by units with public funds. At ordinary times, they will not set up special seats when

watching plays or movies in the Guangdong Military District auditorium or in the open-air cinema house. Everyone without exception will purchase tickets when tickets are required and will not watch movies free. Party Committee Secretary Xiong Pei [3574 2278] and Deputy Secretary Su Keshi [5685 0344 0037] require that administrative departments take inventories of appliances in their homes and return to the public organization those that exceed the prescribed standard. This year, many leading cadres have gone deep down to the basic-level units to inspect work or crouching positions; they insisted on practicing "san tong" [the three identical ways] with the cadre fighters of the company units and would not let company units provide them with any special conveniences in their living conditions.

The Party Committee leadership of the Guangdong Military District is resolved to participate in the party's organizational life, pay party dues on time, and consciously accept supervision by the masses. The Standing Committee itself also combines ideological and work realities at regular intervals and develops criticism and self-criticism; it inspects the efforts of individuals in carrying through all the regulations opposing special privileges, further solves existing problems, and consolidates the results of the campaign to oppose special privileges.

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CSO: 4005

PARTY AND STATE

DIRECT ELECTION FOR WUQING COUNTY PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

Tianjin TIANJIN RIBAO in Chinese 17 Mar 80 p 3

[Article by Song Zhuqin [1345 4376 0530]: "Major Change in Election System"]

[Text] The change in the electoral system, expanding the direct election of people's congresses to the county level, is a major change in China's electoral system and a major reform in local government, and is a major step in improving and perfecting the basic system of China's people's congresses. In the past, Tianjin has held direct elections for the people's congresses of people's communes in the districts and rural villages of the city's jurisdiction, but the county people's congresses in the suburbs were elected indirectly. Therefore, the direct election of county people's congresses is not only a great event for us, but it is also something new. In order to gain experience, last year we tried direct election of the people's congress in Wuqing County. The voters from the county directly elected the representatives to the people's congress, and held the first meeting of the people's congress in accordance with laws governing local people's congresses and local government organizations. At the meeting the work reports of the former county revolutionary committee and the court and procurate were presented. They elected a standing committee of the people's congress, a county magistrate, and a deputy magistrate, changing the county revolutionary committee into the county people's government. They also selected a chief justice of the people's court and a procurate general of the people's procuracy. This brought to an end the revolutionary committee which was formed during the Great Cultural Revolution, and legally established the new people's government directly elected by the people. The trial election in Wuqing County shows that in the 30 years since liberation, the political, economic, and cultural life of the people has been altered and enhanced to lay the foundation of the expansion of direct election of the county level. The direct election of county people's congresses expands the scope of China's socialist democracy. This major reform reflects the wishes of the broad masses of peasants, and has won the wholehearted support of the voters.

I. Changes and Enhancement of Political, Economic, and Cultural Life

Since the Third Plenary Session of the Party Central Committee the work of the entire party and the entire country has concentrated on construction of

the four modernizations. Some basic changes has occurred in the political situation of Wuqing County, just as in all of Tianjin and throughout China. This is shown by the following: since the smashing of the "gang of four" there has been a purge of the "gang of four" faction throughout the entire county; the leadership elements at all levels have been rectified; the power of leadership in the county, communes, and production brigades is firmly in the hands of reliable persons who support the socialist line; there is good social order; and the overall situation is one of peaceful unity. The people's democratic life has begun to get on the right track. Democracy is getting healthier every year. Democratic life is expanding every year. Even though there are still several problems that need to be worked out, but on the whole, democratic socialism is being strengthened. Verdicts have been reversed in a large number of cases where individuals were wrongly accused; cases where individuals were wrongly identified as rightists have been corrected; and reformed rightists have had their hats removed. Intellectuals have had their "stinking number nine" hats removed. The vast majority of landlords, rich peasants, and capitalists have had their hats removed. There has already been a basic change in the class situation in the rural villages. They have restored and fostered the glorious tradition of the party. Work on all fronts has gotten on the right track, bringing into play the socialist activism of all the people of the county.

During the more than 3 years since the smashing of the "gang of four," great changes have also occurred in economic construction in Wuqing County. Last year, grain production reached more than 400 jin per mu. There have also been relatively large developments in industry and other enterprises in the county. The standard of living of the people is gradually getting better. This is a great material base for the implementation of democratic elections.

The educational level of the people is another important condition for holding direct elections. More than 80 percent of the people in Wuqing County have received an education. One or more persons in every household can read--not only make out the names of the candidates on the ballots, but also read books, papers, and propaganda literature to analyze and distinguish between the different candidates. The raising of the educational level of the farmers is helpful in secret ballot elections to directly elect the candidates they feel are most nearly ideal and most trustworthy as delegates to the county people's congress to represent them in the affairs of state and to lead the people of the county in the construction of four modernizations.

II. Thoroughly Implement Policy: Expand the Scope of Socialist Democracy

China is a nation of dictatorship of the proletariat. The people's congress is the basic political form; it is a basic political system. It guarantees that the workers, farmers, intellectuals, and all other patriots who embrace socialism all enjoy the right to govern the nation.

Wuqing is a county that is mostly agricultural, but it also has a rapidly expanding industry. It has a population of 705,275. On election day as many as 426,696 voters registered. This is 60.5 percent of the population of the entire county. This is 10 percent more than the percentage that voted for the commune people's congress in 1965.

The elimination of the exploiting classes, especially the elimination of landlords and rich peasants, has greatly expanded the scope of the people's democracy. During the agricultural reform, landlords and rich peasants constituted 8 percent of the households in the county (based on population, this figure would be slightly higher). In 1978 there were still 3,160 "four kinds of elements"--landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and bad elements. Early last year, according to central instructions, the hats were taken off the four bad elements who had reformed, people wrongly charged were righted, and 5,118 persons won their political rights.

To a citizen, political rights are his political life. When Wuying County carried out voter registration and inspection of voter qualifications, it also did a lot of work in implementing party policy. It solved a lot of cases that had been around for years, and solved political and historical problems for a lot of people. While they were checking voter qualifications, there were 42 "four bad elements" in the county who were still wearing hats. Of these, 23 were at home, and 19 were at large. To make certain that everyone who should have voting rights does, and at the same time to make sure that no one who should be stripped of his right to vote steals that right, the masses were mobilized to examine, one at a time, the 23 "four bad elements" who were at home. One of these was found to have been falsely convicted, and the verdict was reversed. The other 22 had their hats removed after approval by security and procurate agencies. The situation was more complicated with the 19 who were "at large." They had been "at large" for different lengths of time--some for 3, 5, or as long as 10 or more years. There were also many different reasons for being "at large." Some were afraid of criticism and struggle; others had left to find different ways to make a living. How should these people be treated? Some comrades said that since they were at large, they were not to be trusted and should be stripped of their voting rights. Other comrades felt that since they have been away for a long time, we have no way of knowing how they have been conducting themselves, so they should not be registered. Afterwards, after repeated study of the new voting laws and related party policy and unifying knowledge, we all felt that if these people's problems are not solved, it will not only hurt the elections but will also not be good for the development of the political situation of peaceful unity. In view of the recent changes in class relationships in China, we should be very careful with these people's voting rights. We should carry out party policy, try to get at the facts, and completely carry out democracy. After doing ideological work on their families and friends, we found where they were. We organized some people to look into their problems. Then, according to specific circumstances, dispositions were made. Two people had been falsely convicted, and their verdicts were reversed. Nine people had had their hats put on by individual units or "rebel factions" and not by public security organs or county revolutionary committee. These were declared invalid. Two people had had their hats for a number of years but had conducted themselves pretty well, so, according to policy, their hats were removed. Two people had not conducted themselves well after wearing hats, so they were not registered and were not given voter's cards. They were told to return home and join in production. In the past these people were called "at large"--that is, hiding for fear or punishment. Now they are classified according to the specific

situations. The first two categories above are called "absent," the third category is called "vagrant," and only the fourth category is called "at large." This kind of meticulous work, thoroughly implementing the party's policy, has been well received by the people.

In addition, during the trial election period, Wuqing County had nine people who were under public surveillance. Four were rightfully stripped of their voting rights; one was found to have been falsely convicted and had his verdict reversed; one had conducted himself well during surveillance and his period of surveillance was ended early; and three people's periods of surveillance were already over. These five were declared no longer under surveillance and thus they legally had the right to vote.

The result of hearing these cases was that in all of Wuqing County, only eight people were stripped of their right to vote (not including those convicted and sent to the city to prison). This is only one in 100,000. This shows the earnestness of the socialist legal system.

Those described above as having their voting rights stripped or revoked are mostly criminals. During the trial election, all of the landlords and rich peasants had their hats removed. Not one landlord or rich peasant lost his voting rights because he wore a hat. This is even clearer proof of the eradication of the landlord and rich peasant classes. Those capable of performing labor have already been turned into self-supporting socialist laborers, and just like other voters, in the democratic elections they directly elect people they trust to manage the affairs of state.

III. The Broad Masses of Voters Enthusiastically Cast Their Votes

Based on the practical experience of Wuqing County, if a good job is to be done in the election, the election law must first be propagandized broadly and deeply among the broad masses of farmers--as well as the organizational law concerning the people's congresses at all levels and the people's government, in addition to the relevant party policy--to let the farmers understand the great significance of the election and its specific content and operation. The remnants of historical feudal thinking must be eliminated--especially the pernicious influence of the feudalism of Lin Biao and the "gang of four." At each stage of the election process in Wuqing County, there were special indoctrinations. According to statistics, more than 500 leading cadres from the county and from communes made reports to the electors, with more than 1 million people listening to the more than 500 reports. The people of Wuqing County call the "election law" the "love the people law." They were overjoyed when they heard that they were going to elect a people's congress and a county magistrate. The voters cherish their right to vote, and they swarmed to take part in all the election activities. Eighty-two percent of the voters took part in nominating candidates, and 86 percent took part in the consultation for the determination of formal candidates. Countywide, 97.3 percent of all voters cast ballots, and 98 percent were valid ballots. This many voters taking part in the election when they live in isolated villages, and especially when the direct election took place during the busy farming season, clearly proves that the broad masses of farmers have high enthusiasm for direct elections.

The thing that most concerned the farmers in the direct election was to elect people they could trust to represent them in the handling of the affairs of state. In rural villages, because of production, livelihood, and marriage relationships, the farmers all have many dealings with each other, and everyone knows who is what kind of person. Most of the local cadres were born and raised in the area. The few cadres who are not from the local area have been there for a long time and the masses know them well. This helps in the nomination and recommendation of candidates. Therefore, most of the candidates were nominated and recommended by voters in their own voting district and their own units. Only a small portion of the candidates were jointly nominated and recommended by the Wuqing County party committee and the various peoples' group organizations. There were 2,730 preliminary candidates in the county, which was about six times the number of delegates to be elected. After much evaluation and discussion, these delegates were reduced to 788 formal candidates, which is 1.74 times the number of seats to be filled. This is in complete accordance with the election law.

The electors are very perceptive concerning the differences between the candidates. During the recommendations and the decision as to who the formal candidates would be, Wuqing County arranged for the candidates to meet with the voters, to report on their work, and to ask voters their opinions, which allowed the voters to more easily cast their votes for their favorite and most suitable candidate, in accordance with the election laws and regulations concerning local peoples' congresses and the organization of people's government. For instance, a technician of the county transportation bureau had made some innovations in bridge design, was a municipal model worker, and the voters felt he had made some contributions toward the four modernizations; he received more votes than any other candidate. There were three others who were sons or younger brothers of local landlords and rich peasants who were candidates for the local people's congress. One of these had become the chief of his production brigade through hard work and despite his background. This had never been done before. As a result of the election, most of the representatives were from the farms (including those cadres divorced from production). These came to 68 percent of the total, and constituted a majority of the delegates. The county people's congress was formed in such a way as to guarantee leadership by the party, and it demonstrated an alliance of workers and farmers. It also included delegates from all of the many different walks of life. It contained some progressives and some ordinary people. It was representative of Wuqing County.

In summation, the trial election in Wuqing County to elect the people's congress directly was a success. It clearly shows that the new election laws which allow for the direct election of county people's congresses is in complete accord with the situation in Tianjin. It is a further development of democracy among the broad masses of farmers in the villages of Tianjin. It will serve to further and strengthen activism and peaceful unity in the political situation.

Of course, just as in other things, this test election of direct election of the Wuqing County people's congress resulted in experiences, in lessons, and was a great success. However there were also some shortcomings and some errors. Once these were discovered, they were immediately corrected. They were not allowed to interfere with the normal development of the election. The experience and lessons of Wuqing County are beneficial to the popularization of direct elections of people's congresses at the county level in our city.

PARTY AND STATE

SHANGHAI MASSES CHEER REHABILITATION OF LIU SHAOQI

Shanghai JIEFANG RIBAO in Chinese 2 Mar 80 p 1

[Consolidated news report: "Rehabilitation of Comrade Liu Shaoqi by the Party Central Committee Wins Enthusiastic Popular Support"]

[Text] People of every social stratum of Shanghai enthusiastically support the decision unanimously passed by the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee in rehabilitating and vindicating Comrade Liu Shaoqi. Everyone is jubilant and excited, running around informing one another, and cheering: This judicious decision of the Party Central Committee has expressed the common desire of millions upon millions of people; to bring about a thorough rehabilitation of the greatest injustice in the history of our party is a significant event for which everyone has long been waiting.

Many comrades have remarked: Comrade Liu Shaoqi was a great Marxist and proletarian revolutionary, a revolutionary leader deeply loved and supported by the masses. The striking down of Comrade Liu Shaoqi was a grievous and grave mistake on the part of the our party. The director of First Superior Steel Plant, Qi Chuanliang, who met Comrade Liu Shaoqi twice, said: Due to the criticism of Comrade Liu Shaoqi and the so-called "Liu Shaoqi revisionist line" during the Cultural Revolution, the ideology of the people was confused--getting hold of production became "On the Sole Force of Production," getting hold of management became "management, restriction, repression," giving rewards became "material stimulation," and giving full scope to the effectiveness of technical personnel became an "erroneous line." At present, the party has quelled all chaos and has restored order. Cadres of the Superior Cotton Mill No 22, who once received comrade Liu Shaoqi, said: On 23 April 1957, Comrade Liu Shaoqi accompanied foreign visitors on a tour of the mill; this part of history was distorted during the Great Cultural Revolution. People were saying that Comrade Liu Shaoqi arrived at the mill, threw himself head over heels into the arms of the imperialists, and accepted 120 sweatshirts from the imperialists. In reality, the sweatshirts were prepared beforehand by the mill to give to the foreign guests and had not actually been given to Comrade Liu Shaoqi at all. Today, the Party Central Committee has rehabilitated Comrade Liu Shaoqi, and we feel it necessary to clarify this historical fact.

Many comrades have said: To thoroughly rehabilitate Comrade Liu Shaoqi is what the people have wanted all along. While this decision of the Party Central Committee goes along with the wishes of the people and falls within their hopes, it has also come as an unexpected joy. Qiu Weiliang [6726 4850 2733], party committee deputy secretary of Shanghai Watch Plant No 2, said: The thorough rehabilitation of Comrade Liu Shaoqi by the Fifth Plenary Session is an important policy which fully shows that our party is realistic, factual, straightforward, and upright; our party has the strength, confidence, and courage to correct its own errors and, by doing so, has the ability to continuously move forward while overcoming mistakes. Ding Xingqing [0002 2622 3237], national model worker, deputy director of the Shanghai Switch Plant, and chairman of the labor union, said: The rehabilitation of Comrade Liu Shaoqi is not only relevant to himself alone, but is also an event involving thousands and millions of households. At the beginning of the Great Cultural Revolution, people of our group were all labeled as "production party members," "old security party members," and "Liu Shaoqi party members." Consequently, we were unable to raise our heads in politics; in production, we were unable to stand upright; and a heavy load was laid on our minds. Now that the Party Central Committee has rehabilitated and absolved Comrade Liu Shaoqi, this load has been lifted from our hearts. Li Zhixia [2621 1807 0204], party committee secretary of Shanghai Institute No 708 and former bodyguard of Comrade Liu Shaoqi, said: "During the Great Cultural Revolution, I was labeled 'Liu Shaoqi's lackey' and eventually was sent to prison and locked up in an insane asylum for 8 years. After the "gang of four" was smashed, I was rehabilitated. But I felt so much resentment toward the injustice suffered by Comrade Liu Shaoqi that I was unable to eat or sleep well. The rehabilitation and vindication of Comrade Liu Shaoqi by the Fifth Plenary Session has really brought much gratification to the people's hearts. Shanghai Institute of Biochemistry researcher Peng Jiamu [1756 0502 2606], who was falsely accused of being "boss of the plum party" during the Great Cultural Revolution, said: In the past, a great number of people were implicated because of the Comrade Liu Shaoqi issue. Nor were we intellectuals lucky enough to escape involvement. Many were cursed as the "aristocracy of the mind" and "stinking old bums." Now, the Party Central Committee has rehabilitated and redeemed Comrade Liu Shaoqi. With Comrade Shaoqi rehabilitated, we intellectuals feel much more relaxed and comfortable.

Many comrades recognized: The rehabilitation of Comrade Liu Shaoqi is an enormous driving force in promoting stability and unity and in accelerating the progress of the four modernizations. Cadres of Shangwu Plant No 18 said: "In the people's hearts, Comrade Liu Shaoqi's case is the greatest issue left from the Great Cultural Revolution. That this issue is now resolved will bring great benefit toward the development of a stable and unified political situation and toward the carrying out of the four modernizations with one heart and one mind." The party committee secretary of the Shanggang 3rd District, Chang Yongkang [1603 3057 1660], who suffered criticism and struggle on charges of belonging to the "royalist clique," said: "The great injustice done to Comrade Liu Shaoqi, which people have been repressing inside themselves for more than 10 years, is now rehabilitated and redressed. The rehabilitation truly wins and soothes the people's hearts; it increases

even more our trust in the Party Central Committee and strengthens even more our confidence in the realization of the four modernizations." Wang Guangzheng, sister of Comrade Wang Guangmei, general branch secretary of the party and deputy director of the Department of Gynecology and Obstetrics affiliated with the Yi Yi Hospital, said: "The rehabilitation of Comrade Liu Shaoqi is an urgent desire common to the entire party and all the people. Were Comrade Shaoqi to know of it in the underworld, he would be at peace. I have to inherit the aspirations passed on by our revolutionary martyrs and senior revolutionaries, and must strictly demand of myself that I develop the party's excellent tradition and workstyle and offer my strength to the four modernizations." The production personnel of the movie "Liao Yuan" [Prairie Fire], which was castigated as a "deadly weed" due to its involvement with the Comrade Liu Shaoqi issue, cheered Comrade Liu Shaoqi's rehabilitation enthusiastically, shouting joyously that the outstanding movie "Liao Yuan," reflecting the historical merits of Comrade Liu Shaoqi, will also be rehabilitated accordingly. They said that they would certainly use movies as a weapon to diligently produce good works and actively serve the four modernizations. While cheering the Party Central Committee's rehabilitation and vindication of Comrade Liu Shaoqi, many people who originally were engaged in industry and commerce looked back at the ever-progressing course they have been following along with the party since liberation and remarked: Today, having become self-reliant workers, we think of Comrade Liu Shaoqi even more. We must eliminate lingering fears, look forward, and offer every useful idea and specialized skill to the four modernization projects of our ancestral land.

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CSO: 4005

PARTY AND STATE

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH WORK TO SERVE FOUR MODERNIZATIONS

Readers' Letter

Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO in Chinese 19 Mar 80 p 2

[Letters from Readers Complain of Indiscriminate Destruction of Scientific Experiments by Local Cadres]

[Text] Comrade Editor: Since the National Science Congress, the combat line of science and technology has been like fresh flowers blooming competitively. Where we are, however, events such as the destruction of the base for scientific research have continually taken place. It has indeed broken our hearts.

Our institute is located in the countryside of Dan Xian on Hainan Island. Since August 1978, some people from areas peripheral to us, on the pretext of land disputes, have continually come to seize the test ground of our institute, destroy experimental rubber saplings, chop down experimental protective forests, take away the rubber sap of the Experimental Saplings Section, and ruin the area our workers and employees use in their daily life. Some of the cadres of the brigades and the farming and pasture land of the Baodao Commune in our neighborhood have also continually served us notice demanding that we cease testing and production for specified periods of time in certain land areas stipulated by them. Although our institute had reported the situation to the concerned leading local authorities at the proper time, it did not arouse enough of their attention. They took no measures to stop the said cadres' actions, thus causing our scientific research work to suffer serious setbacks. The area for comparative evaluation of superior varieties of rubber trees are an important test ground of our institute for the selection and cultivation of new varieties. After more than a decade of diligent cultivation and care by the scientific researchers more than 10 high-yield varieties were picked during the initial selection. What the researchers were preparing to do next was to finish the work of identifying the amount of their yield and their characteristics. However, during the years 1978 and 1979, the test rubber trees were continually cut viciously and illegally. Since the sap had been taken away and the trees destroyed, the work of identification had to be discontinued half way through. More than 10 other scientific research projects such as the analysis and testing of rubber production

and the biological observation and testing of the structure of bark from rubber trees likewise suffered serious damage and adverse effects. According to incomplete statistics, the amount of dried rubber illegally stolen during the past year reached 11 tons, equivalent to more than 60,000 yuan. The value of the damaged and smashed instruments such as pollinators and sap containers amounted to 16,000 yuan.

Under such truly intolerable conditions, we could not but report the situation to the press as it was and request them to voice our opinion to the public. On 9 January, NANFANG RIBAO published our "letter from a reader" and additional remarks made by the reporter after investigation. It criticized the illegal activities that had damaged scientific research and testing. Nevertheless, the secretary of the party branch of the Dashi Brigade adjacent to our institute, Li Rixin [2621 2480 2450], on both 12 and 13 January came to our office to angrily inquire after the author of the letter, an unreasonable interference with the reader exercising his legitimate rights. On 14 January, some men of the Dayong Production Team of the Dashi Brigade blocked the road and seized an automobile of ours. These events indicate that some men have never correctly looked at the mistakes they made in the past.

Nineteen Hundred and Eighty is the first year of the 1980s in which we can do a lot of things; it is also the first year during which our new Criminal Law came into effect. We hope that judicial and political departments at all levels and the leadership concerned can enforce the laws conscientiously, take resolute measures to stop such destructive action, and safeguard scientific research work to enable it to serve the four modernizations better. By Xiao Yong [5135 3057] and Huang You [7806 2589] of the South China Institute of Tropical Crops.

Response to Letter

Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO in Chinese 19 Mar 80 p 2

[Text] As early as January, we started our investigation of the problem as reported in the above letter. It has been proven that the test grounds of the South China Institute of Tropical Crops (hereafter referred to as "TCI" in abbreviation) truly suffered serious damage: of the 38 research projects assigned by the state to the TCI in 1979, 14 were damaged to varying degrees.

In August 1978, some individual cadres of a brigade belonging to Baodao Commune in Dan Xian, neighboring the TCI, started their conspiratorial activity and agitation on the pretext that the TCI had infringed on the land of the peasants. Having gained the support of the leader of the original commune, they established a so-called "command" and directed some men to forward notes and letters to the TCI for several days with a view to forcing the institute to halt all experiments and give the land back to the peasants within the prescribed time. They also demanded that "If the TCI should fail to return the land to its owners, they would annex the institute." After these unreasonable demands had been rejected, some cadres of the production team, together with their associates, entered the test grounds of the TCI, viciously

and illegally tapped the experimental rubber trees, smashed test equipment and materials and felled trees of the experimental protective forest. Some brigade cadres even threatened the masses by saying, "No rations will be issued nor any wage points given to those who fail to participate in this action." Because of the instigation and support of the leading cadres, these activities became more and more violent. According to statistics, between May and October of 1979, the amount of rubber tapped, taken and stolen by these commune brigades adjacent the institute reached 11 tons (if counted as dried rubber).

More serious was the loss in the field of scientific research. For instance, the analysis and testing of rubber production had already been carried on for 6 years. A decision had to be made soon on its popularization. Repeatedly tapped and cut, the rubber trees were damaged to the extent of becoming rotten to a serious degree. The previous efforts put into testing were rendered completely fruitless.

Again, for instance, the testing of high varieties of rubber trees had been carried on for over a decade and resulted in the selection of more than 10 high-yield varieties. They were to be further promoted after the volume of production and the characteristics of the rubber trees had been determined. Due to the serious damage the rubber trees had suffered, this work cannot now be carried out.

Also, for example, concerning tests for newer varieties of trees in the productive forest, the test trees have, since 1976, been chopped and felled time and again. The situation in 1978-79 was particularly serious. At the present time, most of the forest belt has been destroyed and left in ruins. Some of the tree varieties have been destroyed completely.

Aside from the aforementioned items, the damage suffered by the valuable Tropical Botanical Specimen Garden has also been very heavy. For instance, some of the fruit of the oil palms that covered 85 mu of land were stolen, the flowers of the imported cross-fertilizing sisal hemp which had blossomed only after 10 years of cultivation and care were hacked off and of good species of coconut newly purchased from four different countries with foreign exchange, 15 were stolen.

In the course of the development of the whole event, some people not only plundered trees and rubber, but also destroyed other things at will. From the outset, the TCI was extremely strict and meticulous about rubber tapping work and preservation of the test trees: one cut with a knife every 2 days and no cutting on rainy days. Nevertheless, many rubber plunderers cut any tree as soon as they saw it, whether it was a rainy or a fine day, or whether it was day or night. Sometimes they formed groups of three or five and sometimes they organized teams of 30-50 to steal openly without fear. Some rubber trees after one tapping lost more bark than they would during a one-month period under normal conditions. In some sections, each and every rubber tree suffered from the cutting of different implements such as chopping knife. Some were found to have more than 30 places cut open by knives. From these cuts all over them, the sap would not stop flowing.

For 20 some years since its founding, the TCI has always enjoyed the high esteem and regard of our party and state. In 1960, Premier Zhou visited the institute on an inspection tour. He wrote an inscription, saying, "Start your career at Dan; take root at Baodao" with a view to encouraging the scientists and technicians to scale the heights of tropical crop research. In recent years the TCI not only succeeded in cultivating and growing the 300 and several dozen tropical plants imported from 34 different countries, but also made brilliant achievements in scientific research concerning the breeding of and high yields of rubber trees. It gradually developed into our country's largest base for scientific research in tropical crops. That such a scientific research unit suffered such serious damage ought to have attracted the serious attention of the concerned authorities and caused them to take resolute measures to stop the wrongdoing. However, from 1976 to the present, there was one destructive incident after another. And of those who took the lead to create the trouble and the cadres who connived at such trouble-making activities, none received any punishment. Not only that, the vandalism became more and more violent.

During our period of investigation between the 1 and 8 January this year, nearly 300 trees in the test protective forest of the TCI were furtively cut. Now people worry that the season for tapping rubber is near. Can there be a halt to such behavior as seizing an early opportunity to tap and collect which will damage the scientific research experiments? It seems that the problem has really developed to such a stage that it must be solved.. We hope that all the local departments involved will, from the viewpoint of the general situation as a whole, take measures to enforce the law strictly, put an end to this unhealthy trend and protect the scientific research activities of our state. By Wang Zhongren [3769 1813 0086] and Xu Huaxi [1776 5478 6007] of the Labor Department of NANGFANG RIBAO.

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CSO: 4005

PARTY AND STATE

SPIRIT OF NEW CRIMINAL LAW EXPLAINED

Beijing GUANGMING RIBAO in Chinese 19 Mar 80 p 3

[Article by Wang Shunhua [3769 5293 5478]: "Why Is It Necessary To Strictly Ban Torture in Extracting Confessions?"]

[Text] It has been prescribed in both our Criminal Law and Law of Criminal Procedure that "extorting confessions by torture is strictly banned." Moreover, in the Criminal Law it is prescribed as "infringing upon the personal rights of citizens." It is absolutely necessary for a sound socialist legal system to have this regulation.

Such unenlightened and barbaric means as extorting confessions by torture existed even legally and reasonably in the long period of feudal society of China. During the Han Dynasty, extorting confessions by torture was already fixed as an institution. It was clearly prescribed in the Tang Code of the Tang Dynasty as "interrogation by flogging" which meant the same as "extorting confessions by torture." In Song times, light and heavy bamboo canes were legally adopted as instruments for beating prisoners. In addition, there were such instruments as crushing boards abusively used at the will of the interrogators. During subsequent dynasties, the example of extorting confessions by torture was followed. Because of that, many innocent working people were either killed by the torture or compelled to confess falsely. In feudal society, the act of extorting confessions by torture was not only legalized and institutionalized but also dramatized in various plays, novels and songs. For instance, in "Rouge," old man Bian is killed after he has gone through three stages of examination. In each stage, the method of extorting confessions by torture is used. Again, for example, in a "Kunqu" opera called "Fifteen Strings," a certain Xiong Yulan is described as being severely thrashed into making a confession and erroneously convicted of murder.

When the activities of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" became rampant, they not only inherited from the feudal period the same method of brutal torture for extorting confessions but also set forth collectively the means of interrogating through fascist punishment which had been practiced by Hitler, Japanese militarists and KMT reactionaries who had used them to deal with the Chinese people. They can truly be referred to as a collection of means

for extorting confessions by torture from both Chinese and foreigners through the ages. Under this extortion of confessions by tortures, how many people have been beaten to death and how many have been tortured and deformed for the rest of their lives? They have thus created a great number of unjust, false and wrong verdicts. Some unjust and false verdicts implicated several hundred, if not several thousand people. We must learn from these bloody lessons; we must totally eradicate the evil influence of the ultra-Leftist line and pro-Leftist current of thought. Corporal punishment has even been abolished in capitalist countries. The socialist society established by our proletariat should be more civilized than capitalist society. How can we tolerate the practice of extorting confessions by torture. As long as our public security people, procurators and judges can take Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as a guiding principle, rely on the union of specialized agencies and the broad masses and develop the revolutionary tradition and excellent work style of our party in judicial matters, there should be no difficulty in solving any complicated case. For this reason, there is completely no need in this country to extort confessions from a defendant by torture. Even if the defendant is actually the person who committed the crime and is very shy and unwilling to confess, we still do not have to use the barbaric method of extorting confessions by torture as in the feudal period to obtain his verbal depositions. It has been clearly prescribed in the 35th Article of our Criminal Law of Procedure that, "When there is no statement by the accused but there is full, conclusive evidence against him, the accused may be considered guilty and sentenced."

In order to realize the four modernizations, we must institutionalize laws; and in order to maintain the dignity of laws and institutions, we must carry out the principle of complying with all laws, executing all laws strictly and punishing whoever violates them. There shall be no exceptions with any defendant. Whether the crime is characterized as something among the people or as something between the enemy and us, it must be solved in accordance with both our Criminal Law and the Law of Criminal Procedure. We should allow the defendant to have the full right of self-defense. To arbitrarily deprive him of the rights he deserves as prescribed by law shall be forbidden. The newly proclaimed Criminal Law and the Law of Criminal Procedure have made concrete stipulations about protecting such thing as the rights of the person and the right of self-defense of a defendant. For instance, it is stipulated in Article 136 of our Criminal Law that "A state functionary who extorts a confession by torture will be sentenced to detention or imprisonment for not more than 3 years." Those who harm or disable people by physical torture may be punished severely by law as guilty of inflicting bodily injury. Article 31 of the Criminal Law of Procedure further strictly demands that the investigators, procurators and judges observe that the verdict:

1. "Must be based on facts" and that
2. "Those who willfully withhold the truth shall be investigated to adjudge their responsibility."

These regulations are not only necessary for the prevention of unjust, false, and wrong verdicts, but also for the protection of public security personnel, procurators and judges.

Strictly banning the extortion of confessions by torture is an indispensable condition for correctly handling criminal cases. Only if the people's courts, people's procuratorates and public security organs, when dealing with criminal lawsuits, can rely on the masses to conduct investigations and study objectively and in an overall manner, with facts as a basis and law as a standard, will they be able to correctly recognize the crime and punish it. Many years of practice have proved that when one tries to extort confessions from a defendant by torture, one often times not only fails to find out the true condition of the case, but on the contrary obscures the distinction between the true and the false. As a result, either the criminal gets a light sentence or an innocent person is wrongly punished. In order to put a stop to some people's mistaken methods of not investigating or studying cases and readily believing confessions, even to the extent of relying solely on them to reach verdicts, Article 35 of the Law on Criminal Procedure also stipulates that "When there is only a statement from the accused and no other evidence is available, the accused shall not be considered guilty and sentenced." This, too, is a forceful measure to halt the extortion of confessions by torture.

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PARTY AND STATE

'ASIATIC MODE OF PRODUCTION' DISCUSSED

Beijing SHIJIE LISHI [WORLD HISTORY] in Chinese No 1, 2 Feb 80 pp 55-64

[Article by Qi Qingfu [4359 1987 1381]: "Is What Is Meant by 'Asiatic Mode of Production' Primitive Society?--Talking Things Over With Comrades Zhishun and Xuesheng"]

[Text] Along with the gradual revival of an atmosphere of scholastic discussion in the realm of historical science since the downfall of the "gang of four," the question of the "Asiatic mode of production," which has long been subject to controversy, has once again been broached. Recently, Comrades Zhishun [1807 4783] and Xuesheng [1331 4141] who have conducted special exploration and study with respect to this question, have again written a special article on the subject to expound their latest views in this regard. They "examined the process of development of Marx's and Engels' thinking on primitive society" and determined that "what Marx meant by Asiatic mode of production is none other than primitive society;" they also generally pointed out two conspicuous characteristics of Asiatic mode of production: one, its primitiveness, and the other, its universality;" and they further "emphatically pointed out that, no matter whether [he called it] 'Asiatic mode of production' or 'the various prehistorical cultural stages,' those were the scientific appellations that the founder of Marxism had for primitive society, and they were also scientific terms." Does this way of mentioning "Asiatic mode of production" and "the various prehistorical cultural stages" in the same vein and likening "Asiatic mode of production" to primitive society accord with the original thinking of Marx and Engels? Is what is meant by "Asiatic mode of production" primitive society? For all this, I would like to talk a little about my own rudimentary views, in the hope that Comrades Zhishun and Xuesheng, and those other comrades who are interested in this question, may favor me with their comments.

I. Exploratory Study and Logical Method

The concept "Asiatic mode of production" was clearly proposed in the introduction to Marx's outstanding work "A Critique of Political Economy."

This "Critique of Political Economy," written from August 1858 to January 1859, marked an important stage in the process of the establishment of Marxist economics. It was "a result of earnest exploration" for 15 years² and the "fruit of research in the golden era of life" of Marx. This work "scientifically expressed for the first time a viewpoint of great significance to social relationships."³ This was a "very solemn, scientific" work.⁴ Engels also pointed out that the fundamental principle of historical materialism proposed in this work "was a discovery of revolutionary significance not only to economics but to all historical sciences (all sciences which are not natural sciences are historical sciences)."⁵ Precisely because of this, the proposing of the "Asiatic mode of production" was no doubt of very great scientific significance. Very clearly, the "Asiatic" undoubtedly was first in the order of those alternating forms of social economy. From this statement alone, we can gather that there must be some reason for saying that what is meant by the "Asiatic mode of production" is nothing other than primitive society.

A scientific concept and term must summarize the essence of what it reflects. Was this "Asiatic mode of production" proposed by Marx put forward on the basis of a discovery of the laws of primitive society and the fact that it summed up the essence of primitive society?

In order to really understand Marx's original thinking, we need to examine and analyze the proposing of the "Asiatic mode of production" and its connotation historically and comprehensively.

As early as 1964, Comrade Tian Cangwu wrote a special article⁶ in which he did a relatively comprehensive and systematic study of the questions surrounding the "Asiatic mode of production." When he set out to study this problem he first established two premises: one was to pay attention to the logical method employed by Marx and Engels, and the other was to combine with a historical examination the scientific history of primitive society. I feel that this was a correct approach to the exploration and study of this so-called "Asiatic mode of production."

Engels pointed out in his article "Karl Marx, 'A Critique of Political Economy:'" "A critique of economics, even by the method already derived, may still adopt two modes: according to history or according to logic." The so-called historical method is namely to carry out a study according to the natural order of historical development. Engels held that the purely historical method was inappropriate for preparing a critique of political economy, and he therefore pointed out: "Logical study is the only appropriate mode." The logical method means that, in the study of the pattern and realm of any economy, one can set aside concrete historical conditions, exclude accidental things, and find the most typical and most mature regularities. The logical method and the historical method are united as one; they are inseparable. "Actually, this is but one mode of historical study, except that it has gotten rid of the historical form and the haphazardness that serves to interfere. Wherever history has begun, one's thinking process should also begin there,

and the further development of one's thinking process is but a consistent formalistic reflection of the historical process in abstract theory; such a reflection is already modified, but it is modified according to the laws of the realistic historical process itself. At this juncture, every element can be examined at that point of development where it is completely mature and of typical form."⁷ What Marx and Engels used in the study of the "Asiatic mode of production" was precisely such a historical, logical method. When people trace the origin of the "Asiatic mode of production," they set their eyes on the historical aspect, often overlooking the logical method. If they do not look at this question from the logical method, it is very easy for them to distort Marx's original thinking. In order to illustrate this, we might well give an example: slavery was intrinsically the first form of exploitation in the ancient world; from the angle of history or, namely, the history of social development, this slavery was nothing other than a slave society. But a society in which slavery existed is not necessarily a slave society. Slavery, as a form of social economy, "has always accompanied the civilized era."⁸ Before 1865, America's slavery existed in a modern capitalist society; before liberation, the Yi people's slavery in our Liangshan area existed in a modern semifeudal and semicolonial society. These two systems of slavery, when studied by the logical method, had something in common with the slavery of ancient Greece and Rome, since they all constituted the first form of exploitative society in human history. As for the "Asiatic mode," if viewed from the historical angle, the position in which it should be arranged under the first social form in human society is primitive society; but if we examine it by the logical method, we discover that what Marx meant by "Asiatic mode of production" is a form of social economy in the realm of political economy, and not a complete stage in the history of social development. The way Marx proposed the "Asiatic mode of production" is mainly the result of study by the logical method. His study of this question took its point of departure from the aspect of political economy and not from the history of social development.

The "Asiatic mode of production" proposed in "A Critique of Political Economy: Introduction" was the only time this concept was solemnly used in all of the works of Marx and Engels. In most cases, the term used was "Asiatic form."

Comrades Zhishan and Xuesheng pointed out in their article: "This proposition of the Asiatic mode of production was brought forth on the basis of the accomplishment of Marxist theory in the 1840's and 1850's, on the basis of the studies conducted by Marx and Engels on the Orient and on Indian communes, and especially on the basis of the voluminous work 'Outline of a Critique of Political Economy' of 1857-1858." Factually, this is precisely so. The "Asiatic form" was given concentrated and full exposition in this work in the chapter on "The Various Forms Prior to Capitalist Production." It is worth noting that this was merely a manuscript "not intended for publication but for clarifying the problems at hand."⁹ This manuscript paved the way for the creative writing of "Das Kapital" later on. But at that time Marx did not solve all the problems at hand; certain viewpoints in this manuscript were still in an exploratory stage. Just as Marx pointed out in a letter:

"Once I attempted to liquidate certain problems as the main subjects of my study, new aspects often emerged into view again, and they inevitably brought up new considerations."¹⁰ As an issue encountered in the process of the study of political economy, the "Asiatic mode of production"--or, namely, the question of an "Asiatic form"--was broached at this time, but exploration of this concept was still in progress and no conclusion had been reached. Some comrades have already pointed out: "The use of such concepts as the Asiatic mode of production indicated merely some experiments in their magnificent summing-up process; they never lingered over that point but continued to change and deepen their views, along with the deepening of their study of the historical sciences."¹¹ Indian scholar R.P. Salaff also gave as his opinion: "The 'Asiatic mode of production' was merely an exploratory term used occasionally by Marx in his several articles. He did not define it or explain it in those several articles or in his subsequent works."¹² I think the use of "experiment" and "exploration" to illustrate the proposing of the "Asiatic" question fits the actual situation exactly. The proposing of the "Asiatic mode of production" by Marx in the 1850's was merely the beginning of an exploratory study; along with the lapse of time and the deepening of the study, the way to propose the "Asiatic" question was also changing.

When Marx proposed the "Asiatic mode of production" in the 1850's, the entire primitive society was still "an unsolved enigma."¹³ Engels added a footnote to the 1888 English edition of "Communist Manifesto" to point out: "In 1847, hardly anybody knew anything about the prehistorical state of society or about the organization of society before the entire written history." Even by 1881 Marx still said that, concerning the various forms of primitive society, "we at present have only rudimentary descriptions"¹⁴ Since at that time "people were still not very clear about the specific content of the era of primitive communism," how can it be said that "before class society there must have existed a classless primitive society," and how can anyone declare decisively that that was "veritably and undoubtedly the case?"¹⁵ Even if what is meant by Marx's proposed "Asiatic mode of production" is primitive society, then it must still be tested by the result of practice in the deepening study later on: if it tallies with the content of primitive society and sums up the essence of primitive society, then it is a scientific term; if it does not tally, or if it fails to indicate that essence, then it cannot be considered a scientific term but must be treated as something "exploratory."

What was the point of departure for Marx in his study of "Asiatic" society? Did he start from the aspect of political economy or from the aspect of the history of social development? Undoubtedly it was the former and not the latter. There is a famous statement by Marx in "A Critique of Political Economy: Introduction: "The anatomy of the human body is a key to the anatomy of an ape's body. Signs of a higher level animal revealed in a lower level animal can be understood only after the higher level animal itself is understood. Therefore, the bourgeois economy has supplied the key to the ancient economy, etc."¹⁶ Marx started with the study of the bourgeois economy

and penetrated into the realm of ancient economy; in the process of his study of capitalism he gradually recognized the various forms prior to capitalist production. "Capital is the economic power that controls everything in the bourgeois society. It must become the beginning point and also the terminal point; it must be explained ahead of land ownership."¹⁷ In order to study capital, it was necessary for Marx and Engels to study the ownership of land prior to capitalist production. The "Asiatic mode of production" was proposed precisely during this process of study.

The essence of what Marx and Engels spoke of as the "Asiatic form" was the common ownership of land based on village communes that existed in Oriental society, especially in Indian society. A footnote to "A Critique of Political Economy" explains this very clearly: "A careful study of the forms of ownership in Asiatic, especially Indian, communes will yield the proof as to how, from the different forms of ownership in those primitive communes, are derived the various forms from its disintegration."¹⁸

In the process of the study of the ownership of land prior to capitalism, Marx explored "the earliest meaning of ownership"¹⁹ and discovered that common ownership was the primitive form.²⁰ And the form of common ownership of land was also most distinctively reflected in Asia, especially in India's village communes. Hence, Marx said: "All forms reflected by this ownership were predicated upon such communes; that is to say, while their members might be different from each other in form, as members they were all property owners. Therefore, the primitive form of this ownership was direct common ownership (namely, the Oriental form, which under the Slavic form underwent some changes or even changed into its antithesis, but which in ancient times, and in the German system of ownership, constituted the underlying and contradictory foundation)." He emphatically pointed out that this "form of common ownership of land was predicated upon a genuine commune system."²¹ From this, it is obvious that the essence of the "Asiatic mode of production"--or, namely, the "Asiatic form"--was the primitive form of common ownership of land, and that its nucleus was the village commune based on common ownership of land which had long existed in Asia. As long as we understand clearly the relationship between Marx's perception of the essence of those village communes and the elaboration of the scientific history of primitive society, we should be able to understand clearly the real connotation of the "Asiatic mode of production," and we should also be able to understand clearly why Marx and Engels later no longer used this concept.

II. The Dual Character of Village Communes and the Establishment of the Scientific History of Primitive Society

In the process of their study of the inevitable laws of the emergence, development, and disappearance of capitalism, Marx and Engels comprehensively examined the forms prior to capitalist production, discovered the developmental laws of human society, established the theory of scientific communism, and at the same time created the theory of the scientific history of primitive society.

The Marxist theory of the scientific history of primitive society was not "in existence at the time of the birth of Marxism;" it went through a process of exploratory study, deepening understanding, basic establishment, and continued perfection.

In 1847, when the "Communist Manifesto" of Marx and Engels appeared in the world, the history of primitive society as a science still did not exist. The "Communist Manifesto" said from the very beginnings "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle." This shows that at that time they still did not include classless primitive society in the order of historical development. This was determined by the state of study of primitive society. We cannot say that they already recognized primitive society but "omitted it without mention;" we can only say that their understanding of primitive society was still not clear. When the "Communist Manifesto" was published in 1888, Engels added a special footnote to this statement in order to explain this situation: "That is, all written history. In 1847, prehistoric society, the social organization existing previous to recorded history, was all but unknown. Since then, Haxthausen has discovered common ownership of land in Russia, Maurer has proved it to be the social foundation from which all Teutonic races started in history, and by and by village communities were found to be, or to have been, the primitive form of society everywhere from India to Ireland. The inner organization of this primitive Communistic society was laid bare, in its typical form, by Morgan's crowning discovery of the true nature of the gens and its relation to the tribe. With the dissolution of these primeval communities, society begins to be differentiated into separate and finally antagonistic classes. I have attempted to retrace this process of dissolution in Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats [The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State], 2nd edition, Stuttgart, 1886."²²

Here, Engels succinctly summarized the state of study of the history of primitive society from the 1840's to the 1880's. The Marxist scientific history of primitive society came into being precisely along with each study. In the 1840's, primitive society as a subject of study still did not exist, but, starting from the dialectical-materialistic and historical-materialistic point of view, Marx and Engels already saw that "in Rome, and among the people of the German, Celtic and Slavic races, the starting point of property development was all communal or tribal property; real, private property, however, was everywhere a result of usurpation." They explored tribal ownership and were of the opinion that "whether in the ancient world or during the medieval period, the earliest form of ownership everywhere was tribal ownership."²³ Even though their understanding of "the earliest form of ownership" at that time was still not very clear, and the concept they used was also rather vague, they had already grasped the essential question in the study of primitive society: public ownership of property. It was precisely from this point of departure that they succeeded in opening the door toward the scientific history of primitive society. "German Ideology" was still the preparatory stage in the study of the history of primitive society. To say that the first stage of the historical periodization first

mentioned in the book "German Ideology" was the era of primitive society does not correspond to reality. At that time, the study of the scientific history of primitive society had not yet really begun.

The scientific study of primitive society by Marx and Engels started from their discovery of village communes.

The central question in the study of village communes by Marx and Engels was the question of common ownership of land. It was in their 1853 correspondence that they first studied and discussed the question of common ownership of land in the Orient. In his letter to Engels, Marx quoted data from French physician, tourist, and author Francois Bernier's "Travels to Janina, Hindustan, and the Kingdom of Kashmir," saying: "Bernier entirely correctly saw that the basis of all the phenomena in the East (by this he meant Turkey, Persia, and Hindustan) was the nonexistence of private ownership of land. This is the real key to understanding the celestial kingdom of the East."²⁴ Four days later, Engels wrote back to Marx and indicated his complete agreement with Marx's view; he, too, was of the opinion that "the nonexistence of private ownership of land is really the key to understanding the entire East."²⁵ Marx and Engels used precisely this key of the common ownership of land to open the door of the village communes, and thereby exposed the enigmatic edifice of primitive society.

From the 1850's up to the early 1880's, Marx and Engels continued to carry on their study of the village communes; they gradually recognized the most essential characteristics of those village communes, and thereby laid the foundation for the establishment of the scientific history of primitive society.

In their works of the 1850's and 1860's, Marx and Engels had many discourses on the Asiatic form of village communes; these discourses were contained mainly in the first volume of "Das Kapital," "A Critique of Political Economy," and Marx's manuscript "Outline of a Critique of Political Economy" and other similar works on political economy as well as in some correspondence; they were also scattered throughout some other articles. Looking through these discourses, we can see that their understanding of the entire primitive society became gradually clear only along with their understanding of the village communes. Several points in their understanding of the village communes merit our attention:

1. From the very beginning they noticed "common ownership and private cultivation" and "owned in common but occupied privately" as the characteristics of those village communes. In his letter to Engels dated June 14, 1857, Marx wrote: "(Paater) was mostly inherited; in some of these village communities, the land of the entire village was cultivated in common, but under most circumstances every landowner cultivated his own land."²⁶ Marx also pointed out in his "Outline of a Critique of Political Economy:" "In the East, insofar as property was concerned there was only communal property; individual members could be owners of only certain given parts, by inheritance

or otherwise, because no single part of the property belonged to any one member. On the contrary, individuals were direct limbs of the commune; namely, they formed the common body of the commune and could not be separated from the commune. Therefore, such individuals could only be owners. There was only common property, and there was only private possession."²⁷

2. They also saw that village communes were preserved in the class society for long periods of time. As they repeatedly pointed out: "Slavery and an ethnic-name grouping system existed inside such village communities."²⁸ "The body of such a small commune was found to bear the marks of ethnic-name differentiation and slavery."²⁹ "The Asiatic form is bound to be preserved most tenaciously and for the longest possible duration."³⁰

3. They attempted to classify various forms of communes and thereby trace the form of "the simplest commune." In the first volume of "Das Kapital," it was pointed out: "In different parts of India, different forms of communes existed. The commune with the simplest form cultivated its land in common and distributed the products from the land to its members, while each family would engage in spinning and weaving and the like as its sideline enterprises."³¹ These "simplest communes," which cultivated their land in common, should be the form of the pre-village communes. During that period, because primitive clan organizations were still not recognized, Marx and Engels often mixed clans and communes together in their discourses. For example, it was written in the first volume of "Das Kapital:" "In the agriculture of an Indian commune, the dominant form of cooperation in the process of labor that we saw was based on the one hand on the common ownership of conditions of production and on the other hand, like individual bees never leaving their hive, on the fact that individuals had not yet cut their umbilical cord from the clan or commune."³²

4. They took the village commune of Asia, especially India, as the most ancient primitive form. In his letter to Engels dated 14 March 1868, Marx said: "The Asiatic or Indian forms of ownership in various parts of Europe I mentioned were all primitive forms."³³ For quite a long time Marx regarded the communal ownership in various parts of Europe as having "originated from India."³⁴ "The prototypes of Roman and German private ownership can be deduced from the various forms of Indian communal ownership."³⁵

On the basis of the foregoing points, we can say that from the 1850's to the 1870's the Asiatic form of village commune described by Marx and Engels was "primitive," "universal," and of a "class nature;" but they still had not discovered the truly essential characteristic of village communes--duality.

Marx achieved this understanding of the nature of village communes in the 1880's. Engels wrote in his introduction to Volume 3 of "Das Kapital:" "In order to write the chapter on land rentals, Marx did some entirely new, special studies in the 1870's."³⁶ At this time, Marx deeply explored the common ownership of land in Russia; he especially studied Russian sociologist and historian Kovalevski's work, "Occupation of Communal Land and the Cause,

Process and Result of Its Disintegration," and noted down detailed summaries. This volume of summaries by Marx was probably written between 1879 and 1880. At this time Marx was reading and studying extensively materials about Russia and America in order to write the part on land rentals in Volume 3 of "Das Kapital," while Kovalevski's book was just published then (1879). Marx read this book apparently for the aforesaid purpose.³⁷ On the basis of a penetrating study of the ownership of land in village communes in Russia, Marx, in the three drafts³⁸ he wrote to V.I. Zasulich in February and March 1881, for the first time clearly summarized the most essential characteristic of village communes--duality. It was precisely this duality which determined the transient character of the village commune. In his third draft, Marx made a succinct and scientific general statement about the essential character of the village commune:

"Since the agricultural commune was the last stage of the original form of society, it was therefore also the transient stage leading toward the derivative form; that is to say, it was a transition from the society based on common ownership to the society based on private ownership. It goes without saying that derivative forms include the series of societies based on slavery and serfdom."

By this time, Marx no longer regarded the village commune of the "Asiatic form" as the most ancient primitive form, but regarded it instead as the last form of the various stages of primitive society. Marx changed his previous way of dividing village communes into Asiatic, Slavic, ancient, and German forms, and now scientifically pointed out: "It is a mistake to speak of all primitive communes in the same vein; just as in the case of geological formations, there is among those historical formations a series of original, derivative, and successive types." By this time, Marx had correctly recognized that the village commune was but "the last stage of the primeval forms of society." He pointed out: "The forms of ancient society were also like this; they were reflected in a series of different stages indicative of successively replaced eras. Russia's village communes belonged to the newest type in this chain of links." So did Asia's village communes. Subsequent scientific discoveries proved the correctness of Marx's dictum. Primitive society passed through the longest period of time in the developmental history of human society. Up to a million years elapsed in the development from primitive groups to clan communes and family communes, but village communes occupied only an ephemeral period during the transition when the prolonged primitive society developed toward class society. When entering this period, primitive society had already begun to undergo a qualitative change.

In the third draft, Marx compared the three most important characteristics by which village communes differed from the most ancient communes; in summary, these were: 1. The more ancient communes were blood aggregations; village communes "were the earliest social associations of free men without blood relations," or, namely, geographical aggregations. 2. The more ancient communes had only "commonly shared houses and collective residences;"

village communes already accommodated private ownership of houses and decentralized residences. 3. The more ancient communes "carried out their production in common" and also consumed their products in common: as for the village communes, every member cultivated by his own labor the land distributed to him, and also kept its products as his own. At that time, while Marx did not differentiate the communal forms of primitive society one by one according to the forms of common ownership of land, he had by then already clearly recognized the characteristic of the form of land ownership in the village communes--"common ownership and private cultivation;" this was the root cause of the duality of the village communes. The three characteristics of village communes pointed out by Marx were established precisely on this duality of land ownership self-contradiction in the village communes. The reason Marx did not mention the characteristic of the form of land ownership in the same vein with the three above items was to stress duality as the most essential characteristic of village communes. Marx pointed out:

"Evidently, this duality intrinsic with the agricultural communal system was able to become a source of great vitality for it; it broke away from the restrictions of the steadfast but narrow blood kinships and acquired as its firm foundation common ownership of land and various social relationships stemming therefrom. At the same time, various families individually occupied houses and lots and [engaged in] small-scale land economy, and private individuals took possession of the products; this situation promoted the development of the individuals, but such a development was incompatible with the organic structure of the more ancient communes."

"But, equally evident, it was precisely this duality which could gradually become the onset of the disintegration of the communes. Apart from destructive influences from external sources, there were already factors within the communes to prompt their own destruction. Private ownership of land had already infiltrated inside the communes through the private ownership of houses and farming lots; this could very well become the castle from which assault on the common ownership of land was to be prepared. This was what had already happened. But most important was still the source of private individual possession--small-scale land labor."

It can be seen that "communal ownership of land" and "small-scale land labor" constituted the characteristics of the land ownership of village communes. Put in simpler language, these were namely "common ownership but private cultivation." This duality of the villages communes was reflected in the unity of the opposites of common ownership of property and private ownership of property; therefore, Marx said that villages communes constituted "a transition from a society based on common ownership toward a society based on private ownership." During this transition, the change in the nature of ownership of the land played the decisive role. Even though these village communes still retained the common ownership of land that had long developed from the primitive communes, their nature had already begun to undergo a change; they had already begun to be stamped with the mark of private ownership. They were developing from "common ownership and common cultivation"

toward "common ownership but private cultivation," thereby opening the way to development toward private ownership of land. The footnote explanation added to the 1888 English edition of the "Communist Manifesto" by Engels indicated that primitive society was recognized along with the solution of problems in two aspects: one was the clan system, and the other was common ownership of land. The drafts of reply Marx sent to V.I. Zasulich were important documents in the scientific history of the discovery of primitive society. At that juncture, the dualistic essence of the village communes was discovered, and the question of the nature of the primitive common ownership of land was also scientifically solved; this served to lay a solid bedrock for the establishment of the scientific history of primitive society. At the same time, the root cause of private ownership was also found: small-scale land labor, which was the source of private individual possession. Roughly during this same period, Morgan's "Ancient Society" was published; his discovery of the clan society became another unshakable piece of bedrock regarding primitive society. Marx read Morgan's "Ancient Society" and also made detailed summaries. From the end of March to 26 May 1884, using as his basis of Marx's summaries, Engels wrote the eternal work "The Origins of Family, Private Ownership and the State;" the Marxist scientific history of primitive society thus declared itself firmly established.

III. Reasons for Marx's Abandonment of the "Asiatic Mode of Production"

The reason Comrades Zhishun and Xuesheng especially emphasize that "Asiatic mode of production" is a "scientific phrase," a "scientific term," is to oppose the view of those who think Marx and Engels abandoned the term "Asiatic mode of production;" they even say: "Only those who mistake the Asiatic mode of production as a peculiar form of Oriental society, or who regard it as the East's system of slavery, would be forced to adopt such a step so as to attribute the blame to Marx."

In their late works Marx and Engels no longer mentioned the "Asiatic mode of production," and Engels, in particular, did not mention the "Asiatic mode of production" at all in "The Origins of Family, Private Ownership and the State." Comrades Zhishun and Xuesheng do not agree with this view, maintaining that Marx and Engels never abandoned the term "Asiatic mode of production." They have quoted a passage in the first volume of the English version of "Das Kapital" edited by Engels in 1887, as their proof:

"Under the ancient Asiatic, ancient Greek, and Roman modes of production and the like, products became merchandise and the phenomenon of men existing as producers of merchandise became secondary; but the more the community moved toward decline, the more important this phenomenon also became.... These organic structures of ancient social production were far more simple and distinctive compared to the bourgeois organic structures of social production, but they were based either on the assumption that the individual was still not mature and still had not outgrown his umbilical cord of natural blood affiliation with other men, or on the relationship of direct rule and obedience."

Comrades Zhishun and Xuesheng point out that in this English version, Engels added "primitive" before "community" and changed "did still not outgrow" into "as individual in the primitive tribal commune, did still not outgrow...." They therefore maintain that the "ancient Asiatic" mode of production belonged to the primitive era of primitive community and primitive tribe, whereas the "ancient" mode of production belonged to the slave era of the relationship of direct rule and obedience, and that of the two the latter succeeded the former. Since the first volume of "Das Kapital" was written in the 1860's, it was not at all strange that Marx should have used the "Asiatic mode of production" therein. Although in Marx's connotation from the 1850's to the 1870's, the "ancient Asiatic" was the "primitive form," it could be stamped with the marks of the slave system and ethnic-name grouping system. Here, "ancient Asiatic, ancient Greek, and Roman" were also terms equivalent to the "antiquity of Asia, Greece, and Rome," and they all meant the slave system; they had all developed from the primitive community. In this passage, we cannot simply draw an equation between "Asiatic" and "community" or even the "primitive tribal commune" added by Engels. The phenomenon of "products changing into merchandise" became more and more important; the last stage of the "community," the "primitive tribal commune," thus also declined with it and was bound to develop toward the slave system. We might as well quote a passage from Engels which was also written in 1887 as our proof: "In Asiatic antiquity and classical antiquity, the principal form of class oppression was the slave system...."³⁹ This shows that the "Asiatic mode of production" here did not have the connotation of primitive society.

Another basis of argument quoted by Comrades Zhishun and Xuesheng is a footnote written by Engels in Volume 3 of "Das Kapital" in 1894: "Earlier, people always underestimated the scale and significance of Asiatic, ancient, and medieval commerce; in contrast to this, greatly overestimating it has already become the fashion."

They think that Engels still deemed it permissible to name the first stage of man's historical development "Asiatic" or the "Asiatic mode of production" just the year before his death. Let us turn to the text of this footnote in "Das Kapital." The title of this chapter is "A Historical Examination Concerning Merchant Capital," and there is this statement in the chapter: "In the ancient world, the development of commercial influence and merchant capital inevitably resulted in a slave economy. But because of different points of departure, it sometimes merely transformed a patriarchal slave system, aiming at the production of direct means of livelihood, into a slave system aiming at the production of surplus value."⁴⁰ Obviously, "Asiatic" and "ancient" both meant "ancient world," because the content of the commerce they discussed was consistent. This meant the slave society, and we can quote a passage from Engels' "The Origins of Family, Private Ownership and the State" as our proof: "Slavery was a form of exploitation intrinsic with the ancient world...."⁴¹ Here "ancient world" definitely did not mean just ancient Greece and Rome; it included also "Asiatic antiquity."

From the above we can see that the quotation used by Comrade Xuexiang can by no means show that Marx and Engels did not abandon the proposition concerning "Asiatic." The fact is that from the 1860's Marx and Engels had already abandoned the term "Asiatic mode of production," the reason being that at that time they had already discovered the Asiatic nature of the Asiatic form of village communes. They had already recognized the concept "Asiatic mode of production" as being unscientific because it could not summarize the essence in question.

Because the nature of the village communes was discovered, perceptions made Marx change some of his previous views, and the most outstanding change had to do with the question of the Asiatic form. From the 1850's to the 1870's, Marx had always regarded the Indian commune as the origin of communal ownership. In his letter to Engelsmann he said:

"The suggestion that communal ownership originated in Mongolia is a nominalist lie. As I have repeatedly pointed out in my works, it originated in India, and it was therefore visible in the early period of development of the civilized countries of Europe in general. Even the particular Slavic (not Mongolian) form of the Russian communal ownership (which was visible also among the non-Russian southern Slavs) seemed to resemble most of all an ancient German perversion of the Indian ownership after corresponding evolution."⁴²

But in the drafts of his letter to Zasulich in 1881, Marx's view had thoroughly changed: "German village communes were derived from communes of a more ancient type. Here they were the products of origination and development, and not something wholly imported from Asia. There, the East Indies also had such communes, and these were often the last stage or last period of the ancient form."⁴³

By this time, what Marx first regarded as "primitive character" and "universal character" were no longer present. Hence, he let "Asiatic mode of production" or "Asiatic form," the necessity for its continued use as an exploratory concept in the process of study had already been lost. The passage quoted above is the very indication that Marx had abandoned the term "Asiatic mode of production." Marx did not stop using the term "Asiatic mode of production" after he had read "Ancient Societies" and discovered clan organizations; he did so only after he had discovered the essence of the village commune in 1861. This discovery proved that the "Asiatic" proposal was unscientific; this abandonment was rational.

Not a few people at home and abroad maintain that Marx and Engels no longer used the term "Asiatic mode of production" after the 1870's. The question is that those who subscribe to the "abandonment theory" have a different point of departure, and the reasons for this "abandonment" they have proposed are also different. Some think that even though Marx and Engels no longer used this term, they did not necessarily change their view concerning the "Asiatic mode." Some also think that Marx did abandon his view concerning

the "Asiatic mode of production" because, after his study of the Russian village communes, he denied the characteristics of the "Asiatic mode of production" one by one.⁴⁴ Still some think that not mentioning it was not the same as "abandonment," and hence they advocate a "replacement theory," that is to say, they think the term Asiatic mode of production was merely no longer used and was replaced by the term primitive commune.⁴⁵ As regards the "abandonment theory," we must do some concrete analysis. If anybody says that to insist on this "abandonment theory" is to advocate a "special theory" or a "slave system theory" concerning Asiatic society, this view does not tally with the facts. Comrade Mao Keyao is one who thinks so: "After the 1870's, Marx and Engels no longer used the concept of Asiatic mode of production; this illustrates that they had already negated their view about the ancient Orient being a special form."⁴⁶ Comrade Mao Keyao's article is firmly opposed to such a "special theory." On the other hand, many who insist on this special theory concerning Oriental society attempt to use the "Asiatic mode of production," which Mao Keyao himself has abandoned, as the basis of their argument, and thereby negate the five modes of production in Marxism, negate the existence of slave society in the East, prove the "permanent feudalism" of the East, and even insist on using the "Asiatic mode of production" to prove that ancient China was a "universal slave system;" such views have prevailed for quite a long time, and most recently there are still not a few in the country who maintain them.

Even though Marx and Engels no longer used the concept "Asiatic mode of production," they by no means abandoned the substance which this concept originally embodied--the study of village communes; instead, they continued to penetrate it. This abandonment of the concept of "Asiatic mode of production" did not in any way affect the Marxist theory concerning the division of human society into five basic forms of social economy; on the contrary, ceasing the use of the term Asiatic mode of production served precisely to indicate that the founder of Marxism's understanding of man's very first basic social form--primitive society--had already attained maturity.

FOOTNOTES

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3. Marx to Ferdinand Lassalle (22 November 1858), "Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 29, p 546.
4. Marx to Engels (between 13 and 15 January 1859), "Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 29, p 369.
5. Engels: "Karl Marx, 'A Critique of Political Economy,'" "A Critique of Political Economy," p 171.

6. Tian Gangwu: "Marx and Engels on the Question of Ancient Society in Asia," "Essays on History," First Collection, Zhonghua Book Company, 1964.
7. "A Critique of Political Economy," p 176.
8. Engels: "The Origins of Family, Private Ownership and the State," "Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 4, p 172.
9. Marx: "Forms Prior to the Birth of Capitalism," translated by Rishi, People's Publishing House, 1956 edition, p 1.
10. Marx to Ferdinand Lassalle (22 February 1858), "Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 29, p 530.
11. Mao Keyao: "Perceptions in the Studies of Marx and Engels on the Ancient Society of the East," BEIJING UNIVERSITY JOURNAL, No 2, 1978.
12. (India) R.P. (Salaph): "Indian Society," Commercial Press, December 1977 edition, p 478.
13. Engels: Introduction to "The Origins of Family, Private Ownership and the State," "Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 4, p 2.
14. Marx: "Draft of Reply to V.I. Zasulich--First Draft," "Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 19, p 432.
15. Same as note 1, p 14.
- 16, 17, 18. "A Critique of Political Economy," pp 215, 217, 17.
19. Marx: "Outline of a Critique of Political Economy," Vol 3, p 113.
20. Marx: Foreword to "A Critique of Political Economy," "A Critique of Political Economy," p 197.
21. Same as note 19, pp 113-116.
22. "Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 1, p 251.
23. Marx and Engels: "German Ideology," "Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 3, pp 422, 69.
24. Marx to Engels (2 June 1853), "Complete Works of Marx and Engels," vol 28, p 256.
25. Engels to Marx (6 June 1853), ibid., p 260.
26. Marx to Engels (14 June 1853), ibid., p 272.

27. "Outline of a Critique of Political Economy," Vol 3, p 96.
28. Same as note 26.
29. Marx: "British Rule in India," "Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 2, p 67.
30. Marx: "Forms Prior to the Birth of Capitalism." p 20.
31. Marx: "Das Kapital." Vol 1, People's Publishing House, June 1975, 1st edition. p 396.
32. Marx: *ibid.*, Vol 1, p 371.
33. Marx to Engels (March 14, 1868), "Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 32, p 43.
34. Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann (17 February 1870), *ibid.*, p 637.
35. "Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 13, p 22.
36. "Das Kapital," Vol 3, People's Publishing House, 1975, 1st edition, pp 10-11.
37. Marx, "Summaries From Kovalevski's Book on 'Occupation of Communal Land and the Cause, Process and Result of Its Disintegration:'" publisher's note.
38. "Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 19, pp 430-452.
39. Engels: "The Workers' Movement in the United States," "Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 4, pp 258-259.
40. Marx: "Das Kapital," Vol 3, p 371.
41. "Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 4, p 172.
42. "Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 32, p 636.
43. "Complete Works of Marx and Engels," Vol 19, pp 433-434.
44. Qui Lianshong: "Concerning the Question of Private Ownership of Land in Ancient India," "Historiography," inaugural number, 1979.
45. See note 40.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

POSSIBILITY OF ENEMY NUCLEAR ATTACK MUST BE CONSIDERED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN DAO in Chinese 16 Sep 79 p 3

[Article by Xu Baohan (1776 1405 0810): "We Must Be Prepared To Fight Nuclear War in First Stages of Any Future War")]

[Text] There is a popular theory nowadays that in the initial stages of a future war, or even throughout the entire war, the enemy is "most unlikely" to use nuclear weapons to attack us. The proponents of this theory list four reasons to support their argument. First, although the enemy has tactical nuclear weapons, "it is very difficult to distinguish" the use of tactical nuclear weapons from that of strategic nuclear weapons. Since we too have nuclear weapons, the enemy would not run the risk of resorting inadvertently to strategic nuclear weapons. Second, our defensive positions are in the mountains. If the enemy used tactical nuclear weapons, the threat would not be too serious and his nuclear shells would be wasted. Third, the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with wars of predatory aggression. Fourth, since the enemy enjoys absolute superiority in conventional weapons, he is unlikely to use nuclear weapons in the initial stages of the war, even though he might use them in its final stage. Personally, I find it disturbing to base our war preparations and troop training on the strength of this theory. My reasons are as follows:

1. Nuclear weapons as they are today tend to be more and more diversified and smaller and smaller in size. Soviet troops are now equipped with tactical nuclear weapons of various sizes, not only the 10,000-ton class, the 1,000-ton class and the 100-ton class, but also much smaller ones which could be fired by a conventional cannon. The radius of destruction of such a shell is not much greater than 200 to 700 meters, and they are likely to become more compact. These are designed for use in actual combat zones to kill armed personnel without massive destruction of urban centers and industrial sites. Obviously there is a line of distinction between the use of tactical nuclear weapons and that of strategic nuclear weapons, which are no longer "difficult to distinguish." In fact, the use of tactical nuclear weapons restricts rather than escalates nuclear war. For instance, if the enemy used tactical nuclear weapons to attack our major defense positions and if we hit back with tactical nuclear weapons,

the enemy would not resort lightly to strategic nuclear weapons. If he did, he would face unfavorable international reaction. This produces such a restraint on the choice of nuclear weapons that the belligerent parties are practically obliged to limit themselves to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Consequently, the use of tactical nuclear weapons and that of strategic nuclear weapons are apparently two different matters. If we say the use of tactical nuclear weapons would escalate nuclear war but could not restrain the use of strategic nuclear weapons, we would be fooling ourselves and lowering our guard against the use of tactical nuclear weapons by the enemy.

2. Contrary to popular belief, the use of tactical nuclear weapons by the enemy would be a serious threat to our defensive positions in the mountains. We all know tactical nuclear weapons are easy to carry and could aim accurately within a short range. One tactical nuclear shell could penetrate our defense line and leave a gap several hundred meters long. It could destroy our defense hubs and vital strongholds. A single tactical nuclear shell, when exploded at a low altitude, could kill our troops positioned on any side of a mountain peak. Although troops inside defense shelters would not be killed, they would not be able, due to post-explosion radiation, to take up positions outside the shelter soon enough to intercept enemy tanks and armor units advancing in the wake of the shelling. True, tactical nuclear weapons lose some of their effectiveness in mountainous areas, but this could be compensated for by firing more shells. I don't think any enemy who is set to gain the military initiative would hesitate to pay the price.

3. The use of tactical nuclear weapons has gained top priority in Soviet military thinking. According to the Soviet military leadership and writings on military matters, the consensus is that "modern wars are practically nuclear wars." "Preemptive nuclear attack against the enemy is a decisive factor in gaining the advantage over the enemy and retaining the initiative." "Small nuclear weapons help boost the combat capabilities of motorized infantry units and cut back the dependence on weapons provided by the higher echelons. Thus, nuclear weapons will be the principal tool of annihilation on the battlefield." Judging by these statements, we can clearly see how obsessed they are with tactical nuclear weapons.

Driven by such a frenzy for tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet troop units at and above division level are equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, and as the weaponry keeps improving, the Soviet army organization and equipment will improve and strengthen accordingly. The current trend indicates that the Soviets might use tactical nuclear weapons anytime a war breaks out.

4. There is no contradiction between the use of tactical nuclear weapons and a war of predatory aggression. In fact, the two are becoming the same because tactical nuclear weapons are used exclusively to destroy lives without destroying urban centers, residential areas, and industrial bases --the objective of pillage and enslavement. Moreover, tactical nuclear

weapons might help shorten the war and make it possible to realize the objectives of wars of predatory aggression much sooner.

5. "Since the enemy enjoys absolute superiority in conventional weapons, he is unlikely to use nuclear weapons in the initial stages of a war." This is wishful thinking. Once the enemy launched an aggressive war against us, the will to fight on both sides and the scope and intensity of the war would be unprecedented. It would be not only a contest of military and economic strength but also a test of the political resolve of both sides. The enemy's strategy rests on a sudden, extensive, and overpowering attack to achieve his predatory objectives within the shortest possible time. However, as soon as enemy forces entered our territory, they would face a hostile population, unfamiliar topography, and fierce counterattacks, especially at our major defense centers. Our stiff resistance and repeated counterattacks could make the enemy so frustrated that he might resort to tactical nuclear weapons to spring a shock attack.

A nuclear attack by the enemy is not as dreadful as our lack of vigilance and preparedness. Chairman Mao pointed out: "We must admit the difficulties we face, analyze them, and struggle against them." (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol 4, p 1061) He also said: "'Preparedness breeds success; lack of preparedness invites disaster.' If we do not plan ahead and be prepared, we won't be able to win victories." (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol 2, p 462) So when we explore what would happen in the first stages of a future war or in its entire duration, it is better to anticipate more difficulties and greater complexities. We must be prepared to face a nuclear attack and be ready for the use by our enemy of tactical nuclear weapons in the initial stages of a future war. If we are so prepared emotionally and materially, we will be able to cope with any complex situations. On the other hand, if we believe a nuclear war is "unlikely to occur," pay very little attention to the study of nuclear war, do not include nuclear war in training, and do not base combat planning on the possibility of tactical nuclear attack but go by subjective, wishy-washy concepts, the consequences will be unthinkable in case the enemy actually uses nuclear weapons.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

MODERN WARFARE CALLS FOR SCIENTIFIC METHODS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 16 Sep 79 p 3

[Article by Hu Zichang [5170 5261 2052] and Jiang Zongping [1203 1350 1627]:
"Use Scientific Methods To Organize Coordinated Combat Command"]

[Text] The most unique aspect of modern warfare is coordinated combat by all arms of the services, including the ground, air and naval forces. While engaged in coordinated combat, these forces are mutually supportive and restrictive. A movement by one affects the positions of all. If an ill-informed commander of the combined forces has no idea of the overall deployment and does not know how to use scientific methods to organize a coordinated combat command, he will throw the entire force into disarray and confusion.

Learning to use scientific methods to organize a coordinated combat command means racing against time to seize the best opportunity to catch the enemy unprepared. We all know modern wars are three dimensional, huge in scope, surprising and extremely destructive. The mobility of troops has increased tremendously, and so have military strength and firepower. Everything must move within a specific space at a specific time. Space and time restrict the military strength and firepower of the belligerents. "Troops must move fast, and time is as valuable as troops." This is especially true under modern conditions. We must race against time to establish superiority in military strength and firepower. In the past, when wars involved only infantry, the movement of foot soldiers was simple. "Carrying only their backpacks," the foot soldiers could overtake the enemy's motor vehicles by forced march along country roads and shortcuts. The commander's courage and willpower were the most crucial points. Today, as the conditions at the front change continuously, the courage and willpower of the commander are not good enough for commanding the coordinated operations of combined forces. The vital point is to use scientific methods to organize an efficient command which saves time and makes good use of time.

Learning to use scientific methods to organize a coordinate combat command for combined forces requires rectification of thought and adherence to the most scientific Marxist line of thinking which seeks truth from facts and

base everything on facts. This means focusing our attention on new historical facts and the characteristics of modern warfare, seriously and objectively analyzing the traditional procedures and methods of organizing a coordinated combat command, abandoning complicated theories and outmoded systems so as to liberate our thought, and launching drastic reforms to make the methods and procedures of organizing command clearcut, simple and practical. For instance, the established procedure to ready troops for combat is first to study the topography; second, to call a meeting of the party committee; third, to launch a drive for political mobilization; and fourth, to deploy troops for combat Could these standard procedures be modified? Is it absolutely necessary to call a meeting of the party committee in every battle in order to assert the leadership of the party? These are serious questions deserving careful study. Under existing conditions, the leaders at various levels speak in different capacities. If everyone takes his turn to speak at the party committee meeting, when the meeting is over there will be no time left for command coordination meetings. As a result, the party committee meeting often simply replaces the coordination meeting. This could breed serious errors in organized command.

Since our command instruments are not sufficiently advanced, it is especially important to simplify and improve the procedures and methods of organizing combat command so as to race against time. Not long ago, when we were engaged in a hypothetical operation to organize and strengthen our motorized infantry division against newly arrived enemy troops, we introduced "four simplifications" to the headquarters which organized the combat command. First, simplify written commands. Use personal or telephone contacts to replace paperwork. Second, simplify the procedure for a commander to receive reports or recommendations. Get rid of the standard procedure of reporting through channels by staff officers. Let the chief of staff present a comprehensive report to the commander and provide him with information which would help him make final decisions. Third, simplify the procedure of transmitting the commander's decisions. The assignments of specific tasks, coordination of operations, and security measures should be transmitted simultaneously instead of separately. Finally, simplify the procedure of preparing comprehensive reports on our position and that of the enemy. Information collected by various groups organized by the command headquarters should be sorted out and incorporated in a comprehensive report to enable the commander to have an overall picture of the situation at the front so that he can seize the most advantageous moment to issue the required commands. The "four simplifications" helped reduce the amount of time needed to organize a combat operation from 4 hours to 2-1/2 hours, and the results were satisfactory.

In learning to use scientific methods to organize a coordinated combat command for a combined force, the commander must know very well the principles of deploying the various arms of the services, the specific combat requirements, the organization of the troops, and their strength, equipment and the combat capabilities. He must work conscientiously to make

himself an expert with full knowledge of the various arms of the services and to be capable of exercising subjective initiative, using the troops scientifically and imaginatively, and working out new methods to organize a coordinated combat command. A commander who has neither the scientific nor the professional knowledge of the various arms of the services will not be able to avail himself of scientific methods to organize a combat command, no matter how enthusiastic he is.

A wise commander should free himself from the shackles of outmoded theories. He should study new problems, new science, and new knowledge. To learn to use scientific methods to organize a coordinated combat command intelligently, he must not let his command concepts be restricted by existing equipment. He should study modern military science and use modern instruments of command. For instance, an automatic command system which provides efficient, speedy and accurate computing capabilities would increase efficiency and free the command personnel from the pressure of intense planning. Although these command instruments are not yet widely used by our troops, automatic command systems will be used as our national defense becomes modernized. Now we must study all related literature available in China and abroad in order to learn in advance of new command methods and lay a foundation for using the most advanced technical equipment of computerized command. This would enable us to train our personnel before we acquire the new equipment.

Learning to use scientific methods to organize a coordinated combat command for combined forces calls for self-confidence and rejection of the concept of mysticism. Take operational research for example. It is now widely used by the military in most foreign countries. The use of operational research in planning and organizing combat operations is much more advanced than the World War II system of charts and maps which we still use. But our commanders have not shown any noticeable interest in this branch of knowledge. A number of comrades think it is a mystery. As a matter of fact, a crude form of operational research was used by our ancient military strategists. The best example is the method used by Sun Bin to help Tian Ji win a horserace with the Duke of Qi. Sun Bin advised Tian Ji to let his worst horse compete with Duke Qi's best horse in the first race; then let his best horse compete with Duke Qi's mediocre horse in the second race; and finally use his mediocre horse to compete with Duke Qi's worst horse in the third race. As a result, Tian Ji's horses won two races out of three. That took place 2000 years ago. Now, shouldn't the commanders of our proletarian forces in the 1970's use operational research, practically a popular science, to organize coordinated combat command? It must be pointed out that scientific methods and technology do not recognize class distinctions. Anybody can study and use them. To improve the technique of coordinated combat command, we must acquire the habit of incorporating science in our day-to-day training and applying science to whatever we do, so as to make ourselves qualified commanders of combined forces.

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PROPER ALLOTMENT OF TRAINING TIME PRODUCES GOOD RESULTS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 16 Sep 79 p 1

[Article by Li Zhixi [2621 0037 3556], Tang Yongsheng [0781 3057 3932], Shi Faxian [4258 3127 6343] and Li Ping [2621 6097]: "Use Practice-First View-point To Solve Training Problems"]

[Text] Excellent training is achieved by the proper allocation of training time. This is what a certain division of the armed forces in Shenyang has done in integrating practice with the criteria based on truth.

In the past, training time was rarely allocated to conform to an overall program. Consequently, focal points of training did not receive enough attention. After training began this year, training time has been reallocated to certain courses as suggested by various groups. But cadres and privates at company level have still found the adjustment unsatisfactory. They say there is not enough time for training in three-offensive and three-defensive operations but too much time for grenade throwing and bayonet fighting. After careful deliberation, they have decided on three basic rules: first, major emphasis in new training programs should switch from anti-infantry to antitank operations. Second, instructions most urgently required in modern warfare should be stressed and given more time in the program. Drills in less urgent items should be cut back. Third, the amount of time for less vital instructions should be reduced, and the time thus saved should be allocated to most urgent items, but the allocation of training time should be based on practice. As a result, the time for grenade throwing and bayonet fighting has been cut 50 percent, and the time thus saved is allocated to three-offensive and three-defensive training. The time for training in antitank rocket launchers has increased from 144 to 190 hours. The time allotted for training riflemen and machinegunners to operate 40-rocket launchers against tanks has increased from 27 to 74 hours. The various regiments and companies have also readjusted their training programs and training time according to the levels of their training and the weapons they use in training.

Concentration of training time and proper emphasis on focal points of training have yielded remarkable results. Accuracy in hitting targets

with 40-rocket launchers this year is 50 percent greater than last year. The training of riflemen and machinegunners in manning 40-rocket launchers has been generally satisfactory. Even the training in less urgent items, though allocated much less time, still produces the established level of achievement. Rifle and machinegun practice ranks first in the entire division. There has also been an improvement in the accuracy of grenade throwing.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

TEXTBOOK PROCEDURES NOT ALWAYS BEST IN PRACTICE

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 16 Sep 79 p 1

[Te.] A certain artillery regiment of the forces stationed in Lanzhou which tries to acquire "better skills" not found in textbooks has succeeded in improving the use of 85-mm cannon against tanks. The improved method applied in training this year has produced excellent results. Of all 18 squads engaged in training to hit tanks in motion, 14 hit the targets with the first round, 9 hit the targets with every round, all the squads earned a passing grade, and 88.9 percent of them earned outstanding grades.

To use 85-mm cannon to hit tanks in motion, according to the textbook instructions on artillery, the gunner must complete five different steps in 30 seconds: measure the distance, position the cannon, load, aim and fire. The positioning of the cannon is especially complicated. The gunner has to remember the parameters to figure out the number of seconds required, and to do so proficiently a gunner usually has to remember scores of parameters. At the time of firing, he must come up with the exact figures after measuring the distance. However, as the time a shell takes to travel the measured distance varies, the figures not only are too complicated to memorize but also are conducive to delays and error. Failure to solve this problem very often interferes with firing practice during training. So when the training began this year, the regiment commander, Jiang Defu, proposed simplifying the procedure in order to increase the speed of firing. The suggested solution was not widely accepted at first, because people believe it is practically impossible to achieve any "better skills" not given in textbooks, which after all are based on practice. To overcome the apathy to reach a consensus, regiment commander Jiang organized a study group consisting of cadres and privates of the cannon regiment to study writings on the relationship between thought liberation and criteria of truth in order to find an answer to this question: "Could the rules laid down in textbooks be modified?" Their conclusion is that a textbook represents only a certain practice in a given place at a particular time. These limitations make a textbook much less than the acme of perfection. Objective facts keep

changing all the time. Textbook rules which were correct in past practice have to be improved to keep pace with changing conditions. Complexity must be simplified; imperfections must be improved; mistakes must be rectified without fear. After repeated exploration, they finally found a simpler way to figure the parameters and exact timing without having to memorize the travel time of cannon shells over divergent distances. This saves time, speeds up firing, avoids mistakes and improves the accuracy of firing. In addition, they have discovered better ways to trace the range of tanks moving in different positions at different angles, and the methods of emergency and ultra-direct distance firing at tanks.

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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

THREE METHODS FOR DRAWING UP COORDINATED PLANS EXPLAINED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 16 Sep 79 p 3

[Prepared by the Operational Training Division, Beijing Garrison Command]

[Text] Charts and maps are the principal forms used at headquarters to draw up coordinated plans. Some units even use the network method. The following is a simple explanation of these three methods.

Charts. Charts with written notations are used to indicate the combat and coordination activities planned for the arms of the services participating in a war. The advantages of charts are clarity and precision. Even though written explanations and notations should be short, the charts must be comprehensive with emphasis on focal points, especially the "three-offensives" and "three-defensives."

Maps. Use prescribed symbols to mark on a map the combat and coordination tasks assigned to the various arms of the services. Use written explanations where symbols are inadequate, but use symbols as much as possible. Written explanations must be concise and short. Crucial points, such as the objectives of a campaign, should not be marked in symbols on maps. They must be in writing to draw attention.

Networks. The network method is a part of operational research. It uses lines, numbers and concise written explanations to illustrate combat planning. The main theme is to employ a network of lines to indicate all necessary activities according to established priorities, so that the overall progress can be controlled. The system has the advantage of representing precisely the relationship of all categories of work at every stage and the process of work projection and analysis. It provides effective leadership for speedy execution of tasks and helps the commander to differentiate various priorities and concentrate on focal problems and the handling of difficult tasks. It facilitates better organization of combat command, saves time, and cuts down on waste. Moreover, it does not require knowledge of advanced mathematics to operate, because its structure is simple and easy to use.

MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY

GUANGZHOU UNIT ENCOURAGES TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 16 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Li Wen Liu (2621 2429 6340) and Fan Guoping (2868 0948 1627):
"Armory of Certain Army Unit Achieve Better Than 80 Percent Mechanization"]

[Text] The armory of a certain army unit at Guangzhou has launched a drive to use its existing facilities to bring about technological innovations. It has already succeeded in building 36 mechanized items, including an electrical hydraulic artillery mover, a rotary stacker and a trimotor stacker. Three of these items will be introduced into the entire army, while 12 are to be put to use within the Guangzhou area. Over 80 percent of the armory will be mechanized.

The armory has organized an innovation team led by a section chief but participated in by custodians and privates. It serves as a vehicle to encourage everyone to read relevant technical books and to dispatch team members to study in other units in order to raise their professional level. During the drive for technological innovations, they try to make full use of existing facilities and supplies to overcome shortages. For instance, once they needed an oil barrel for a stacker they had designed. Since the armory does not have the facilities or capability to process a new barrel, they simply welded together two mortar shell casings and finished it on a lathe they have. After repeated testing, it proved successful.

The innovation team acts resolutely to modify and improve machinery which no longer meets actual requirements. The party committee of the armory lists the operation of machinery as an important item of training, in order to make 90-percent-plus cadres and privates of the service company and the armory custodians well acquainted with the operations.

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MECHANIZATION OF WORK AT OIL DEPOTS STUDIED

Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 16 Sep 79 p 2

[Article by Zhang Hongsheng [1728 1347 3932]]

[Text] The Oil Supply Division of the General Logistics Department recently held a conference at the oil depot of a certain army unit in Beijing to discuss the problem of mechanizing the loading, unloading and stacking of oil supplies for the entire armed forces.

To load, unload and stack oil drums and other supplies manually, as have been done for many years, is no longer adequate to meet the requirement of preparedness for war. The head of the General Logistics Department called upon all concerned to find a solution to this problem, and the sooner the better. In response to the call, the Department's Oil Supply Division convened this conference on mechanizing the loading, unloading and stacking of oil supplies at all oil depots throughout the entire armed forces. The delegates saw demonstrations of forklift trucks loading and unloading heavy drums, the operation of vacuum suction vehicles, empty drum stackers and mobile gantry cranes. They also appraised and approved the CH-1 half-ton drum pincer truck manufactured by a certain army oil depot at Shenyang with the assistance of the Shenyang Automation Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. This vehicle loads and unloads supplies, pulls a train of flatbed cars, and does short-haul transport inside the depot. At the conference there were suggestions for further improvement.

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